13th _BRAGA
_MEETINGS ON
_ETHICS AND
_POLITICAL
_PHILOSOPHY

_BOOK of ABSTRACTS

JUNE 15_

8:30 / 9:30	**REGISTRATION + OPENING SESSION**
9:30 / 10:45	Plenary Lecture **Helene Frowe**

10:45 / 11:00	COFFEE BREAK

11:00 / 12:30	Panel 2.1 CP1_1.05	Panel 4.1 CP2_2.03	Panel 5.1 CP2_1.10	Panel 7.1 CP2_0.15	Panel 8.1 CP1_1.43	Panel 9.1 CP2_1.11	Panel 11.1 CP2_0.13	Panel 19.1 CP2_ 1.09

12:30 / 14:15	LUNCH

14:15 / 15:45	Panel 2.2 CP1_1.05	Panel 3.1 CP2_2.07	Panel 4.2 CP2_2.12	Panel 5.2 CP1_1.40	Panel 7.2 CP2_0.16	Panel 8.2 CP1_2.09	Panel 9.2 CP1_2.24	Panel 11.2 CP2_0.14

15:45 / 16:00	COFFEE BREAK

16:00 / 17:30	Panel 2.3 CP1_1.05	Panel 3.2 CP2_2.07	Panel 4.3 CP2_2.12	Panel 7.3 CP2_0.16	Panel 8.3 CP1_2.09	Panel 9.3 CP1_2.24	Panel 11.3 CP2_0.14	Panel 14.1 CP1_1.40	Panel 15 CP1_0.17

17:30 / 17:45	COFFEE BREAK
17:45 / 19:00	Plenary Lecture **Mathias Thaler**

JUNE 16_

9:30 / 10:45	Plenary Lecture **Daniele Archibugi**

10:45 / 11:00 COFFEE BREAK

11:00 / 12:30	Panel 3.3 CP2_0.17	Panel 7.4 CP2_1.12	Panel 9.4 CP2_2.03	Panel 11.4 CP2_0.14	Panel 13.1 CP2_2.02	Panel 14.2 CEPS Room	Panel 17.1 CP2_2.01	Panel 18 CP1_1.25

12:30 / 14:15 LUNCH

14:15 / 15:45	Panel 3.4 CP2_0.17	Panel 7.5 CP2_1.09	Panel 11.5 CP2_0.14	Panel 12 CP1_1.43	Panel 13.2 CP2_2.07	Panel 14.3 CP2_1.15	Panel 16 CP1_2.17	Panel 17.2 CP1_2.21

15:45 / 16:00 COFFEE BREAK

16:00 / 17:30	Panel 1 CP2_1.15	Panel 3.5 CP2_0.17	Panel 6 CP1_2.17	Panel 7.6 CP2_1.09	Panel 10 CP1_2.27	Panel 11.6 CP2_0.14	Panel 20 CP2_2.07	Panel 21 CEPS Room

17:30 / 17:45 COFFEE BREAK

17:45 / 19:15	Plenary Lecture **João Rosas + Nadia Urbinati +** **Richard Bellamy + Silje Langvatn + Stuart White**

PANEL 1_COLLECTIVE TRAUMA

CONVENOR: BERNHARD SYLLA

The number of studies on the trauma phenomenon has been increasing significantly over the last three decades. One of the direct consequences of this trend is the now remarkable transdisciplinary relevance of the trauma phenomenon. Besides psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, medicine, analyses in the field of sociology, history, literature studies, cultural studies and philosophy have become very numerous. As far as philosophy is concerned, the phenomenon of trauma can be considered from numerous points of view, such as the ethical, political, ontological or anthropological.

Due to the extraordinary wide range of the trauma topic, the focus of this panel will be on the following questions / problems:

- Is the term collective trauma justified?
- Are terms with collective connotations such as cultural trauma, symbolic trauma, chosen trauma, etc. justified?
- Current debates on specific collective traumas, such as Holocaust trauma, trauma due to ethnic persecution, terrorist attacks, trauma due to social discrimination (gender, race, religion), refugee trauma, etc.
- Differences between collective and individual trauma
- Is it justified to speak of humanity traumas?
- Are there prospective traumas (e.g., due to impending ecological catastrophes)?
- Aspects of the political treatment of trauma victims (social recognition, compensation policies, etc.)
- Collective scapegoating, spirals of violence (e.g., the Freudian thesis, that identification with collectively experienced traumas can lead to new violence)
- Governments and genocide (Are genocides state-induced? Are states / governments responsible for genocides?)
- Other topics

Collective Trauma and Humanity Trauma: An outline of possible research strands

Bernhard Sylla_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT Especially since the 1990s, the concept of trauma has gained great influence beyond the psy-sciences and has become a research-structuring term in such diverse sciences as literary studies, cultural studies, political philosophy, history or social sciences. For some time now, the term philosophy of trauma has also become familiar as a designation of a distinct field of knowledge and research, although philosophers have reflected on the phenomenon of trauma even before the creation of this term.

In my talk, I will address why and in what ways it might make sense to speak of a trauma of humanity. In order to deal with this question in a reasonable way, I believe that a long road has to be taken, along which numerous particular problems arise, all of which must be given special attention to ensure that the investigation does not remain superficial. These problems, which at the same time represent possible focal points of research in the field of the philosophy of trauma, will be presented here in outline form, drawing on fundamental topics such as the differences between collective trauma and humanity trauma, the question of collective violence, and the difference between structural and historical trauma.

KEYWORDS Philosophy of trauma, collective trauma, humanity trauma, collective violence, structural trauma, historical trauma

Children After War: from Moral Development Claims to Welfare and Agency Rights

Giorgia Brucato_
_Central European University

ABSTRACT The key question addressed in this paper concern the morally right way of treating children in societies recovering from conflict, given the grave impact of war experiences on their processes of moral development, term meant here both as the development of capacities for personal autonomy and for moral powers in their Rawlsian understanding, that is capacities to form, revise, and purse a sense of justice and a conception of the good. After considering how contexts of war impact children's lives in different ways – mostly, but not uniquely, traumatically – I argue that such contexts provide opportunities to either advance or set back their moral development, and that one way to respond to such development is through the granting of adequate welfare and agency rights. Besides an interest in satisfying their basic needs and protection, children generally have an interest in developing their moral powers and grow into autonomous agents. Children who experienced war thus have a claim to compensation for the frustration of their morally relevant interests in developing in normal, non-harmful ways. In my analysis, I maintain both the idea that children are entitled to protection from their vulnerabilities to experience harm and compensation when that protection fails, but also that children should be granted recognition and respect for the capacities and interests they gradually mature, which entails providing adequate opportunities to exercise such capacities. Evidence from empirics shows great variation in children's responses to traumatic circumstances and war-related harms, from severe psychological disorders, to enhanced resiliency and cognitive and moral capacities. As moral powers and autonomy ground the permissibility of paternalistic treatment and the exercise of certain rights, I thus argue that children are entitled to an adequate assessment of how their interests and capacities have changed through exposure to war. In particular, for children whose moral development was set back, states should grant opportunities for recovery and promote further development, which suggests strengthening welfare and protection rights; while for children

whose moral development was advanced, states should recognize such advancement and grant opportunities for the exercise of their newfound capacities, which suggests granting certain agency rights alongside welfare and protection. I thus discuss the translation of children's claims of moral development (and compensation for its adequate coming about) into the language of rights and justice mechanisms available to societies transitioning to peace in the aftermath of war, discussing the potential tension between welfare and agency interests, such as in the case of children in need of medical treatment or children preferring to work rather than resuming their education. I conclude the paper by discussing some worries to my proposal.

PANEL 2_RECOGNIZING CARE WORK: AT THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN LOVE AND OBLIGATION

CONVENOR: CATARINA NEVES

While fundamental to our existence, and the foundation of every economic system, care work /or reproductive work, care work has often been overlooked in debates of political philosophy. Such a dismissal might not come as surprising: the tradition of political philosophy is intertwined with liberal thinking, where ideas of the self-sustaining individual are upheld, and a stark division between private and public domains is drawn in theoretical discussions, and proposals for public policies. The latter point contributes to amplify this dismissal, by highlighting a certain murkiness around care work. In the boundary between private and public, care work is associated with values of love, esteem, compassion, kindness, which serve to argue that discussing money will be corrupting such values or lead to misunderstandings about what is implied in care work. While feminist thinkers have worked to reaffirm the role of care work, albeit in different ways (Julie Nelson, Nancy Folbre, Arlie Hoschschild, Deborah Stone, Mignon Duffy, Anca Gheaus) care work is still often portrayed in an incomplete manner, as mostly a labor of love (with 'other forms of care', such as domestic work, being considered menial and routinely), or dismissed altogether in discussions about work, distribution and justice.

The theoretical dismissal of care work seems to mirror its lack of recognition in society. While almost everyone is said to

perform or benefit from some form of care i.e., domestic, family, health, care work is still undervalued. Care workers often are not receiving any wage or are being paid a meager wage for the work they conduct, while also being subjected to precarious working arrangements. Moreover, the lack of recognition further amplifies existing injustices, given the role that gender and race plays in determining who cares for whom. The last decades have also seen a surge in transnational networks of care workers, with Eastern European women performing the lion share of underpaid care work in western Europe, and the same happening with women from the Philippines and other Asian countries doing the same in United States, alongside African American.

While care workers are still denied recognition, caring necessities seem to be taking central stage in discussions on the welfare state. Ageing populations in most western countries, and the impacts of Covid-19 and lockdowns highlighted the need for care workers – nurses, health aids – but also the strains associated with an uneven and gendered distribution of care. Political philosophy might be well positioned to pose some of these debates, if it acknowledges the historical dismissal of the phenomenon in its debates, and pledges to engage with existing feminist literature on the topic. This call for papers aims to provide an additional contribution to this debate, exploring the phenomenon of care work in all of its dimensions.

Topics might include:

- The gendered and racialized nature of care work.
- The global-local nexus of care, and the legal standing of transnational care workers: what injustices are they suffering? What do we owe such workers?
- Motivations of care work: in between love, kindness, compassion, duty, and obligation?
- The justice in distribution of care work: should care work be incorporated in discussions on distributional justice, and how?
- Should care be a duty or obligation of citizenship?
- What role can philosophy have in contributing to put care at the center of discussions?
- Is there room to discuss care ethics as an alternative to virtue ethics or an ethics of justice?

Reflections on the gendered meanings of emotional intelligence and resilience in care work

Ylva Gustafsson_
_Åbo Akademi University

ABSTRACT In the 1990s many countries, including Finland, were affected by deep economic depression. In connection with this, so called New Public Management theory was implemented in the public health care sector. The main feature of New Public Management (NPM) was that it adopted perspectives from the private business world and implemented these in the public sector. New Public Management is often described as a theory of rationalization of institutions with cut downs on staff, tighter working schedules, and stricter control of the production of service.

However, in this talk I will suggest that NPM did not only lead to a rationalization of public health care but also to a new kind of emotionalization of public health care. The 1990s was a time when so-called Emotional intelligence theory (EI) gained influence as a business leadership theory. Central figures in the research on EI were Daniel Goleman, Peter Salovey and John D. Mayer. A central aspect of the definition of emotional intelligence was an emphasis on emotions as a personal strength connected with personal virtues in combination with health and getting rich.

However, As New Public Management policies came to affect health care in the 2000s, researchers on emotional intelligence shifted their focus from business leadership into the public sector and specifically then into health care. Even though the concept of EI remained the same, the researchers shifted tone in how they described the connection between emotional intelligence and personality. The business vocabulary of 'emotions leading to success and wealth', that had been a central part of the theory of emotional intelligence when it was directed to business leadership, did not fit well with working life at hospitals. Suggesting that nurses will get rich and healthy if they are emotionally intelligent would not make the theory of emotional intelligence convincing in the public health care sector. Now the most important words connected with emotional intelligence were not "wealth" or "success" or "health" but "resilience". To tackle the increasingly stressful working conditions in the public health care sector

it was claimed that nurses should be trained in emotional intelligence to increase their resilience.

In my talk I will suggest that one can see a gendered difference in how emotional intelligence and resilience are described in low-paid female working sectors versus well-paid male working sectors. The shifting meaning of these concepts reflects and upholds a gendered division of working life where women are expected to endure stress in working conditions that do not lead to a career or to a well-paid job, while men working in the business leadership sector are expected to endure stress to achieve both a career and a secure income.

One crisis to solve another?

Anca Gheaus_
_Central European University

ABSTRACT The world of work seems to be facing two crises: The first is that automation, including the widespread use of advanced AI, might eliminate many more jobs that it will create; this is the threat of mass unemployment. The second crisis, one that affects economically developed countries in particular, concerns a shortage of care. Although both (potential) crises are widely discussed, they are rarely discussed together. This is the task of my paper: to probe into the possibility that, instead of compounding their harms, each crisis could hold the key to solving the other.

One obvious worry raised by the prospect of unemployment is large scale poverty; without meaning to downplay it, I assume this worry doesn't raise a philosophically difficult problem. It is easy to explain why the material gains generated by the new wave of automation ought to be distributed in ways that – at the very least – ensure that no one is left materially worse off. Yet, as I argued in the past (in work with Lisa Herzog), money is only one of the goods of work. Other goods, that are highly important to most people's conception of a good life, and that can only be realised, at the moment, within one's working life, include: (i) attaining various types of excellence; (ii) making a social contribution; (iii) experiencing community; and (iv) gaining social recognition (Gheaus and Herzog 2016). Thus, unemployment would involve significant losses above and beyond the material ones. The latter could be easily mitigated – for instance, via a basic income; but the lack of opportunities to realise other goods of work would be much harder to compensate for.

Yet, some of the tasks that are integral to the care-giving professions are immune to the threat of automation: namely, those that require attention, affection, getting to know others, and human companionship. It is certainly possible to imagine robots emulating the behaviours through which people express interest in, warmth for, and understanding towards, one another. But if another person's attention, affection and companionship constitute objective goods, they can only be provided by other human beings. This, I take it, is a plausible premise. Providing goods is integral to much care work, when it is done well: to being a nanny, a caregiver for elderly, sick, disabled (yet sufficiently conscious) or dying individuals, a psychotherapist, an educator of young and old people. These jobs, which cannot be automated without serious loss of value,

are currently badly paid, have unfairly low status and are often done in conditions that are very burdening to the workers – with the possible exception of some psychotherapy. Yet, they are crucial to the wellbeing of all individuals at certain stages of their lives; arguably, the so-called "loneliness pandemic" that besets the developed world (Cacioppo and Patrick 2008) is itself one face of the care crisis. Insofar as the recipients are children, good care generates enormous positive externalities. Personal care can be the type of work that generates most of the goods, the loss of which makes mass unemployment a bleak perspective: it requires excellence, constitutes as much of a social contribution as any kind of work can, and, once these two aspects are acknowledged, it should also be able to attract social recognition.

My paper considers our reasons to reform the conditions of providing personal care in the wake of the next wave of automation, in order to enable the concomitant fulfilment of two important interests: the interest in engaging in good work and the interest in receiving good personal care.

Inheritance and Care: a legitimate claim

Catarina Neves_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT Hendrik Hartog describes a case of a housekeeper that was promised by her employer that she would receive one of his three farms if she would remain working for him. She took care of the old man between 1876-1901, despite earning little. In In the end, however, that promise was not fulfilled, and instead his family was granted the three farms (Hartog, 2012: 102). In another instance, Lourdes Maria Cambra, a domestic worker, who worked for the first woman elected official in Brazil was publicly shamed after claiming that she was promised the possibility to live in her former employer's house (Schpum, 2004). Both examples illustrate claims from paid care workers to receive an inheritance or to be entitled to gifts they might have received from their employers. These are usually women, who are paid very little, and perform challenging emotional and physical work.

Despite what seem instances of gift-giving, or plausible claims for compensation, both judicial courts (Hacker, 2022; Regev-Mesalem, 2020) and public opinion tend to reject paid care workers' rights to inheritance. In what follows, I intend to explore this debate, by first discussing what I believe are the three normative arguments behind those who oppose care workers' right to inheritance: 1) the possibility of corrupted motivations; 2) the idea that family needs to take precedence; and finally that 3) no double compensation should occur. I will proceed to explain each argument and offer objections which I believe strengthen the claim of care-workers to have a right to inheritance.

Parental care as a source of vulnerability

Eva Groen-Reijman_
_Universiteit van Amsterdam

ABSTRACT The parental relationship is often, and rightly, discussed in terms of the needs of vulnerable children and the responsibilities of parents. In this paper, I want to focus on a different key element of parenthood: parental vulnerability. I argue that there is a particular vulnerability that comes with being a parent and that for this reason, society has a particular responsibility of care towards them. Parental vulnerability, as I understand it, stems from the intersection of two key features of parenthood. The first is the special kind of care that parents, generally speaking, have towards their children, where a strong desire for their welfare merges with the deeply felt responsibility to provide for that welfare. The second key feature is their children's vulnerability, who are dependent on others for having their vital needs met, usually their parents. This dependency of children, and thus their vulnerability, is not just an intrinsic part of the parent-child relationship, but it is socially, politically and legally embedded: it is in part by virtue of their legal status and social position that children are so exclusively dependent on their parents. Parental vulnerability, then, is a function of this special kind of care and love combined with the vulnerability of children. This vulnerability applies to parenthood generally, but it becomes exacerbated when coupled with other sources of vulnerability, such as a lack of social support, poverty, (mental) health problems, or discrimination. In such circumstances, the parental need to care can become a source of (even) greater costs, anxiety, stress, guilt and other harms.

From this analysis, the paper argues that society should care for parental care workers, because 1) there is a general societal responsibility to care for its vulnerable members, and 2) society bears some responsibility for parents' vulnerability. Not only does society organize, institutionalize and benefit from children's dependency on their parents, the injustices that exacerbate parental vulnerability are often socially produced. This societal obligation should not treat parental vulnerability as (solely) an instrumental problem – take care of the parents if you want to take care of the children – but as an intrinsic one. My argument is that the fact that becoming parents exacerbates people's threat to being harmed themselves should be taken more seriously,

by protecting parents' ability to care for their children or by alleviating their responsibilities. This argument has implications for the organization of work and childcare, but also for public discourse on care workers. While this paper focuses on parental care, the understanding of vulnerability and its social implications that the paper develops apply to some extent to other caring relationships as well.

KEYOWRDS Care, vulnerability, parent, child, institutions

The relational virtue: Understanding care as a moral excellence

José Manuel Beato_
_Universidade de Coimbra

ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to clarify the theoretical conditions that allow us to conceive and define care as a virtue within the context of the relationships between the ethics of care and virtue ethics. Although some authors, like Virginia Held, assert that the ethics of care has become a moral theory in its own right, consistent in normative and even meta-ethical issues, we defend the idea that it could find a true ally in the renewed virtue ethics.

The extension of natural caring to ethical caring, which encompasses strangers and distant individuals, opens up a unique field of ethical demands and a specific form of moral excellence, namely a virtue. Care, as both a disposition (care for) and a practice (take care of), has a triple cognitive, affective, and volitional dimension that leads to morally relevant actions. This functional structure is recognized in the most common definitions of virtues. We can consider care as a "relational virtue" that challenges the formation of the moral agent as a "relational self". By being intrinsically empathetic and altruistic, care prioritizes the well-being of others, making it a virtue with a unique and valuable role in moral philosophy.

Conceiving and enacting care as a virtue involves a reconfiguration of traditional understandings of virtue theory, and it does not involve subordinating care to traditional moral conceptions. Rather, it allows for the emergence of a new approach to the notions of "moral perfectionism", "eudaimonia" or ethical agency.

By force of the principle of organic unity and reciprocity of virtues within Virtue, to understand care as a virtue also provides an internal and more fundamental articulation for justice and care, below and beyond their usual antinomy. Moreover, including care in the board of virtues is, in fact, a pivotal strategic point to overcome the artificial duality between so called "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" virtues, for caring for oneself is a necessary condition for caring for others, and vice-versa.

This analysis is undertaken through the works of Sandrine Berges, Virginia Held, Nel Noddings, and Joan Tronto, and its dialectical confrontation with those of Michael Slote, Christine Swanton, and Julia Annas, who are well-known contemporary virtue ethicists.

From Romantic Love to Parental Love

Roberto Merrill_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT There are essentially two kinds of definitions of love: the first considers love to be a form of desire, the second considers love to be a form of perception. There is also a third important variant, which consists of a mixture of the first two, and according to which love is to be understood as a form of relationship. I will first examine the main arguments for and against each of these three variants. In a second moment I will examine what each of these variants has to tell us about the relationship between love and morality, and argue that the definition of love as perception is the only one compatible with a consequent conception of morality. I will then propose some reflections on love and equality of opportunity. I will end with and apology of parental love as trumping romantic love.

The democratic roots of the self: maternal care, safe attachment, and identity

Laura Adrián Lara_
_Universidad Complutense de Madrid

ABSTRACT In *The Human Condition* (1958), Hannah Arendt states that the incorporation of the citizen into the public space, where he will show himself to others through his actions and words, is like a "second birth", in which the individual could show who she/he is. That second birth, however, has been preceded by a first biological birth, in which the infant citizen has been and existed thanks to the arms that supported him (Winnicott). From the first moments marked by an omnipotent relationship of fusion between the baby and the mother (psychic monad) (Castoriadis, Dorado Romero) until the gradual separation of the infant in relation to its caregivers, the maternal work of care is shown as a basic element in the formation of the citizen's self. And yet, a work that is darkened and discredited for not adapting to the severe criteria of identity logic that is imposed in our adult and public relations. In our paper, we will inquire into the political matrix of the maternal care relationship with which all our biographies begin. It will be considered how the creation of a secure attachment relationship can acquire democratic significance, both for the child citizen and for the adult citizen who deals with this care work.

KEYWORDS Identity, secure attachment, omnipotence, maternal care, natality.

Adequate Opportunity to Receive Fitting Appraisal Respect

Sanat Sogani_
_Central European University

ABSTRACT I argue that the division of labour in a society should be such that people have an adequate opportunity to receive fitting appraisal respect. Using a framework proposed by Stephen Darwall (1977), I distinguish between two kinds of respect – recognition respect and appraisal respect. Giving recognition respect to a person amounts to giving due consideration to their moral agency. Appraisal respect constitutes respect for excellence as a person or as engaged in some specific pursuit. I argue that, like recognition respect, appraisal respect is also a consideration of justice, one that is particularly relevant to debates about workplace justice. To sustain our self-esteem, it is crucial that we are respected for our worth as human beings (recognition respect) as well as appreciated for our particular actions and capacities (appraisal respect). While Rawls is not explicit on this point, in *A Theory of Justice*, he seems to endorse the view that the primary good "social bases of self-respect" includes considerations of appraisal self-respect.

Current working time arrangements severely limit individuals' ability to get appraisal respect outside of their jobs. Moreover, some jobs do not give enough opportunities for the individual to act in appraisal respect worthy ways at work. Thus, I argue that as a matter of justice, either working times should be adjusted and/or jobs should be restructured wherever necessary to give individuals adequate opportunities to act in appraisal respect worthy ways. This has direct implications for debates about gendered division of labor. In the Long-Term Care sector, for instance, there has been a deskilling of care work and the shifting of power from frontline care workers (who tend to be overwhelmingly women) to management (with a much higher proportion of men) in many countries. The workers are often left with little autonomy and workloads consisting almost entirely of standardized repetitive technical tasks such as feeding, toileting, dispensing medications and moving residents around the building. More complex/creative tasks such as maintaining an emotional relationship with care recipients are either ignored or delegated to higher levels of the management hier-

archy. Such trends severely constrain the frontline workers' opportunities to receive appraisal respect.

Taking seriously a principle of 'adequate opportunity to receive appraisal respect' can guide policy making in important ways. Operationalizing this principle may require giving more autonomy to the frontline workers, ensuring a rich diversity of tasks within each job profile and achieving a healthy balance between creative and repetitive tasks. In cases of repetitive jobs that may not easily be restructured, working time reduction can help by giving workers more time to engage in activities outside of the workplace wherein they can receive appraisal respect. I believe this paper opens a new direction for policy making, one that is important to ensure jobs such as those in frontline care work are valued and remain attractive career options.

Unequal Compensation for Unequal Climate Change Losses and Damages: Recognizing women's vulnerability and unpaid care work

Josep Recasens_
_University of Pompeu Fabra

ABSTRACT Climate Change is already negatively affecting world's population. The distribution of these effects, however, is not equal. Some communities and individuals are more affected by them. Specifically, women tend to be more vulnerable to Climate Change (IPCC, 2023). This paper is divided in two parts. Section I justifies that women are more vulnerable to Climate Change because they tend to do the unpaid care work. Women are more affected by Climate Change in most of the cases a) either because they do the unpaid care work and this one is more difficult to do under extreme conditions (e.g., they need to walk more hours to get some water). Or b) because doing the unpaid care work left them in a situation of disadvantage to face natural disasters (e.g., have less education or less skills valued in the job-market). Furthermore, compensation for natural disasters is usually given to owners according to the properties that have been lost. However, men own most of the world's property (OWOD, 2023). Therefore, compensations for natural disasters tend to reproduce the gender unequal status quo.

How should compensations for Climate Change recognize care work and the vulnerable position of care workers? The second part of the paper, section II, is normative and argues two things. First, that unpaid care workers should directly receive a compensation for Climate Change disasters. Second, that since unpaid care workers are more vulnerable to Climate Change, they should receive more compensation than non-care workers.

The former is supported by two arguments. On the one side, there is a forward-looking argument. It is argued from a primary goods approach that all citizens should have the amount of goods that allow to be an equal and free citizen (Rawls, 1971). Since most of unpaid care workers may not own any property, receive com-

pensation may be necessary to assure their condition of free citizens. On the other hand, there is a backward-looking one. It argues that compensation is required as a recognition of the unpaid care work that has been given until the moment. This can be considered as an alternative to the idea of a salary for the housework (Federici, 1975), that can avoid some of its problems. Furthermore, certain constitutions recognize the economic importance of unpaid care work (e.g., Ecuador) and direct compensations could be an implementation of it.

The latter is supported with a capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2011). Unpaid care workers are more vulnerable because they did not have access to education, the job market or even property ownership. To allow them to enjoy the same capabilities as non-care workers after a natural disaster, a bigger amount of material resources is needed. Finally, section III considers one objection: that giving more compensation to women may not be enough to improve their unequal situation if social norms do not change. To this, the paper argues that it may not be sufficient, but it is necessary to improve women's condition.

KEYWORDS Compensation, Climate Change, Unpaid Care Work, Women, Capabilities.

PANEL 3_PUBLIC REASON IN A POLARIZED WORLD

CONVENOR: JOANA PINTO and ROBERTO MERRIL

The discussants in this panel will include Silje Langvatn (University of Bergen).

 Normative theories of public reason subscribe to the idea that political and legal impositions in constitutional liberal democracies must be publicly justifiable to be fully legitimate, and they also prescribe some duty or ideal of public reason for at least some political agents in order to meet this such a criterion of public justifiability. For long this approach was exclusively associated with John Rawls and his political liberalism, but different interpretations of Rawls are in play, and a range of non-Rawlsian versions of public reason approaches have also developed. This panel seeks to bring together different perspectives on public reason and public justification with a special focus on how ideas and ideals of public reason hold up under non-ideal circumstances, or in liberal democracies that are less well ordered than those Rawls discussed. What is the role and appropriate version of public reason in a world marked by distrust and polarization where we need to act together to face existential threats to democratic life, such as the climate crisis problem.

 The panel welcomes contributions relating to (but not limited to) the following questions:

- What is the most convincing grounding of the idea of public reason, or the idea that exercise of political power over a range of issues must be publicly justifiable?
- Which type of public reason approach is better suited in a non-well-ordered setting? In a setting where we are facing an existential climate crisis? Does this challenge speak in favor or against the consensus or convergence approach, for example?

- What constraints or orientations should a public reason Ideal impose on the political debate to address the climate crisis, if any?
- Public reason and political parties: Should an ideal of public reason apply to political parties or is it legitimate for parties to serve an aggregative function in liberal democracies? Can and should ideals of public reason reduce political polarization?
- Critical objections to public reason.

Public Reason and Partial Compliance: Rethinking Political Justification

David McCabe_
_Colgate University

ABSTRACT This paper addresses a question about public reason that is undertheorized: what is the relation between the conception of public reason elaborated in the work of so-called political liberals (i.e., the later Rawls and those who follow him) and the public debate, deliberation, and reason-giving that actually goes on in existing liberal democracies? Some might deny that the latter are genuine cases of public reason (perhaps because they fall afoul of canons advanced by political liberals) and so conclude that there's no reason to think public reason as political liberals understand it bears any relation to actual political practice. But that insistence is too costly if we hold that any satisfactory approach to political theory must meet the criteria not only of soundness (i.e., must be theoretically and normatively compelling) but also relevance (i.e., must have some genuine chance of helping citizens respond thoughtfully to political disagreement). Though theorists of public reason tend to focus their energies chiefly on soundness, the increased prominence of both non-ideal theory and political realism reflects a growing frustration with political theory that is disengaged from real politics and offers little hope of illuminating our political situation.

I suggest that the distinction between these two ways of understanding public reason – one which stresses various normative commitments said to be derivable from the very idea of liberal democracy, the other which attends to how citizens of liberal democracies in fact reason their way to positions on important political matters – points to a serious tension within a strain of liberal thought that I call progressive liberalism. Progressive liberalism is committed to two ideas. The first is a methodological claim, stressing that fundamental political principles should be endorsable by the citizens they govern. The second is a substantive commitment to distinctively liberal positions (e.g., a strongly redistributive state, greater inclusiveness for those historically marginalized, a sharp distinction between political authority and religious claims, and so on).

The state of many existing liberal democracies show the difficulty in harmonizing these two claims, as the political principles endorsed by progressive liberals meet

continued resistance from numerous citizens whose exercises of public reason lead them in profoundly different directions. One strategy for resolving this tension is to endorse a conception of public reason which focuses on what I called the soundness criterion and so remains broadly indifferent to the way citizens actually think and reason about important political matters. That approach, however, seems not only hard to square with the commitment to public justification that so many liberals stress, but also bound to inflame the charge of irrelevance. An account of public reason that has any chance of remaining relevant to political life must thus be more responsive to the ways citizens actually think through their political challenges. While this approach does not so infallibly connect public reason with the positions progressive liberals endorse, I conclude by showing why this fact need not be a cause for despair to those sympathetic to progressive liberalism's substantive commitments.

Leading the Justification of Justice: Rawls on Moral Leadership and Social Change

Jimmy Lim_
_National University of Singapore

ABSTRACT Rawls's concept of public justification is part of a wider discourse that he refers to as "public reason." The received literature suggests that his account of public reason is vulnerable to two objections. The first objection turns on the assumption that Rawlsian public justification is something that involves the participation of many citizens. On this assumption, Rawls's account of public reason is unrealistic because it ignores the fact that many citizens in a real society may be politically apathetic or lack the time to participate in public justification over laws and policies. The second objection turns on the assumption that the "duty of civility" (the duty to offer public reasons in the justification of law) is something that falls on both government officials and ordinary citizens. On this assumption, Rawls's account of public reason is unrealistic because it ignores the consideration that officials and citizens alike may not observe the duty of civility.

In this paper, I resist the first objection by arguing that Rawlsian public justification involves the empathetic power to place oneself in the shoes of those to whom one disagrees with, in the course of evaluating the normativity of law. Taking my cue from Stephen Darwall, I call this power the power to take up the second-person standpoint in moral reasoning. For Rawls, what makes justification as a mode of reasoning "public" is not a situation where every member of society gathers in some outdoor space to debate with one another (which would make justification an actual, historical, event), but the presence of an implied addressee (which makes justification a normative, second-personal, concept). In Rawlsian thought, citizens may pursue public justification collectively, in a raucous townhall, or privately, without ever participating in face-to-face debates.

I also resist the second objection by arguing that, in the context of a real society, the duty of civility falls more heavily on the shoulders of politically active citizens than on ordinary citizens. Inspired by Martin Luther King, Jr., Rawls himself sees

politically active citizens as playing an important role in honoring the duty of civility and mobilizing ordinary citizens to take up the second-person standpoint in public justification.

My paper sheds light on the realistic dimension of Rawls's political philosophy, and provides resources for us to understand the place of reactive attitudes in public reasoning under non-ideal circumstances. As Rawls sees it, the chief cause of injustice is not disagreement but avarice. Rawls himself intimates this idea in A Theory of Justice where he contrasts an effective sense of justice with pleonexia, or a desire for more than one's fair share. In Political Liberalism, he uses this distinction to frame the difference between the psychology of modus vivendi and that of an overlapping consensus. In my paper, I draw on Rawls's work to explain how empathy and second-personal reactive attitudes such as indignation, guilt and so forth are 1) constitutive of public reasoning 2) vital in tempering the problem of avarice and 3) central in activist-led social change.

KEYWORDS Rawls, second-personal justification, pleonexia, reactive attitudes, moral leadership

Reasonableness, reason-giving, and respect: a normative problem with Rawls' conception of public reasons

Diogo Carneiro_
_Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT For Rawls, the justification of political decisions requires agreements based on a shared set of reasons: those reasons called public reasons as defined by reasonableness. That is, the reasons admissible for public justification are those that are given with the belief that others could accept them, according to a common standpoint shared by all. These reasons do not necessarily correspond to those that persons sufficiently, or conclusively, have; they correspond to the reasons that can be given. Fundamentally, this is grounded on the argument that we have to treat others with respect as free and equal citizens, in that we recognise we owe justifications to other citizens for the rules and policies that may be imposed on them. In short, reasonableness defines that public reasons are those that can be given to others, not the reasons one can be said to have.

I argue that this focus on reason-giving and reasonableness creates a normativity problem: it shifts the source of normativity of reasons from an agent to all other agents.

Specifically, I will start by analysing Rawls' move from attributing normative relevance to reasons one has to attributing normative relevance to the reasons that there are. For Rawls, we start from the fact of plurality of views, where an agent's reasons are taken to be normatively relevant. However, because of this plurality, disagreement arises. To solve the disagreement problem, Rawls proposes that we should ignore our practical reasoning stances and comprehensive doctrines, and, instead, adhere to other ones imposed by what others collectively consider being acceptable.

I will then argue that this move of abstracting from the reasons one has leads us to demonstrate the opposite of respect for others. As I will propose, this is a normativity problem: we cannot treat others with respect by rejecting those reasons that one takes to be justificatory before a process of public justification. That is, by focusing on reasonableness and reason-giving, Rawls' view implies that the reasons one has

are, in fact, normatively irrelevant – or, that reasonableness is a normatively more relevant standard. This happens because other persons' acceptance of one's reasons becomes the standard that determines which reasons one can give (which are not necessarily the same set as the reasons one has).

I will conclude that reasonableness should not be the criterion defining which reasons are acceptable for public justification if we are to actually treat others with respect.

Global Public Reason: Too Thick or Too Thin

Maximillian Afnan_
_London School of Economics

ABSTRACT Most significant policy issues facing humanity reach across national borders. Consequential political decisions with cross-national effects are frequently made by states, non-state organisations, and corporations. Under these circumstances, it is widely acknowledged that it is important to conduct deliberation at the global level. Below this shallow agreement, however, lies deep disagreement about a crucial question: how, if at all, is it morally permissible for deliberation to result in a set of international laws and rules that are imposed on a world population which is deeply pluralistic in its moral and political attitudes?

When the equivalent question is asked within the confines of a political community, one prominent answer is by reference to a standard of public reason. While there is a large literature about public reason at the domestic level, the literature on global public reason is comparatively underdeveloped. The paper addresses this lacuna in two ways. First, it motivates the global public reason project, and conceptualises the nature of the challenge that accounts of global public reason face. On the one hand, they seek to be expansive and rich enough to allow for the generation of globally applicable solutions to shared problems (desideratum 1). On the other hand, they seek to avoid imposing on diverse individuals and peoples policies which they could reasonably reject (desideratum 2). Second, it demonstrates that, by their own evaluative standards, existing accounts of global public reason are unable to satisfy both demands simultaneously, being either too 'thick' or too 'thin'.

I begin by reconstructing a cosmopolitan account of global public reason, defended by among others Blain Neufeld, which holds that we should deploy domestic public reason liberalism in the same form at the global level. I then argue that, even if political liberalism can be justified in this form at the domestic level, such an account of global public reason defines the justificatory constituency in a way that is sectarian. I do this by demonstrating that, against the view of Jonathan Quong, both 'external' and 'internal' conceptions of public reason liberalism implicitly rely on appeal to a liberal political culture, which is unavailable at the global level.

Liberal nationalist public reason, as exemplified by Rawls' *The Law of Peoples*, attempts to circumvent the problem of parochialism by positing a much thinner set of liberal principles to form the basis of global public reason. I argue, however, that Rawls is only able to purchase this defence against the parochialism objection at the cost of either incompleteness or implausibility in reflective equilibrium. Using climate change as an example, I argue that the principles of the 'law of peoples' do not contain the conceptual resources necessary to ground a global, coercively-backed framework regulating carbon emissions. I then consider the objection that this makes the 'law of peoples' not incomplete but merely deferential to the autonomy of individual peoples, responding that this move makes the theory implausible in reflective equilibrium. Either way, the theory does not satisfy desideratum 1.

Social Discounting and the Tragedy of the Horizon: The Stern-Nordhaus Philosophical Debate on Time Preference and the Cost of Carbon

Ramiro de Ávila Peres_
_Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT Recently, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Vanuatu Initiative so as to request the International Court of Justice to issue an opinion on the responsibilities of greenhouse gas-emitting nations in relation to climate damage – including what will be suffered by future generations. One of the methodologies that economists use to estimate them is the "social cost of carbon" (SCC) – used to price or tax emissions, internalizing their externalities. One of the main sources of disagreement in SCC estimates – which has ranged from $1 to $2000 – is the so-called "pure time preference," the "delta parameter" of an exponential discount function, which reflects how much one favors present over future well-being. This point is relevant for impact assessments and cost-benefit analyses of projects and policies with long-term effects, as well as discussions on ethics and intergenerational justice.

On the one hand, those who advocate the descriptive approach, associated with William Nordhaus, propose to aggregate the time preferences empirically observed among individuals, which would result in a drastic limitation of the value attributed to the distant future. For instance, at a discount rate of 7% per year (used by the Trump Administration – which led to a social cost of carbon of only $8), a project with a return of $1,000 over 50 years would today have a present value equivalent to only $34 (a total discount of 96.6%). On the other hand, the normative approach, associated with Nicholas Stern, proposes to treat everyone impartially, in any period of time, and implies transferring many more resources to the next generations; at the limit, assuming exponential population growth, it can lead to the "longtermism" thesis (defended by William MacAskill in the recent book "What we owe the future").

Both approaches present challenges for conceptions of public reason: in the former, the discount rate results from aggregating individual preferences observed in markets (under the influence of self-interest and cognitive biases), rather than from

public political deliberation; in the latter, it results from a moral decision to treat as equals individuals who do not belong to the political community (for climate damage will occur in different countries, in different generations). Rawls proposed the principle of just savings precisely because public reason, without further principles, would face problems to extrapolate to intergenerational justice; however, it is doubtful, to say the least, that such a principle applies adequately to scenarios with population variance and global catastrophic risks. Finally, we present how the approach (currently advocated by Stern) of target-consistent pricing, which aims to define carbon prices consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement – thus emphasizing the role of political and international agreements – deviates from these problems, albeit without solving them.

The political struggle against climate change: towards a power-based account of public reason

Clotilde Nouët_
_University Mohammed VI Polytechnique

ABSTRACT Such as it is defined in *Political Liberalism*, Rawls' ideal of public reason allows him to shape a space of discourse and deliberation which is properly "political", i.e, in which reasonings about public good can take place. Reason is the name of a faculty or power which both helps us determine our ends (our plans, our priorities) and put these ends in relation with means allowing their accomplishment (making decisions). And it is said "public" in the sense that it involves the "polity", the collective body of citizens who exercise political power by enacting and amending the constitution, on questions of fundamental justice. This device of a public reason can hence be very helpful to think ways in which citizens who do not necessarily share substantial conceptions of what a good life is, are able to build common grounds on which political decisions can be made. The context of the climate change crisis gives a new dimension to this ideal, since it reiterates, but under urgent circumstances, the need for a collective shaping of legislation and public policies: facing an existential threat, the body politic has to meet in the next decades an agreement on a certain number of radical decisions which will probably deeply affect its forms of life.

I will therefore defend the actual value of this concept of a "public reason", but under two specific conditions which imply that we take some distance with its narrow Rawlsian account.

1-   First, we need to put at a distance the exclusive grounding of "public reason" in a theory of democratic justification. When Rawls argues on the limits of public reason, he tries to show how the publicity principle guarantees the legitimacy of deliberations and decisions taken by the body politic. Yet, as I will show, this framework prevents us to take seriously the power dimension of public reason: the fact that citizens can appeal to public reason and a public sense of justice or public good opens up a great deal of possibilities in terms of collective action. I will thus suggest, with the help of an Arendtian concept of "power", the necessity to turn from a justification-based to a

power-based account of public reason. This move is all the more important to make, as the political fight against climate change involves not only the enactment of reasonable and legitimate conventions, but the ability to lead power struggles, generally against powerful economic and industrial actors.

2- Second, and accordingly, we need to extend the scope which Rawls lends to the exercise of public reason, by broadening the contours of what he identifies as a public forum. I will here argue that not only should we take into account the deliberative reason at work in Supreme courts, or in advisory assemblies (e.g. the Citizens Convention for Climate in France), but also two types of actions which have made their mark on the political scene and which imply a constituent appeal to public reason: civil disobedience by climate change activists, and the litigation route (e.g. The People v. Shell) taken by environmental associations.

Certainty in an Uncertain World: The Philosophical Contradictions of Public Opinion

Eric-John Russell_
_Institut für Philosophie, Universität Potsdam

ABSTRACT Amid the popularization of conspiracy theories around Covid-19, terms such as 'fake news' and 'post-truth' circulate freely within the popular lexicon. Here we find an environment where objective facts have "become less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" (OED). In these circumstances, which seem to be overwhelmed with opinions and falsehoods without any priority for the emergence of truth through deliberation, it is vital that scholars seek to understand the socio-epistemological elements of the institution of public opinion and its relationship to the public reason. My paper will show that we have to return to the institution of public opinion as found in the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel and the social theory Theodor W. Adorno to better understand current challenges to public reason.

For Hegel, the sphere of public opinion assumes that publicly confronting viewpoints and letting falsehoods "devour each other", as Hegel puts it, will let truth ultimately emerge while educating participants in the process. Here, if the institution of public opinion works in the way intended, the institution of public opinion would suspend dominating external authorities, expand the freedom of subjective expression and yield a deeper form of shared legitimacy and truth. In its current state, however, it fails in all three regards: it does not allow for a truly subjective expression but merely for the display of avatars of individuality saturated with self-certainty; it does not manage to let truth emerge from falsehood but remains stuck in the realm of mere opinion; and it does not manage to actually bracket external authorities. Rather, following the critical theory of Adorno, it stands under the implicit power structures of contemporary digital platforms of communication, which tend to privilege certain opinions over others.

Hegel's concept of public opinion will be brought into discussion with Adorno's various writings on public opinion as a development of public reason. It will be asked whether the meaning of public opinion — which presumes the existence of a public

capable of engaging in deliberation guided by well-informed citizens clear about their own interests – has undermined its own principles. Such an approach to concept of public opinion helps us understand that current developments around 'disinformation' and falsehood are not accidental, but rooted in essential tensions within the very institution of public reason. By formulating a critical theory of opinion, I will provide vital new insight into how and why this distinctive epistemological structure of thought we call 'opinion' has become ever more pervasive in our 'post-truth' society.

KEYWORDS public opinion, public reason, public sphere, Hegel, Adorno

Uncivil speech in the social media. Political liberalism and the virtue of public reason.

Ludvig Beckman_
_Stockholm University and the Institute for Futures
   Studies, Stockholm

ABSTRACT In response to the destructive effect on public discourse by the social media, some online giants have begun to supervise and regulate uncivil speech. Uncivil speech is rude and offensive language and is distinct from, though potentially overlapping with, hate speech. These regulatory efforts are controversial and identifies a dilemma as a democratic society depends both on freedom of speech and the value of a reasoned public sphere.

   This paper distinguishes between the rights, duties and value of uncivil speech in the social media on the basis of political liberalism; arguably the most influential account of the "moral basis for a democratic society" (Cohen 2003, 86) while also a "highly protective doctrine of political speech" (Nussbaum 2011; Bonotti 2015). At the same time, political liberalism recognizes that citizens have a duty of civility and that public reason is a basic precondition for the legitimacy of the state.

   The thesis is that the citizen is legally entitled to uncivil speech, albeit not against social media platforms; the citizen has a moral duty not to engage in uncivil speech, albeit not in the public sphere; that civil speech is a value because public reason is a virtue among free and equal citizens. The virtue of public reason cannot be legitimately enforced by the state. In fact, the citizen does not even have a moral duty to abide by the virtues of public reason in the public sphere.

   The overall argument is that the regulation of uncivil speech by social media platforms should be welcomed. At issue are the virtues of public reason citizenship on which a democratic society depend and in which uncivil speech has no place. The upshot is that a democratic society can only hope for citizens and social media platforms to accept the value of public reason in the political discourses of the public sphere.

KEYWORDS Uncivil speech; social media; political liberalism; freedom of speech; public reason

Public Reason Without a Public: The Legitimacy of Private Reason in Walter Lippmann's The Phantom Public

Lucas Dijker_
_University College Dublin

ABSTRACT The complexity of innovations, such as for instance blockchain and artificial intelligence, results in a discrepancy between such technologies and political transparency. If policy outcomes should not only be effective and just but also epistemically responsible, how can citizens be expected to reasonably endorse policies they know nothing about?

This paper answers this question by examining the (infamous) work of American intellectual Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). In his lesser-known publication *The Phantom Public* (1925), Lippmann argues that democrats have created a common will to allow public government to function within deeply pluralistic societies. Yet, for Lippmann, this deep pluralism shows how knowledge, both moral and scientific, is localised and, consequently, that there is not a unified common will. Hence, some are better positioned to judge an affair than others. As a result, the public is to be understood as a spectator outside of social action. Only those "responsibly concerned as agents in the affair" ('insiders') are able to carry "on the work of the world, of inventing, creating, executing, of attempting justice, formulating laws and moral codes, of dealing with the technic and the substance" (Lippmann, 1925: 63).

Unlike, Rawlsian public reason, which is agnostic towards truth claims – which has been followed suit by the deliberative democracy literature – Lippmann's approach avoids this 'epistemic abstinence' to a degree and offers a procedural approach to making political decisions just, effective and epistemically responsible to the public. He proposes four tests that the public can employ to assess whether the process of opinion among insiders has come about legitimately. Fundamentally, these tests imply that the public can reasonably endorse political decisions by placing epistemic trust

in insiders. Additionally, these tests emphasise how Lippmann equates reason with following established and accepted procedures: "For the public, then, any rule is right which is agreeable to all concerned" (Lippmann, 1925: 94).

This paper starts by detailing Lippmann's theory and proposed tests and compares this Lippmannian public reason to Rawls's. An attempt is made to interpret Lippmann's work as touching upon the essential matters with which Rawlsian public reason is concerned. However, secondly, the paper also critically engages with Lippmann's proposal, arguing that his distinction between the public and insiders is difficult to make and leads to an anti-democratic proposal that lacks wider public scrutiny of political decisions. This criticism became the crux of John Dewey's theory of democracy, portraying Lippmann's contrarian in the Lippmann-Dewey debate.

Despite this criticism, Lippmann's work offers insights into our epistemic dependence and trust in others who are better placed to judge political affairs. Moreover, this paper also shows how Lippmann's theory provides a framework and the conditions for making political decisions just, effective, and epistemically responsible to the public, while also raising important questions concerning to whom public reason should be circumscribed and what should be subjected to public reason.

Consensus and rationality in Habermasian theory of international politics

Cristina Foroni Consani_
_Federal University of Paraná

ABSTRACT Habermas is one of the contemporary exponents in the study of cosmopolitanism, and his project continues along the lines of some of Kant's positions. He bases his theory on rationality, communication, and intersubjective agreements, as guided by the search for consensus. This paper investigates the extent to which a cosmopolitan model based on a rationalist foundation and linked to a critical theory of society is capable of dealing with the manifestations of affection and dissent in political deliberations and with the resulting challenges in politics and international law. The guiding hypothesis is that consensus and social rationality are the best foundations for a critical cosmopolitan perspective capable of identifying the emancipatory potential in international politics and with the goal of protecting and promoting human rights, peace and global justice. This is so because a theory based on consensus and social rationality are fully capable of recognizing power relations and can deal with the radicality of conflicts and social irrationality (affections, emotions, personifications) in the scope of application by seeking to direct them through institutional mediation channels. I intended to show that this is Habermas's position and I will go on to evaluate it, to compare it with other theories of rationalist foundation, as well as to further Habermas's work into new fields. To carry out this claim, the study of the method used by Habermas in his theory is essential. Considering that Habermas's critical theory is based on reconstruction (Habermas, 1973, 1976, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1992; Peters, 1996; Honneth, 2007, Pedersen, 2008; Iser, 2009, Nobre; Repa, 2012; Repa, 2021), this paper aims to analyze and evaluate how the category of reconstruction is presented in his works on cosmopolitanism and to what extent the normative deficits pointed out in the context of the foundation of morals, politics and law (Forst, 2007) remain within the scope of his cosmopolitan project (Habermas, 1996, 1998, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2013, 2021).

KEYWORDS Habermas, consensus, conflicts, rationality

Toward a More Inclusive Idea of Public Reason

Linda Priano_
_University of Milan

ABSTRACT Notably, Rawlsian public reason excludes unreasonable citizens and unreasonable doctrines from the legitimation pool. Here, my aim is to propose a more inclusive idea of public reason in which some unreasonable citizens and doctrines are welcomed.

To accomplish this goal, I propose to distinguish unreasonable citizens into different categories in order to shed light on the fact that they are not all unreasonable in the same manner and degree. Following Sala's categorization (2013), I distinguish unreasonable citizens into three groups: (i) the "unreasonable", those citizens who threaten liberal institutions and social unity; (ii) the "reasonable to be", those who will become reasonable thanks to liberal institutions; (iii) the "non-reasonable", those who do not share the fundamental values of a just society but support liberal institutions. Given that unreasonable citizens are labeled as such due to different reasons, it seems more fruitful to include in public reason those citizens who are not "unreasonable". More specifically, the second and third categories of unreasonable citizens should be included in public reason for the following reasons.

First, there is a concern with stability. As is well known, one of the reasons why Rawls's theory excludes unreasonable citizens is to ensure stability for the right reasons. However, excluding unreasonable citizens from public reason may jeopardize stability in the long run. If unreasonable citizens feel excluded from public reason, they may be prone to radicalize themselves and become "unreasonable". Even those citizens who are not "unreasonable" may become so because they feel marginalized. Living under liberal institutions is not enough to become reasonable and appreciate these institutions, what is necessary is feeling part of their justificatory process and endorsing them from their comprehensive doctrine. These citizens who are not unreasonable as Rawls argues deserved to be allowed to take part in public reason since they do not cause instability. On the contrary, they can ensure stability for the right reasons in the long run.

The second reason why it is necessary to include unreasonable citizens and doctrines is an epistemic one. Drawing from the "Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem" and the "Numbers Trump Ability Theorem" (Landemore 2013), I suggest endorsing a "Diversity Strengthens Reasonableness Theorem". With Diversity Strengthens Reasonableness I mean that if we broaden the constituency of public reason and more citizens take part in it and more arguments are provided, the more reasonable, namely, the more just the outcome is likely to be. In other words, if the public justification takes into account more citizens, that is, both the so-called reasonable citizens and those who are not yet considered reasonable but who have the potential to become so, it is more likely to reach a more reasonable justification. This means that public justification is more acceptable by citizens because it takes diversity more into account and because the number of citizens included in the justificatory process is greater, therefore, decisions are shared by more citizens.

Obduracy, Recalcitrance, Pride: Non-rational Belief and the Expansion of Public Reason in Anti-Jewish Politics

Andrew M. Jampol-Petzinger_
_Grand Valley State University

ABSTRACT An important reference point for thinking about the nature of public reason in the history of Western philosophy is the development of anti-Jewish polemic during the long late-Medieval to Enlightenment era. During this period, an increasing belief in the rationality of Christianity, coupled with a tendency to attribute a common form of rationality to all human beings, led, paradoxically, to a deep suspicion concerning the "refusal" of non-Christians to recognize the (supposedly) self-evident, rationally-justifiable truth of the Christian worldview (Ben-Shalom 2003, 163). Rather than simply excluding non-believers from the sphere of the possible exercise of rationality, anti-Jewish polemics during this period tended towards an account of intellection among Jews as occluded by moral and cognitive vices like pride, obduracy ("stubbornness"), and spite. Funkenstein (1993) argues that it was indeed this dialectic of inclusion in, and exception from, (rather than simple exclusion from) the sphere of rationality that served to justify the intensification of coercive and exterminative violence against Jews during this period (182).

By considering several key moments in the development of a conception of public reason during the late-Medieval era—in particular, the performance of Disputationes ("disputations") intended to confirm the primacy of Christian doctrine—we will come to better understanding the nature and limits of possible political consensus, and develop a sharper sense for the ideological concomitants of attributions of moral and intellectual vice to those who stand outside the limits of public rationality. In particular, I will argue, we discover that one of the implicit functions of public rationality is to define those boundaries beyond which "justifiable" coercion becomes necessary.

KEYWORDS Judaism, anti-Judaism, rationality, Medieval philosophy, coercion

The Only (Sustainable) Way Out: Identity Reflexivity?

Amaël Maskens_
_Hoover Chair, Université Catholique de Louvain

ABSTRACT Although subject to many contextual variations, "affective polarization" is on the rise (Bernaerts et al. 2023). This shapes the way citizens form their political perspectives: they often lack coherent ideological commitments and act on the basis of identity and emotional cues (Hannon, de Ridder, 2021; Iyengar, 2021). What matter then are not the reasons in support of a policy or a representative, but whether my group is endorsing it or not. Such a development threatens a core feature of (deliberative) democracy, i.e., that every decision should be justified to all those subjected to it (the ideal of public reason).

Firstly, it endangers the "subjective" condition of public reason: if individuals picture their political opponents as irrational or morally deviant, they won't see the point in justifying them their decisions, nor in treating them as equals (Talisse, 2021). But it also threatens the normative appeal of public reason, given that a decision justified to "unreasonable" individuals seems undesirable – e.g., why a decision justified to racists or climate sceptics be legitimate?

Here, I will focus on the first issue. Regarding the second one, I take an open normative stance. Instead of trying to exclude unreasonable individuals or to build a counterfactual constituency of idealized citizens, I consider public reason as an intuitively appealing – and essential – regulative ideal, which is but one element making up democratic legitimacy (Enoch, 2015).

My hypothesis is that we need identity reflexivity (IdR) and identity skills (IdS) (see Cuneen, 2021) to set the conditions for the exercise of public reason. IdR is an operation in which I turn my attention towards the way my self-image shapes my (political) judgments. IdS are the skills that promote the emergence of relational experiences triggering such a reflexive operation, and those that help carrying out this operation. These are imaginary, narrative, emotional, dialogical, and critical thinking skills (Cuneen, 2021). IdR and IdS appear crucial for at least two reasons:

a) To see others as equals in a context of affective polarization, one must overcome prejudices and biases embedded in her own identity. Having

"cross-cutting" contacts, as often suggested to mitigate polarization (e.g., Mason, 2014; Talisse, 2019) is not enough to defeat entrenched prejudices (Gillespie, 2015).

b) To understand the grounds upon which concrete others could accept a collective decision, one must understand their perspectives. This requires complex skills (Cuneen, 2019), and notably the ability to pay attention to how one's own identity may be filtering the other's words and actions.

I argue that IdR and IdS are thus necessary conditions for public reason in our polarized world. Yet, they are far from being sufficient conditions. Many structural solutions are needed to overcome polarization, such as democratic innovations (Strandberg et al., 2017; Fishkin et al. 2021), fighting economic inequalities and racial segregation, regulate media environments, etc (Barber, McCarty, 2015; Sharp, 2022; Bernaerts et al., 2023). But the long-term success of structural solutions is highly dependent on their ability to trigger identity reflection. I conclude by exploring some means to promote IdR and IdS.

Pluralist Constructivism, Public Reason, and Policymaking: Political Lessons from Public Archaeology

Rob Hanson_
_Groningen University

ABSTRACT As politics has become more polarised, an increasing number of topics have not only become progressively party-political but also ontologically significant; with the capacity to (in)validate how individuals understand their very existence and the world they live in. The Climate Emergency debate, for example, is not just a debate about extinction and disaster mitigation, it is also a debate about the future of the nation-state, national identities, and the question of whom we can trust and whom we have responsibilities to. This raises the stakes for participants involved in certain debates as to lose not only entails accepting a policy you disagree with but also accepting a different understanding of one's very existence.

Competing ontologies are problematic for Public Reason approaches to policymaking and policy legitimisation because, in circumstances involving them, the resulting policy will necessarily challenge some people's firmly held, existential beliefs. In these circumstances, we are left with three questions. (1) if and how we should include incompatible ontologies in our policymaking. (2) if we can be obliged to include/exclude certain ontologies, given how including them can "legitimise" them. And (3), what normative power validity has when it comes to the inclusion/exclusion of different worldviews.

I present a Pluralist, agent-focused variation of Korsgaard's Deliberative Constructivism as a means to establish if and how we should include specific, competing ontologies in our policymaking. As in Korsgaard's framework, the telos of "deliberation" will be used to establish the normative significance, role, and entitlements of the individual as a debate participant. However, by focusing on agency, I will provide a variant framework that acknowledges the normative significance of context and our subjective states; one that can guide us in constructing appropriate policymaking models on a case-by-case basis. The resulting framework, I will argue, provides justifiable parameters for determining if, when, and how individuals should

be (ex/in)cluded within policymaking, as well as if, when, and how we can justify excluding certain individuals from the policymaking and also apply our conclusions to dissenters.

My claims will build upon cases of "public archaeology" involving competing ontologies to demonstrate: the need to include all stakeholders throughout the policymaking process, the role individuals are (not) entitled to as debate participants, and the need for policymaking models to be sui generis to their particular issue.

This paper contributes to the literature on Public Reason, Non-Ideal Theory, and Democratic Liberalism, offering a new understanding of Public Reason that assigns normative value to context and our subjective states whilst still privileging the scientific method.

KEYWORDS Public Reason, Agency, Constructivism, Competing Ontologies,
                    Non-Ideal Theories, Liberalism, Policymaking

Against Rational Politics: Mouffe's Agonism Towards a New Pluralism

João Rochate da Palma_
_PRAXIS - CFUL

ABSTRACT The idea of a possible resolution for the conflict at the center of social and political life is one to be rejected. The notions of conciliation, deliberation or public common reason, which have shaped modern democracies, especially in European/Western context, are now facing a challenge in progressively multipolar communities. In these, recognition-seeking groups are now deeply rejecting the agglutinative efforts of liberal democracies.

With this end in sight, I shall lean on the work of Chantal Mouffe to argue that these deliberative rational positions, such as those proposed by Rawls or Habermas, do not integrate the real genesis of social life which is rooted in two poles: 1) an affective, or emotional, basis for action, rather than a rational one; 2) the natural conflict which emerges from difference and the simultaneous positive and negative identity-building forms (affirmation of the self and negation of the Other) which are at play within every community.

In reference to the first of these poles, I will stand by the Freudian conception of behavior driven through the Eros and Thanatos instincts. As such, what we observe in the attempts of establishing a Public Reason is the repression of these two poles of action, rather than the ideal attempt of balancing them. Liberal democracies are seen to subsume within them the drives towards creation and destruction and are rather stagnated within an ideal, moral, and cultural form of application.

Secondly, by siding with Mouffe, I will argue for her agonistic position. One that admits Schmitt's conception of the political as a struggle between groups (an 'us' and a 'them'), but that also negates this view of confrontation as one between allies and enemies, seeing it instead as one of adversaries. This focus on agonistics, as irresolute conflict, will allow the foundation of political practices that shall reinterpret the scale of political action on an individual, collective and institutional level. It will equally reinterpret the role of pluralism within a more radical form of Democracy. For pluralism is not something to take into account as a mere difference of positions within an institution, but as substantial, real differences in heterogeneous communi-

ties (class, race, gender,...) which can only be shown amidst subversive movements of contestation.

Thus, between these two spheres, arises a critique of liberal democracies, allied to an equally sharp critique of the notion of a common public reason. Mouffe's proposal, and my own, is that antagonism and a form of Thanatos is the ontological foundation of communities, but it must be redirected to its agonistic form — in such a way that it allows for pluralism and enriches the heterogeneity which is (as Nietzsche would put it) «for life» (Eros). I will also put forth that agonism, such as expressed, is the fundamental tool to overcome the greater challenges of multipolar communities today, which are failing to recognize its own heterogeneous roots, and are, consequently, repressing them.

PANEL 4_THE MORAL, ECONOMIC, ECOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL VALUE OF BASIC INCOME

CONVENOR: THIAGO SOUZA, CATARINA NEVES and ROBERTO MERRIL

The discussants in this panel will include Stuart White (University of Oxford).

The idea of the Unconditional Basic Income (hereinafter UBI) has been the subject of discussions within the Academy of Ethics, Philosophy, Political Sciences, and Economics for decades. In recent years, the UBI debate seems to have been boosted by new challenges that the world has offered us, such as the economic crisis of 2008 and the Covid-19 Pandemic. The Basic Income theory draws several parallels between the obstacles faced by humankind today. Issues such as socioeconomic inequality, welfare crisis, mass unemployment, democratic inclusion, and even environmental sustainability are often discussed under the UBI scope.

Such an interest in UBI, has resulted in several tests and new policies around the world. We have the South Korean Gyeonggi case, the Maricá Citizen Basic Income, and the tests performed in Ontario (Canada), Stockton (US, California), Finland, and Barcelona (Spain) to name a few examples. Besides, many countries plan to put a UBI pilot to test.

To keep promoting the debate, this panel invites contributors to elaborate discussions concerning the Basic Income theory and its connection with problematics in the fields of Ethics, Politics, Sociology, and Economics. There are central issues for this panel, which aim for multidisciplinary debates that should stimulate UBI studies in various disciplines.

Therefore, questions that play a key role in this discussion

are the following:
- How can a UBI project tell us more about the potential environmental impacts, and the rise of inequality, unemployment, and poverty around the world?
- Which social policies should be proposed in coordination with the UBI aiming for higher welfare levels and environmental stability?
- What are the ex-post consequences of a UBI policy, either in the short, medium or long-term perspectives? How would it affect educational, health, and political spectra, and how does it influence individual freedom?
- How does one build political and economic conditions for a UBI policy to be approved and how do long-lasting projects impact governmental spending regarding public services?
- Would a Basic Income project be beneficial to Portugal when faced with the Portuguese socio-economic structure and challenges?

  Also, this panel is part of a broader project run by CEPS - Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society - entitled The Moral, Economic, and Social Value of Basic Income. The project, led by Professor Roberto Merrill (UMinho, CEPS), and funded by the Portuguese Foundation of Science and Technology, includes a comprehensive list of associate researchers worldwide. The focus of this project is to expand and systematize the methodology and analysis regarding the nascent literature on the moral, economic, and social benefits of the UBI, and to uncover more about the mid to long-term socioeconomic benefits of implementing a UBI.

Foucault, Neoliberalism, and Basic Income: A Critical Analysis

Otto Lehto_
_New York University

ABSTRACT Michel Foucault's analysis of (neo)liberalism in his Collège de France lectures (1978-1979), published under the title *Birth of Biopolitics*, remains one of the most astute commentaries on the Chicago and Ordo Schools of liberalism. Foucault discussed the Negative Income Tax (NIT) as part of his lectures. A cursory reading suggests that Foucault was somewhat sympathetic to NIT/UBI as a less punitive form of poverty relief that does not engage in bureaucratic micromanagement and leaves more freedom of choice and action to individuals but also, by the same token, demands more of them in terms of self-improvement and self-reliance, including the cultivation of their entrepreneurial capacities and "human capital" (Gary Becker). Some scholars (Dean and Zamora, 2021) have argued that Foucault become highly sympathetic to neoliberalism and saw basic income as one of its attractive, liberating, and post-disciplinary policies. However, I will argue that Foucault's analysis of neoliberal governmentality, and basic income in particular, is neither a celebration nor a condemnation. It is a highly ambiguous analysis of NIT as a tool of neoliberal "governmentality." On the positive side, NIT is a new means of asserting "the right to be different" and for sowing the seeds for the articulation and expression (or even celebration) of "everything which makes individuals truly individual." At the same time, although this is more implicit in Foucault's analysis, these very same structures of the liberal regime may inadvertently lead to, or be consciously used to achieve, a social order that "separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up community life, forces the individual back on himself, and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way." This paper shows that the superficial reading of Foucault as a "proponent" of basic income (or neoliberalism more broadly) should be replaced with a more nuanced account.

KEYWORDS Foucault, basic income, negative income tax, neoliberalism, governmentality

Universal Basic Income (UBI) Model as Innovative Technology of Welfare

Birutė Visokavičienė_
_Kazimieras Simonavičius University

ABSTRACT The Universal Basic Income (UBI) model will combine in a single framework the goals of social sustainability and innovation development, the potential of human and material capital with new innovative methods of smart economic, monetary and fiscal policy.

UBI in this study is presented as a new integrated financial instrument which guarantees people the necessary standard of living and thus addresses not only social but also public finance management and economic policies. A method and a tool for shaping change in the social fabric that benefits people's well-being and the environment, encourages public finance and public sector reforms and creates new effective models of social security. At the same time UBI includes a public governance mechanism that drives the development of a competitive, sustainable economy in the age of digital technology and Manufacturing 4.0.

The main goal of the study is to develop a model of sustainable growth, social inclusion, innovative economy and public services based on the universal basic income in Lithuania.

A study will be conducted on alternative financing methods and mechanisms that could be used to create a stable flow of UBI financing in the Lithuania. Research will be carried out, including the use of monetary policy instruments, such as innovative non-state budget financing of UBI. The work packages examine the purposeful integration of the UBI financing mechanism with monetary and fiscal instruments in order to increase the state's capacity to create social welfare in Lithuania.

One of the major problems of the UBI research is not only the financial mechanism, but also the practical implementation of the UBI model in terms of the purposefulness

and efficiency of these financial allocations, their utilization, as well as ways of creating added value and increasing innovation potential. The direct application of the UBI covers and affects substantially all aspects of socio-economic life and creates opportunities for transformation. This is done through the improvement of public services, enabling the pursuit of increased societal progress and well-being by making the best use of the financial opportunities provided by the UBI. The ways and forms to use UBI effectively depend directly on how the public service system is prepared to be adopted, adapted and used in the most efficient way.

The UBI model should focus on the quality of public services and the availability of UBI's, and vice versa - public services should be developed for eventual adaptation of the UBI mechanism. In both of these cases, the most important criterion is the development of the economic potential and well-being of society. This requires the development and introduction of new welfare technologies, ranging from the application of environmental technologies to the modernization of cultural, creative, educational, labor market and other welfare attributes through public services.

Does UBI provide freedom and equality? Pros and cons

Dorina Patrunsu_
_University of Bucharest

ABSTRACT In this article, my purpose is to show that the universal basic income (UBI) proposal is not consistent with the principles of a free and fair society.

To do this, I first bring a generic argument in favor of UBI, emphasizing it in those works that offer UBI's most recent and notorious defenses, especially those that argue that a basic income will not only maximize the amount of "real freedom" of the least free in society, but also the strengthening of the framework of equality and inclusiveness in society, i.e., cooperation.

After, I bring a fundamental objection that might defeat both the legitimacy and functionality of UBI. The crux of the objection is that the justification of basic income as improving empiric equality is parasitical upon intrinsic equality and, last but not least, upon substantive individual freedom. The questionable assumption here is that the cooperative desideratum could be met without reciprocity. We can say that the lack of money in the pockets is a problem of cooperation or inclusion, but putting money in someone's pockets does not mean that the cooperation problem will be solved. Bref, better and legitimate democratic results for everyone do not mean fair results.

The mistake made by the proponents of UBI is to consider something legitimate just because it is functional. Functionality in justifying the legitimacy of the universal basic income is only a necessary condition. So, functional equality (functional fairness) is not enough.

In addition, the idea of UBI has a strong ideological component; therefore, the risk of this idea to be politically manipulated and not reasonably used is quite high, endangering the noble desideratum behind it.

Thus, universal basic income is self-defeating; it could not be effectively imposed without significant loss of freedom, i.e., legitimacy, being coercive and arbitrary even if more equalitarian.

KEYWORDS Unconditional basic income, empiric eguality, cooperation problem,
           Rawls' principles of justice, substantive freedom

Main perceptions of Greek Mayors towards the introduction of a UBI-scheme in Greece

Iordanis Paraskevas & Constantine Dimoulas_
_Panteion University

ABSTRACT The aim of our research was to shed light on the interest the political leadership of the Greek local government, specifically the Greek Mayors, has on Universal Basic Income (UBI). First, we conducted a comprehensive analysis of the historical, political and economic elements that have shaped the local government in Greece, as an institution, and in the context of our study. Our findings show that regions and municipalities in Greece lack the institutional and economic framework that could enable them to experiment with UBI.

Our main research focused on revealing the opinion, disposition and perception of Greek Mayors towards UBI. For this purpose, we conducted a primary, empirical research through semi-structured questionnaires targeted directly to all Greek Mayors. A side goal was to also disseminate the idea of UBI. We asked about the special characteristics of their municipalities regarding the population, the economic, political and institutional context, as well as their social policy. The main section of questions revolved around their opinion concerning various elements of welfare, and of course UBI.

Most of the participating Mayors in our survey like the idea of UBI, would support a pilot program for their municipality, but believe that it is unfeasible, because of limited resources and lack of an institutional framework that would enable such an effort. Another interesting finding was a significant confusion between the characteristics of UBI and Guaranteed Minimum Income (which was imported into the Greek Constitution in 2019).

KEYWORDS Universal Basic Income (UBI), local government, Mayors, Greece

UBI experiences: a comparative analysis and the importance of context

Carla Costa & Pedro Goulart_
_ ISCSP

ABSTRACT Universal Basic Income (UBI) has been put forward as a panacea for re-distribution and a guaranty for dignifying living conditions, especially in the upcoming of the 4th Industrial Revolution and the advent of Artificial Intelligence.

However, there is not a wide consensus on the concept and, especially, its means of application, because of the difficult appraisal of cost/benefice balance. In this paper, we will adopt Aerts et al (2023) perspective, that stress that UBI outcomes will depend on the "level, design and context". We focus on addressing the issue of context and in which countries, given their characteristics, would be more politically feasible/desirable the implementation of UBI programmes. We will try to demonstrate, trough qualitative and quantitative analysis, that transaction costs could be a powerful metric in order to decide for applying UBI, and that those costs do vary among countries, on account of different socio-economic organizational features, ranging from demographics and social services structures, to political behavior and the electoral system.

KEYWORDS UBI; Context variables; Socio-economic organization; transaction costs

Universal Basic Income: the worst bar all others?

Luís Guimarães & Diogo Lourenço_
_Queen's University Belfast and CEF.UP University of Porto

ABSTRACT What is the impact of replacing conditional welfare programs with a Universal Basic Income (UBI) that costs the same? We answer this question using a general-equilibrium model with incomplete markets that account for three imperfections of conditional programs: incomplete take-up, illegitimate transfers, and administrative costs. We find that UBI would increase capital stock, employment, and output, and lower inequality and welfare. The welfare loss is, however, neither universal nor robust. The least educated individuals would benefit from a UBI in our benchmark, and introducing a sizable UBI would be preferable to expanding conditional programs. Incomplete take-up is key for our findings.

KEYWORDS Universal Basic Income; Welfare System; Take-up; Labor Market Flows; Administrative Costs

Who is most deserving? Stigma and rights in the consolidation of the Citizens' Basic Income Program of Maricá, Brazil

Fernando Freitas_
_ Fluminense Federal University

ABSTRACT Cash transfer programs have been widely adopted because they are inexpensive and effective in combating poverty (Fiszbein, Norbert & Ferreira, 2009). These programs exhibit certain recurrent characteristics: they tend to target a low-income population and often feature requirements around education or employment status. These conditions are typically framed as ways to ensure the most efficient use of resources to help people overcome poverty.

This targeted approach has been criticized for the high administrative cost of identifying the most vulnerable, for ineffective conditionalities, and for the stigma that beneficiaries often report. Focusing exclusively on the poorest individuals can also lead to stigmatizing recipients for their economic vulnerability. For Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017), expanding the target population for cash transfers and eliminating conditionalities – in other words, moving towards a basic income guaranteed by right to all individuals – could offer a route to overcoming these deficiencies.

The present paper evaluates Van Parijs and Vanderborght's hypothesis in the context of the Citizens' Basic Income program of Maricá, Brazil. Maricá's program was created in 2019, when a previous minimum income program with 20,000 beneficiaries was expanded to include 42,000 recipients, approximately 20% of Maricá's population. Recipients must belong to households earning less than three times the Brazilian federal minimum salary and must have lived in Maricá for three years. As of March 2023, the benefit pays 200 reais (US$38) per person in a local currency called the mumbuca, which can only be spent in Maricá. Beneficiaries can purchase any kind of good or service, and the program has no conditionalities.

We wish to determine whether the expansion of the target population in Maricá contributed to a mitigation of stigma for its beneficiaries. Our focus is to identify the

profile considered "deserving" of eligibility to the program by the population. To the extent that the program is seen as a right, we investigate whether the breadth of the target population or the absence of conditionalities played a decisive role. While we hypothesize that the expansion of the target population helped to mitigate the stigma experienced by beneficiaries, we also expect that the consolidation of the policy as an entitlement will not be achieved quickly, owing in part to difficulties with the program's enrollment model and to uncertainty about its long-term survival.

Our analysis relies on 72 interviews with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the program, and on 27 interviews with individuals involved in the formulation and implementation of the policy. We see this study as an important contribution to the literature on stigma in cash transfer programs, which historically has concentrated on two kinds of programs: targeted transfers and guaranteed income experiments. The former targets extremely poor target populations, while the latter focuses on temporary, small-scale programs, limiting measurement of long-term effects on behavior (Widerquist, 2018). This paper, in contrast, is the first to analyze the transition from a minimum income program to a program with basic income characteristics, with a broad target population and without conditionalities.

KEYWORDS Cash transfer programs, citizen's basic income, street-level bureaucrats, stigma, rights

The economics of a green path to UBI

João Vasco Ribeiro Ferreira Gama_
_Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT The political viability of UBI is path dependent. I argue that a first step towards UBI should be financed mainly by Pigouvian taxes aimed at addressing the environmental challenges humanity faces, and I estimate the social, economic and environmental consequences of such approach. The velocity and scale on witch the path to a full UBI is followed may depend on the degree and speed of automation. I study the economic underpinnings of this relation and present some ethical reflections.

KEYWORDS UBI, Sustainability, Automation

Ecological aspects of a basic income: the case of Maricá

Camila Monteiro Alves, Carolina Grottera, Fábio Waltenberg_
_Fluminense Federal University

ABSTRACT Poverty eradication and environmental degradation are obstacles to achieving social and environmental justice that are potentially interconnected in the contemporary world. Such adversities need to be solved so that society can achieve a sustainable trajectory. As the basic income is an instrument for poverty alleviation, the interest of this research arose in the relationship of this redistributive policy with environmental sustainability. The municipality of Maricá, in the metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro, develops public policies called solidarity economy, which include the Basic Citizenship Income (BMI) program. The controversy is that such policies are financed by receiving royalties from oil exploration, a product with oscillating market prices, non-renewable, exhaustible, and with a strong polluting capacity. A case study was carried out with the municipality, using a qualitative methodology with the technique of collecting information through a semi-structured script of interviews with the municipal secretariats. The general objective of the work was to understand to what extent cash transfer policies, especially CBR, have the potential to foster or mitigate ecological impacts. In addition, to capture the perception of a possible ecological transition process taking place in the municipality. It was identified an increase in consumption through the collection of urban solid waste, arising from the increase in income, either because of the cash transfer, or because of the generation of jobs, resulting from the catalyzing effect of the association of CBR with the social currency. This corroborates the literature that an extra income implies in higher production and consumption, even more so maintaining the same consumption patterns, and its unknown long-term effects, especially in developing countries. The results of this research point out that basic income alone cannot be framed as a driver of environmental collapse, since CBR, in conjunction with the public policies that occur in Maricá, produce ecologically beneficial effects. Such policies demonstrate a perception of sustainability when they seek to minimize possible collateral damage to the environment, even if they are not their primary objectives. Moreover, being a modest amount of CBR and not universal, this would not be a villain for such a collapse, given that, historically, the consumption

of the wealthy classes have a much more worrying ecological footprint and have not undergone behavioral changes. However, maintaining CBR funding from oil royalty revenues may offer social justice in poverty alleviation, but it becomes conflictive in achieving environmental justice. There was no evidence of discouraging oil consumption and production, only alternatives to be developed. The attempt to diversify the economy through sustainable tourism has been questionable, because there is the possibility of an enterprise being built in an environmental preservation area, a source of food and income for local fishermen. Such open contradictions may become obstacles in the long run to achieving an ecological transition. One of the limits of the research was that migration to post-productive activities in Maricá was not verified, which diverges from one of the main arguments in favor of adopting a basic ecological income found in the literature.

The Unconditional Basic Income proposal as a promoter of Ecological and Socioeconomic Justice

Thiago Souza_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT This paper aims to explain why the struggle for a more ecologically sustainable society is inseparable from that for socioeconomic justice and why the Unconditional Basic Income is an effective policy to act on both fronts. Firstly, the corresponding theory sheds light on the argument that environmental and socioeconomic oppressions are two effects of the same historical process and hence cannot be addressed separately. It is incoherent to address one while ignoring the other; they are both traits and consequences of present society. It is imperative to acknowledge the historical debt that exists in vulnerable economic classes and developing countries. Green Republicanism might as well set up a theoretical foundation for Social-Ecological thinking. Defining freedom as non-dominative and spreading this conception to all living beings are fundamental conditions to overcome both socioeconomic and environmental kinds of oppression. Subsequently, the UBI is presented and discussed theoretically as a strong case to face these two challenges. The UBI is not only a way to help a transition to a post-productivism society, transforming labor relations, but also a propulsive measure towards circular economies and more sustainable occupations. Besides, it should also act with other policies to stimulate green transition.

KEYWORDS Environmental Ethics, Ecology, Socioeconomic Justice, Unconditional Basic Income

PANEL 5_EUROPEAN UNION

CONVENOR: PEDRO SILVA

The surge in interest from political and legal philosophers in the European Union should be welcomed, but theory should pay closer attention to the institution's specific challenges such as the climate emergency and mitigation of inflation's effects among many others. This panel has a very broad scope in that it will seek to theorise about the EU's responses to several challenges but it will also entertain more abstract discussions about familiar concerns such as justice and legitimacy of the supra-national institution.

What conception of justice should animate the ECB's decision-making? Can it, alternatively, support Member States in fulfilling each local conception of justice? Is the ECB's current toolbox and is its latest strategy review consistent with liberal egalitarian principles? It is possible that the European Central Bank (ECB) is waging a fight against current inflation in a way that makes greater inflationary shocks likelier in the future. Energy efficiency and adaptation and clean energy production require large upfront investments that are made harder by steep increases in interest rates that are being used to combat current inflation. This panel seeks to shed light on how the ECB may better realise economic and environmental justice.

Migration within the EU is another area in which questions of justice currently arise. Freedom of movement is one of the key pillars of the EU yet many Member States currently restrict access to goods and services on the part of newly arrived mobile individuals from fellow countries on the grounds that they have not yet contributed enough to the shared social networks that generates this moral claim. It is questionable, however, why duties of justice are triggered by this. Some appeal to norms of international reciprocity in order to justify this. It is questionable, however, whether this appeal

is successful. Perhaps a richer understanding of reciprocity that accords equal respect supports lifting such restriction. On the other hand, restriction of access to "welfare rights" could encourage social dumping on the part of employers in the most-advantaged Member States and may, therefore, be objectionable for other reasons that are independent of reciprocity.

The panel welcomes contributions related (but not limited) to the following questions:
1. Is the ECB's current toolbox an adequate instrument for socio-economic justice?
2. Should Member States be allowed to temporarily restrict access to "welfare rights" on the part of individuals from other EU countries?
3. What policies should the EU adopt on migration from third countries?
4. Do transnational electoral lists enhance the EU's legitimacy?

European Union and Freedom as Non-Domination – A Republican Approach To A Solidaristic European Identity

Ricardo Matos_
_UMinho

ABSTRACT In the current European political framework, the processes of globalization of financial markets, the growing planetary ecological crisis, global terrorism and the current migratory crises in North Africa and Ukraine are responsible for the need to face cross-border challenges, which often require supranational, international or transnational political actions that protect the basic interests of all nation-states and their citizens. These basic interests, such as the "sovereign freedoms" of Philip Pettit and the freedoms of all individuals, can be ensured through republican values such as equal opportunity for civic participation, the discursive autonomy of member states and individuals and reciprocal power.

However, in the current European political context, where market relations prevail, competition mechanisms favor the exercise of domination and oppression by the strongest states and richest multinational economic corporations over the most politically and economically vulnerable states.

In this perspective, the present paper aims to justify the definition of a European identity with a solidaristic nature in which freedom as non-domination is inserted at the level of facts and not only in the de jure dimension. It is within a solidary and loyal polity - in fact, a prerogative of all forms of republicanism - that the principle of freedom as non-domination becomes action, rather than an eternally postponed teleology. Throughout the paper, we will examine different theories and mechanisms for building, or searching for a moral and mystical Europeanism leading to the possibility of imagining a true European demos, a community in which its members relate to each other in an equally dignified, solidary and free of domination manner.

In this paper, we aim to demonstrate that the ideal of non-domination is only possible with the constitution of a common European life, through the critique of non-po-

litical models at the regional level and the justification of a model based on a European democratic process of deliberation through which solidarity should raise as a moral heteronomy, or in other words, as a sort of a quasi-naturalized solidarity with traces of ethnicity.

Increasing Numbers of Refugees Admitted or Increasing Compliance with the Duty to admit Refugees? A Hard Dilemma for Refugee Protection in the EU

Dimitrios Efthymiou_
_Goethe Universitat Frankfurt

ABSTRACT Most of the current literature focuses on the nature and scope of the duties that states have towards refugees (Carens 2013; Miller 2016) as well as, to a lesser extent, on appropriate refugee policies in the context of the EU (Bauböck 2018; Owen 2019). However, this paper delves into the dilemma arising from the distinction between partially compliant and non-compliant states and its implications for normative judgments, particularly in non-compliance scenarios with member-state duties towards refugees. Imagine the following scenario: member-state A is willing, due to prevailing domestic political preferences, to meet its quota of refugees but insofar as it accepts refugees from state B only and not refugees from state C, even if individuals from state C are equally or needier than refugees from state B. This raises a dilemma. If the member-state cannot be made to accept more or equally needy refugees from state C due to the rigidity of these domestic preferences, then we are faced with the hard choice of either allowing state A to arbitrarily cherry pick among refugees according to its political preferences in order to meet its quota or of disallowing for such criteria of selection at the expense of a greater number of refugees been offered protection. The paper evaluates two responses to resolving this tension, one based on exclusively condemning illegitimate preferences for certain refugees, and a second that focuses solely on the number of refugees admitted. By comparing the numbers of Ukrainian and Syrian refugees admitted by different member-states, the article finds both responses wanting in non-ideal conditions characterized by widespread non-compliance. Instead, the article proposes an alternative approach that aims to ease the dilemma by factoring in considerations that are overlooked in the

literature, such as the timing of admission and sanctions. Additionally, the paper emphasizes the persistent cogency of competing policy priorities, such as stability vs. justice considerations, that need to be taken into account when theory and practice meet in the context of a non-ideal international union of states like the EU. The overall aim of the article is not to resolve the dilemma but rather to provide a more nuanced understanding of member-states compliance with duties towards refugees in the current non-ideal circumstances.

A human right to immigrate and EU migration policy

Jan Turlej_
_ Jagiellonian University in Krakow

ABSTRACT In this paper, I examine in which areas EU should change its migration policies. The starting point (1) for these considerations is a human right to immigrate idea discussed mostly in open/closed borders debate. Within this framework (2) I ask whether the human right to immigrate concept is needed to judge migration injustices in the EU. I analyze if a human right to immigrate might be considered an ideal, which is burdened with problems of end-state justice theories. That is why I discuss (3) if a non-ideal human rights approach might focus on the most important challenges facing the EU. I illustrate these challenges with the pushback problem, focusing on the human right to asylum.

In the first part (1) I start with a human right to immigrate idea, which is considered in the open/closed borders debate (J. Carens, K. Oberman). In this respect, I argue that some of the human rights approaches would also support the human right to immigrate. In this context, I briefly consider some modern human rights approaches and their justification (W. Talbott, J. Griffin, M. Nussbaum) as a basis for a human right to immigrate. In the second step (2) I ask whether a human right to immigrate concept is needed to judge migration injustices in the EU. In other words, I discuss if the ideal of a human right to immigrate is necessary to judge how far the UE policies are from this ideal. In this context, I examine if discussed human rights conceptions with a human right to immigrate ideal echoes some theoretical problems of end-state justice theories (A. Sen, L. Valentini, D. Wiens, A. Berg). Therefore, I ask whether:

a)   human rights approaches might be considered ideal theories (what I call "end-state human rights approaches");

b)   a broad idea of a human right to immigrate might be achieved and widely shared;

c)   abstract ideal human right to immigrate may guide our progress toward human rights realization;

d)   a human right to immigrate concept is action-guiding;

e)   a human right to immigrate may help us to understand current injustices in the UE;

f)   a human right to immigrate could help to judge how to transition from existing unjust relations to ideal arrangements.

In light of this, I discuss if a moral, human right to immigrate concept is of any need. That is why, in the last, third part (3) I consider whether the non-ideal approach to human rights is more appropriate. Because non-ideal theories focus on real problems I shortly discuss contemporary migration issues facing the EU. I briefly present the situation on the Polish-Belarusian border as an illustration of a pushback EU challenge. I argue that a non-ideal theory of human rights with its comparative approach should address the question of how human rights improvement might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, in the actual world. The injustice we see on borders should call for a recognition of not only moral but also the political realization of the human right to asylum. That is why the universal moral human right to asylum should result in a new policy in the EU in this area.

The compound injustice of the (provisional) EU agreement on the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), and a possible solution

Fausto Corvino_
_ University of Gothenburg

ABSTRACT In December 2022, EU co-legislators reached a provisional political agreement on the introduction of a EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), starting from 2026, in some emission-intensive sectors currently covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The carbon price imposed on imports to the EU will be equivalent to the weekly carbon price determined on EU ETS markets – it is expected to be around USD 100 per tonne of CO_2, on average, at least until 2030. Despite the fact that the CBAM, as conceived, places a rather heavy burden on LDCs that are economically dependent on trade with EU countries, EU co-legislators envisage that the CBAM will be applied without exception and that CBAM revenues will be channelled to the EU budget and will be mainly used to repay the Next Generation EU – COVID-19 recovery package.

The CBAM, thus conceived, is in open violation of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities – CBDR-RC (UNFCCC 1992). Yet, EU co-legislators defend this unfair mitigation burden as unavoidable, as carbon leakage in LDCs is now incompatible with the mitigation goals of the Paris Agreement. The EU Parliament recently tried to remedy the unfairness of the CBAM by demanding that LDCs be granted an increase in climate finance, from EU countries, proportional to the carbon revenues paid by LDCs at the EU border. As a result, a dual track approach to EU climate policy is emerging, one for emissions-abatement and one for climate finance.

I will argue that there are two ethical reasons why the (unfair) burden-sharing problem posed by the CBAM cannot be solved on the distinct track of climate justice finance. Firstly, the CBAM with uniform carbon price is not only a violation of the CBDR-CR principle, but it also compounds a previous injustice. The latter consists

in the fact that in the last 30 years EU countries, among others, have deliberately pushed the climate crisis to the point where fair mitigation is no longer possible. The CBAM gives rise to three different form of compound injustice: direct causation, harm amplification, and perverse paternalism. When an unfair burden-sharing compounds a previous injustice, redistributive instruments, such as climate justice finance, are insufficient to rectify the burden-sharing injustice. Second, the CBAM is a distortion of the moral underpinnings of carbon pricing, whose purpose is not to punish CO_2 emitters, but to promote social efficiency and/or protect people, especially the most vulnerable, from the negative consequences of an out-of-control climate. Both arguments suggest that CBAM revenues must be returned to LDCs in an amount equivalent to the CO_2 they export to the EU, in sectors subject to the ETS.

Relating as Equals in the European Union: Social Narratives and Economic Inequality

Giovanni Martino_
_ KU Leuven

ABSTRACT The debate on what a just European Union (EU) requires has mostly focused on responsibility-sensitive goods distributions, following an approach known as 'luck egalitarianism'. The main competitor to this approach, relational egalitarianism, argues that equality is not primarily about distributive patterns but about people relating to one another as equals. As relational egalitarianism claims to be a promising alternative to luck egalitarianism, it is striking that none of the existing scholarship has investigated its normative implications for the EU. I aim to fill this lacuna, focusing on one aspect of EU justice: economic inequalities. I argue that economic inequalities in the EU are unfair because they express social narratives of unequal relations among Europeans, and that distributive policies track an obligation that Europeans stand in relations of equality. I first debate and favour relational over luck egalitarianism, concentrating on Christian Schemmel's expressivist proposal. Then, I highlight the need to clarify the harm caused by expressive wrongs, and the non-institutional dimensions of relational inequality. To do so, I develop a narrative framework and discuss social narratives of economic inequality in the EU. Finally, I consider a prominent objection to EU egalitarian distributive justice and show that my account raises a robust counter-argument based on how social narratives influence relations among Europeans. Overall, my contribution is twofold: I show that relational egalitarianism offers a plausible approach for identifying the moral salience of economic inequalities in the European Union, and I provide a novel argument from social narratives to do so.

KEYWORDS European Union, Relational egalitarianism, Economic inequality, Status inequality, Social narrative

European Fair Value of Political Liberties

Pedro Silva_
_ CEPS - Uminho

ABSTRACT The principle of the fair-value of political liberties is often assumed to operate domestically. The development of supra-national institutions such as the European Parliament, however, raises the question of whether the principle should also apply in such contexts and what its demands should be. This question becomes more pressing as the European Parliament gradually expands its remit and obtains more powers. In this paper, I will provide a positive reply to the former question and maintain that the fair-value of political liberties should indeed apply to the European Union as well as domestic states. Firstly, I will survey some of the main considerations in favour of the fair-value of political liberties and argue that the protection of self-respect and the production of just legislation constitute important reasons in favour of this. Secondly, I will explore a recent account that dismisses a concern with the Rawlsian notion of the "the strains of commitment" as a consideration in favour of the fair-value of political liberties. I will argue that the disinterest that the least-advantaged income groups have shown for European affairs in the form of low political participation are an important counter-example and suggest that the strains of European integration may indeed be too strong currently. This suggests that it may be important to ensure that the worse-off do not have lesser influence than the most advantaged with respect to European institutions, assuming equal willingness to participate. Thirdly, I will also consider whether the fulfilment of the fair-value of political liberties in each Member State domestically may render the fair-value of political liberties at a European level toothless. I will argue that this is not the case as the fulfilment of fair-value of political liberties domestically is consistent with wide disparities in ability to exercise political influence - on account of income and wealth - at the level of the EU. Fourthly, I will restrict my account by acknowledging the fact that EU legislation still has a lesser impact on individual's interests means, however, that the demands of fair value of political liberties are less stringent than those that obtain at the level of domestic Member States. Finally, I will explore some of the more practical demands of the fair-value of political liberties at a pan-European level. I will maintain that it provides a strong rea-

son in favour of interpersonal distributive justice between European individuals from different Member States and that it disallows some of the current practices allowed by the European Parliament, such as lobbying. I will conclude by presenting a worry on which future research on this topic should turn.

PANEL 6_LEGAL REPUBLICANISM, FREE MOVEMENT AND EU CITIZENSHIP

CONVENOR: JOÃO CRUZ RIBEIRO

Thirty years after the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, it may be time to reflect upon the normative turn (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2003) that this step has represented in European integration. Among many significant changes, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced the status of Citizenship into the architecture of the European Union. Since then, important scholarship has focused on the contributions that Republicanism, as a normative research program, can bring to the Political Theory of the European Union. However, there is still work to be done concerning what Besson and Martí (2009) have called Legal Republicanism, namely with regard to the rights specifically foreseen in EU law as citizenship rights. Indeed, a substantial part of citizenship rights are expressly provided for in primary law (TFEU and Charter of Fundamental Rights). It is appropriate to evaluate whether the emergence and development of these rights have contributed in any way to the satisfaction of proper republican concerns, or if, by contrast as some scholarship argues, they have been aligned with strong libertarian claims.

Free movement is paramount here. Being the most important of the citizenship rights, we should ask whether it attains substantive and procedural standards to be considered republican law (Besson and Martí, 2009). Similarly, one can say the same about the principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination. The characterization and conceptual framing of these rights will be decisive in the evaluation of European integration from a republican perspective.

Thus, many questions remain open about this evaluation and its

significance within this tradition of thought. This panel aims at further exploring this and all related topics.

We welcome contributions that address, but are not limited to, the following questions:

- From a republican perspective, does EU citizenship meet the criteria to be considered as such?
- Is EU citizenship excessively oriented towards the market?
- Is it possible to frame the rights attached to EU citizenship in such a way as to make them compatible with republican concerns?
- If we understand market-citizenship as a problem, what help, if any, can we expect from the European Court of Justice?
- Does EU Law have specific characteristics deserving a specific understanding of the substantive and procedural standards of legal republicanism?

This panel also intends to discuss Republicanism broadly conceived. Hereby, we invite contributions from researchers who wish to present their work in the field of Republicanism in general.

Legal republicanism and the evolution of free movement of persons in EU Law

João C. Ribeiro_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT The evolution of the legal framework concerning free movement of persons in the European Union can be useful in debating legal republicanism. In one dimension, this evolution has greatly enhanced the idea of freedom and equality. Initially economic in nature, a set of rights has evolved and has been construed as to be recognized fundamental in character, underpinning the existence of a Union Citizenship. Nationals of the Member States have observed a significant expansion of their legal status, with the inevitable increase of opportunity sets. In another dimension, however, this legal, freedom enhancing reinforcement has represented a considerable decrease in Member States' exercise of self-government.

From a neo-republican approach, this tension or conflict should be seen as normal. It is nothing more than common in the republican tradition for there to be tension between the substantive and procedural strands. The purpose of this essay is to evaluate whether the current legal framework is still one of tension between the two dimensions, or whether, on the contrary, the primacy of one of these dimensions – the substantive one – has definitively transformed this framework, carrying it beyond the boundaries of legal republicanism.

KEYWORDS Legal Republicanism; Free Movement of Persons; European Union Law

The Naturalisation of the Vulnerable: An International Responsibility

Davide Pala_
_University of Manchester

ABSTRACT On the standard view of the attribution of human-rights responsibilities, notably exemplified by Beitz (2009), states are the primary bearers of duties corresponding to human rights, and international institutions only bear secondary duties. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this view has been recently challenged by what might be called the negative view of human-rights responsibilities (e.g., Pogge 2008; Dworkin 2013; Montero 2017). For the latter, international institutions are causally connected to some human-rights violations, and, therefore, they also bear a primary duty – that not to contribute to engendering them. This paper sheds light on another crack in the standard view, by showing that there are even more primary international responsibilities than commonly envisaged, and not just negative responsibilities at that – surprisingly, the positive duty to naturalise a class of particularly vulnerable individuals is one of them.

The paper employs a republican perspective, namely, an approach to political morality based on freedom as non-domination (Pettit 1997). It defends the claim that, if, in a world made up of states, states are meant to protect, first and foremost, the human rights of their citizens, then the human right to become a citizen in the first place is owed to non-citizens too, or anyone. In other terms, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the human right to citizenship and all the other human rights: while the latter are primarily addressed against one's state, the former is primarily addressed against the entire international community. If so, then the correlative duty to naturalise those who do not possess any citizenship-status, or do possess it but it is ineffective, is shared and international from the start, and states are its dischargers in a derivative sense only.

This view has some further intriguing implications. First, naturalisation turns out not to be an exclusive prerogative of states. Second, individuals such as the refugees are owed more than just the fulfilment of basic needs, or asylum at best. Finally, the state system should be modified in profound and new ways to be able to realise human rights.

The paper unfolds as follows. Section I justifies individuals' claim to citizenship as a human right in that citizenship is constitutively necessary for republican freedom, and matter of international concern. Section II shows that the human right to citizenship has an international dimension. Section III argues that the beneficiaries of the international duty to naturalise are the stateless, refugees, and, arguably, some dual nationals, too. Section IV suggests what international reforms are needed to realise the human right to citizenship.

Techno-economic change as danger to republican freedom

Lukas Fuchs_
_Eindhoven University of Technology

ABSTRACT The introduction of new technologies in the form of products, services, as well as production, distribution and advertisement methods into the market has posed great challenges to modern societies since the start of the industrial revolution. In this paper, I wish to analyse this change as a source of danger for republican freedom.

The connection between technical progress, social relations and political processes has already been drawn by Marx's theory of history, but evolutionary economists and transition scholars have sharpened the concept of a dominant economic structure. Perez (2002) coined the concept of "techno-economic paradigms", the common sense for the social and economic usage of new technical advances (for example, the mass production of consumer goods in the post-war era). The "socio-technical regime" (Geels & Schot 2007) similarly captures the cognitive routines of actors in research, technology, markets, industry and politics and which may be challenged and transformed by developments in niches. Both concepts show the enormous societal implications of techno-economic change, which does not appear unexpectedly or as a one-off event, but rather as a recurring, inherent phenomenon of dynamic market economies. The problems that concrete technologies or practices pose to our societies (digital media for democracy, fossil fuels for sustainability, automation for social justice) are merely the most recent examples for threats to the peace and survival of our societies.

Republican theories (Pettit 1997) define freedom as non-domination, that is the independence from arbitrary power and interference. A paradigmatic example for this freedom is the (hypothetical) colonial city that revolts and becomes freer after independence – even if the new city government issues more laws and rules than the previous imperial power. After all, the laws are now made by the city itself and not from the colonial masters who could pass laws and raise taxes arbitrarily. I argue that techno-economic change – especially if not steered by social and political forces – can be understood as similarly arbitrary domination and thus a fundamental danger to republican freedom. Without the social and political shaping, it is arbitrary which tech-

nological niches manage to outcompete and thus transform or replace the dominant regime and how it affects the lives of individuals and societies. Such a replacement or transformation poses a significant interference in the institutions that structure the options for individuals, political decision makers and societies. While there is no actor that can be identified as dominating and limiting such freedom; such domination can nevertheless be understood as structural (in a similar way to feminist accounts of domination).

This analysis shows that an outline of the political institutions of republican political theory must go beyond a merely rights-based conception. The need to shape techno-economic change politically implies the need for public sector organisations which participate not only in the advancement of technical and economic frontiers (through investment, research, innovation projects, missions or challenge prizes), but also in the embedding into social and public purposes (through welfare policies, infrastructure projects, laws and regulations, procurement, tax or social policy).

KEYWORDS Republicanism, techno-economic change, innovation policy

PANEL 7_JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE, DOMINATION AND BEYOND

CONVENOR: HUGO RAJÃO and ANTÓNIO BAPTISTA

The speakers in this panel will include Íñigo González Ricoy (University of Barcelona) and Daniel Halliday (University of Melbourne).

Political philosophy has been concerned with the fair distribution of benefits within society. However, most of these benefits are produced at and via the workplace. Moreover, much of a person's day – and of one's active life as whole – is spent at the workplace and it is here, again, that many significant social relations are formed and maintained. Also, what happens at work has significant spill over effects on a person's life, particularly when relations of hierarchy and domination extend their reach and encroach on workers' private sphere, as Elizabeth Anderson (2017) has argued they frequently do. So, what happens in the workplace should be regarded as a matter of Justice as well and, therefore, as a fundamental topic of Political Philosophy that raises a host of difficult questions.

Are firms political entities? Should the workplace be exempt from the democratic principles that govern society as a whole? Should the workplace be an area of shared democratic decision-making or rather of voluntary one-to-one contracts? Does the capitalist model of enterprise fit with the ideal of a society of equals? Are there alternative models of the enterprise, including non-capitalist ones, which better satisfy the requirements of a Just Society (co-opts, wage-earned funds, co-determination, bicameral system, etc.)?

But the way the workplace is structured, the way it affects those who labor in it and the relations that are established

between the various categories of workers and between these and the owners and CEOs, all of these are structurally connected with factors "external" to the workplace, namely state policy: the legal apparatus that regulates (or fails to regulate) the inner workings of enterprises and the set of rights, both individual and collective, it provides to or withholds from presently-active workers or potential workers. Domination within the workplace, but also without, in politics and society at large, depends on this legal regulation and on the power it affords (or curtails) to capital vis-à-vis labor. The degree of domination as well as the ability to resist domination are crucially dependent on these larger topics related to work and workplace conditions and rights and we seek to address these in our panel.

  In light of this, this panel seeks to discuss the role and impact of workplace justice on the overall problem of Justice in a society and therefore invites contributions relating to (but no limited to) the following topics:

- Workplace democracy.
- Commodification, domination, and exploitation at the workplace.
- Exit options (Unconditional Basic Income, for instance)
- The Goods and Bads of work (income, but not only).
- Conceptions of meaningful work.
- Valuable work beyond the labor market.
- Bargaining power and labor self-control.
- Alternative models to capitalist enterprises
  (co-opt, co-determination, bicameral systems, wage-earned funds)
- Who owns the enterprise (corporation vs firm)?
- Firms as political entities?
- Labor and Human Rights.
- Occupational freedom.
- Working Time Regulation.
- Four-day Workweek.
- Right to Strike.
- Right to Unionize.
- Self-Employment.
- Wage Justice.
- Unemployment Rights.

Relational Egalitarianism, Institutionalism, and Workplace Hierarchy

Brian Berkey_
_University of Pennsylvania

ABSTRACT Relational egalitarian accounts of justice hold that the core value that underlies and grounds requirements and obligations of justice is that of individuals relating to each other as equals. These accounts imply that justice requires that whatever conditions are necessary for individuals to relate to each other as equals obtain, and that conditions that would make it impossible for them to relate as equals are avoided.

Most relational egalitarians believe that certain kinds of hierarchical authority structures, including many of those widely found within firms, are not necessarily incompatible with achieving relational equality. And many believe that this must be the case in order for Relational Egalitarianism to be plausible as an account of justice, since they accept that there are strong reasons to permit firms to be structured in hierarchical ways (e.g. reasons grounded in economic efficiency). The conditions that must be met in order for those at different levels of a hierarchy to relate to each other as equals, however, are plausibly quite demanding. Indeed, the more hierarchical the relevant authority relations are, the more demanding these conditions are likely to be.

Many political philosophers, including many relational egalitarians, also accept some version of the Rawlsian claim that the principles of justice apply to the institutions of the basic structure of society, but do not apply directly to the conduct of individuals and private associations such as firms (I call this view "Institutionalism about Justice," or simply "Institutionalism"). On this view, whatever conditions must obtain in order for justice to be realized must be such that permissible institutional policy, in combination with full compliance by private actors with the rules imposed by such policy, can guarantee them. Individuals and other private associations are obligated to comply with just institutional policies, and to support the implementation of such policies when they do not already exist. But they are not obligated to directly aim at the values that ground the policy requirements in their conduct more generally.

In this paper, I argue that Relational Egalitarianism, Institutionalism, and the view that firms should be legally permitted to be structured in familiar hierarchical ways are mutually incompatible. This means that those who accept the core Relational Egalitarian claim that justice requires that the conditions necessary for individuals to relate to each other as equals obtain must either reject Institutionalism or accept that familiar forms of workplace hierarchy ought to be legally prohibited.

I argue that the best option is to reject Institutionalism, and accept that private actors, including individuals contributing to the determination of firm policy (most importantly those at or near the top of firm hierarchies), and perhaps firms themselves, can be obligated as a matter of justice to promote the realization of egalitarian relations among firm members in conditions that will often be characterized by hierarchical authority relations. This view allows us to hold that workplace structures that tend to promote economic efficiency are not incompatible with justice, without giving up the view that justice requires egalitarian relations among individuals.

Equality as a Social Imperative at Work

Grant Rozeboom_
_Saint Mary's College of California

ABSTRACT Relational egalitarians have cast an attractive vision of moral equality as something made socially real, including in workplaces. They tend to view the moral force of this vision in terms of the principles of justice: relational equality is a feature of what justice demands of the basic structure of society. Accordingly, they tend to rely on "parallel case" arguments that purport to show how workplace authority is sufficiently analogous to state authority so as to be governed by similar constraints (e.g., Anderson, Kolodny, González Ricoy). But this makes it difficult to understand the fundamental way in which relational equality is opposed to objectionable forms of social hierarchy, such as feudal social orders and race-based hierarchies. Such hierarchies tend to persist through the structure of everyday interactions that fall outside the purview of principles of justice.

This has led some relational egalitarians (e.g., Lippert-Rasmussen), instead, to view the moral demands of relational equality as standard, deontic moral requirements that apply most directly to the conduct of natural persons. This is also mistaken. Social hierarchies shape the expectations that others in our social context generally have of us, and they can persist despite some amount of deviance by individuals. We thus need to acknowledge how objectionable social hierarchies exist as a structural feature of social life, the dismantling of which goes beyond what morality might require of individuals, taken one by one.

I propose that relational equality is best understood in terms of a social imperative: a moral requirement to instantiate certain social norms. Social norms are generally accepted, informally enforced, and publicly known rules. Organizations and their members interact with social norms at two basic levels: as subjects, who are expected to comply with the rules, and shapers, who exercise influence over social norms. There are two corresponding levels of moral requirements: subject requirements, which concern what it takes for the members of organizations to follow the rules encoded in morally requisite social norms, and shaper requirements, which forbid them and their organizations from using their social influence to erode or obstruct those social norms.

I conclude from this that there is no general relational egalitarian case for workplace democracy. Workplace democracy consists in the arrangement of a firm such that workers either elect representatives that vote, or themselves directly cast votes, on a wide range of firm governance matters. Assume that the social norms of relational equality must allow for persons to participate in voluntary associations by which they choose to submit to the (limited) direction of others, including priests, coaches, and bosses. Such direction should be somehow accountable to subordinates, but accountability does not generally require democracy; this is clear once we move past analogies with state institutions and examine accountability in other contexts. The subject-level requirements thus do not mandate workplace democracy, at least not generally. And the shaper-level requirements only require workplace democracy if and when this is necessary to prevent workplaces from eroding or obstructing the wider establishment of the social norms of relational equality.

How to Theorise about Employer Authority

Daniel Halliday_
_University of Melbourne

ABSTRACT Employers have the authority to direct the actions of the workers in their employment. Intuitively, this authority is subject to numerous important boundaries. These relate to such things as the protection of leisure time, privacy, various freedoms (religion, speech, political orientation) and a host of other matters that we think of as being none of an employer's business. But it is hard to come up with a principled account of precisely where these boundaries are located, and why they are important. Such an account also needs to explain why certain professions are exempt from certain boundaries, as when professional athletes can be told to follow a certain diet, or prison officers prohibited from joining strongly nationalist political parties. An adequate account also needs to address questions of how the boundaries of employer authority might vary with things like how much a worker is paid, or their level of seniority within an organisation.

There has been much recent philosophical work on the employment relationship. But we are still some way from having a general account of its boundaries. This paper is an attempt to make progress towards an account by comparing and contrasting employment with other kinds of cooperative or contractually-defined relationship.

Employment is tricky because lies some way between 'thin' and 'thick' types of cooperative relationships. Thin relationships are the sort of cooperation where individuals coordinate for mutual advantage, in ways compatible with being quite hostile to each other. It is a feature of human life that we have managed to make successful cooperation achievable in contexts where we don't particularly like each other, at least once there is an established practice of enforceable contracts. Thicker cooperative relationships depend for their success on some stronger sharing of ends, or fellow feeling, beyond mere mutual advantage. This is true of friendship, marriage, and many religious or moralised affiliations. While often unintuitive to describe these as forms of 'cooperation', they often exhibit a contract-like character, with the unintuitiveness of the 'cooperation' label being due to thickness of the relationship making this something of an understatement.

Most familiar categories of cooperative relationship are almost always thin or almost always thick, or else tend to be defective when they are one rather than the other, as in 'marriage of convenience'. Employment is not like this: Employment can exist, and work successfully, as either a thin or thick relationship. But it is sometimes unclear which one it is, or should be. Employment that is actually of one category can sometimes be mistaken for the other category, or indeed misrepresented as such when it suits one of the contracting parties to do so in the event of a dispute. These difficulties are compounded by other unusual features of the employment relationship that are nonetheless distinctive of it, such as its tendency to be hierarchical, and subject to an indeterminacy of contract. Nonetheless, if we can work out in what ways an employment relationship is thick or thin, we can reach greater clarity about the boundaries of employer authority in any given case.

Is liberal-egalitarian labour justice possible? What is equally good work?

Jens Jørund Tyssedal_
_Aarhus University

ABSTRACT Assume, as an egalitarian may, that people should have equally good work as a matter of justice. What would this amount to? This is hard to say, for at least two reasons. First, work can be good and bad in many different ways, along different dimensions. Second, individuals differ in the importance they attach to each such dimension. Any specific account of work-quality, or what a good job is, is likely to be problematically perfectionist to a liberal-egalitarian. However, any theory of labour justice that does not have anything to say about work quality overlooks a blatant fact about the contemporary labour market: that some jobs are better to have than others – and thereby also ignores a significant labour injustice.

This paper therefore pursues the question of whether a liberal-egalitarian, work-quality sensitive theory of labour justice is possible, and what it should be like. It does this by examining justice in the distribution of labour as a problem of multidimensional equality, and studies three proposed answers to the question: 'What does it mean to have equally good work?', on a liberal-egalitarian understanding of work quality.

The first is the envy test. The paper shows why the envy-test is often the preferred approach to multidimensional equality for liberal egalitarians: it provides a plausible interpretation of what it means for people to be equal, all dimensions considered, according to their own conceptions of the good. However, the envy-test runs into impossibility results in many cases, and the distribution of work is nearly sure to be one of these.

Theorists have therefore tried hard to come up with alternatives to the envy-test as accounts of multidimensional equality. The most recent of these is Olson's solidarity solution. Olson proposes a revised version of the envy-test, which only aims at a distribution free of what she calls (eliminable) impersonal envy. The paper argues that this does approach falls short of the desiderata that makes the envy-test so attractive to liberal egalitarians, and argues that it also fails to satisfy the kind of relational egalitarian desiderata Olson suggests it lives up to, such as mutual justifiability to all.

A third option is 'egalitarian equivalence', i.e. envy-freeness relative to a reference bundle of work and income. The main problem for this approach is neutrality in the choice of reference bundle. The paper argues that for work specifically, this problem may be overcome: there may be no work that is equally good to all, but perhaps there is work that is roughly equally bad to all. Hence, egalitarian equivalence may be a decent approach to what it means to have equally good (or bad) work, or at least, the best we can get.

The paper ends with a discussion of what practical implications such 'transcendental', highly theoretical approaches to work quality sensitive labour justice may have.

A New Path to Workplace Democracy: Meaningful Work as Recognised Contribution

James Carey_
_University of Edinburgh

ABSTRACT In this paper I defend a new account of meaningful work before arguing that it provides a new path to workplace democracy, different to traditional routes from autonomy and recognition.

Philosophers have argued the case for workplace democracy from claims to a right to meaningful work (Schwartz 1982; Yeoman 2014), but there remains no clear consensus on what 'meaningful work' is (Cholbi 2022; Michaelson 2021; Tyssedal 2022). A definition is needed, not just for workers desiring meaningful work and work relations (Rosso, Dekas, and Wrzesniewski 2010; Bailey and Madden 2016; Lips-Wiersma and Morris 2009) but for employers competing for employees against the backdrop of the 'great resignation' after Covid-19, campaigns for four-day work-weeks, and general disillusionment with 'work-centred society' (Frayne 2015).

I present my claim that meaningful work is best characterised as self-realising activity, consciously aimed at satisfying the needs of others, in which the work is recognised by the recipient having satisfied that need. I argue this new definition is superior to existing definitions for at least three reasons: It is more precise, illustrating what it is about work qua work that makes it meaningful, and not eliding work into a theory of life's meaning; it is more practical, enabling workers to judge between different types of work based on how meaningful they are; and it is intuitive, giving answers to some hard cases of distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless work.

This conception is then argued to provide a new path to workplace democracy from meaningful work as recognised contribution. Arguments from autonomy posit workplace democracy as a prerequisite for the individual autonomy meaningful work comprises. Recognition theorists claim meaningful work requires workers to achieve recognition, and in turn self-respect or self-esteem; workplace democracy likewise provides the necessary conditions (Frega, Herzog, and Neuhäuser 2019). The new conception proposed appeals not to individual needs, but to work's intrinsically oth-

er-directed nature, and recognition of our contribution to others. In this way it appeals directly to work's defining feature: its other-directed nature.

Work is an essentially contributive activity (Althorpe 2022), and workers must recognise, and be recognised for, their consciously-aimed contributions for work to be meaningful. I argue that firstly, emphasising recognition of contribution to shared goals promotes workplace solidarity. Secondly, workplace democracy enables workers to reintegrate shared objectives into their own conscious aims. Finally, it engages them with their own contribution to the needs of others', further enhancing meaning. As such, a new path to workplace democracy emerges from meaningful work as recognised contribution.

Democracy at work in a neoliberal economy: justice and solidarity as concurring and countermovements to economic efficiency

Pedro Teixeira_
_ Centre Marc Bloch, Humboldt University, Berlin

ABSTRACT The ideal of workplace democracy, generally understood as the exercise of power by workers both inside and outside firms, is again gaining traction in academic debates (e.g. Frega et al., 2019). This newfound popularity, however, obscures the existence of a wide set of proposed models, ranging from classical trade unionism to the German model of co-determination, and including models and notions as far apart as French-inspired workers' self-management, teamwork and employee involvement, employee stock ownership plans, profit sharing schemes and workers' cooperatives.

While these models stem from the application of different conceptions of democracy and representation to historically situated forms of economic organisation, their legitimacy and desirability is often measured up against the twin criteria of justice and efficiency. On the one hand, these models promise to represent the interests of workers in their struggle for higher wages, better control of the work environment, and stronger legal protections; but on the other hand, these promises are made against the backdrop of existing socio-economic arrangements, market pressures, and macroeconomic goals.

In the heyday of industrial citizenship, before the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s, this tension was precariously solved by state-regulated collective bargaining between employers and trade unions, or by integrating workers into management boards. But the exact manner of this solution depended heavily on the adopted model, which in turn had an impact extending beyond the firm. Whereas, in the former, the interests of workers (namely higher wages) were balanced against the interests of employers (higher profits, keeping productivity levels) as the outcome of negotiations, in the latter case the rival interests of both parties were partially merged into the internal

decision-making space of the firm. Both paths, however, fundamentally assumed a trade-off between justice and economic efficiency – in other words, a *compromise*.

Today, despite unionization rates now far below those observed until the late 70s, and an economic landscape increasingly characterized by fewer face-to-face interactions between workers, the tension between justice and efficiency is no less relevant (Dukes and Streeck, 2022). But while the presupposition of an inherent trade-off is still dominant, new forms of solidarity among workers beyond the workplace – but within their own "occupational communities" – may be seen as contributing to greater economic efficiency in ways that go beyond the mere stabilization of employment relations. This, in turn, suggests an interpretation of the struggles for justice and solidarity extending beyond the Polanyian notion of a one-sided countermovement. This changed perspective entails relevant consequences to the choice of the best model of workplace democracy, to the framing of labour law and to the socio-economic rights as enshrined in constitutional orders.

KEYWORDS Workplace Democracy, Solidarity, Justice, Neoliberalism,
          Occupational Communities

Green Decommodification of Labor and Universal Basic Services

Miloš Kovačević_
_University of Belgrade

ABSTRACT The ecological footprint of the struggle for a change in power relations at the workplace was and still largely remains a blind spot of the Left, which tried to ensure high employment security through full employment, worker organizing, and improved working conditions, all of which were supposed to ultimately result in a radical change in the balance of power between labor and capital. However, in that process, the interests of workers were merged with the interests of capital to a certain extent, given that economic growth implied both profit maximization and an increase in employment. Since our economy is predominantly based on fossil fuels, the increase in employment results in a rise in greenhouse gas emissions, which is accelerating the degradation of the environment.

The main question I will explore in this paper is: how can we decommodify labor in a sustainable and just way without repeating the mistakes of the traditional Left? In order to do that, I will employ the degrowth paradigm. Within this alternative theoretical framework, the integration of nature and society is understood contrary to the dominant productivist paradigm, according to which more is always better. The critique of the commodification of labor is a central theoretical component of the critique of productivism. Thus, degrowth shares with the productivist Left freedom from wage labor as its goal, but since it is insisting on sustainability, it sets before itself a more complex task—the green decommodification of labor.

In the first part of the paper, I will explain how the commodification of labor affects the freedom of workers, the value of different types of work, and the environment. In the second part of the paper, I will outline the relationship between work and the economy in general that is required in order for the Earth to become a safe and just place for all. Finally, I will explore universal basic services as a novel idea that has the potential to redefine the welfare state and successfully respond to the numerous social challenges we face. The term universal means that services are available to everyone, regardless of their income or status. Then, the term basic ought to be understood as

meaning essential and sufficient to enable people to meet their needs. Finally, the term service means collectively generated activities that serve the public interest. Universal basic services imply the expansion of the range of free public services that will ensure access to every citizen (or resident) to an adequate degree of security, opportunity, and participation. It has been noted that universal basic services contribute to the reduction of social inequalities, the increase of solidarity, greater efficiency in the provision of the services, as well as sustainability. However, I will argue that the radical potential of this policy is best reflected in the fundamental change that it would make in our understanding of work.

The transnational firm, a government-fostered feudal suzerain

Elena Matias Casacuberta_
_ Centre for Political Research. Sciences Po (CEVIPOF)

ABSTRACT This article defends that transnational firms can be seen as feudal suzerains having a significant power of domination over employees thanks to their legal and economic structure. This thesis is of strong interest since it means that, in our democratic societies, we are accepting the existence of feudal institutions with arbitrary authority dominating employees. This is made possible thanks to legal principles protected, even fostered, by governments: the legal personhood of the corporation and property rights. To defend this, the article proceeds in three times.

First, it presents key legal notions to understand the functioning of the firm and to emphasize the importance of law in capitalism. The article explores two legal principles that allow the firm to exist as it does today: (i) The corporation as a legal person and the principle of limited liability; (ii) Property, accessible to the corporation's legal personhood, which serves as a basis for showing how power is concentrated within firms through the concentration of property rights and associated prerogatives. This property approach emphasizes that it is not a question of thinking of the firm as an object of property, but, on the contrary, as the subject of property. This anchoring in property rights serves as a starting point for dealing with the normative power of the firm, and its capacity to create new normative incidents.

Second, the article defends that the firm is an institution of a political nature. The idea is to show that the firm is an institution that has an existence in itself, independent of its members, who are only there to instantiate it and allow it to act on the world. The article defends the comparison between the firm and the State to stress the political nature of the firm, namely through the importance of authority and decisions inside the firm. Moreover, the development of information technology and instantaneous exchange has led to an evolution of the relationships between members and the decision-making procedures, changing the power dynamics within the firm. For example, employees are often looked at as numerical (commercial) objectives which accentuates their loss of autonomy within the firm. This has led to, in Alain Supiot's words, the return of the bonds of allegiance and relations of vassalage, which com-

pletes the conceptualization of the firm as a feudal suzerain, setting its own, potentially non-democratic, rules.

Finally, the article reviews three possible ways to democratize the workplace: economic bicameralism, the constitutionalization of the firm, and the reform of accounting standards. To do so, it starts by questioning the sometimes taken-for-granted private nature of the firm, to defend that it is not possible, given that the firm's functioning rests on government-granted legal rights, to pretend that the firm should be excluded from State intervention. In fine, it explores each of the three mechanisms to conclude that, to achieve a proper democratization of the workplace, they have to be thought and implemented together.

KEYWORDS Workplace democracy; property rights; firm regulation; political theory; feudal power

Freedom as non-domination: workplace democracy or democracy tout court?

Elena Icardi_
_University of Pavia

ABSTRACT Freedom as non-domination stands as the key concept of Neo-republicanism – a now well-established stance within contemporary Political Philosophy. Roughly speaking, to be free from domination one person should not be exposed to anyone else's arbitrary power (Pettit, 1997; 2012). This is often not the case of employees vis-à-vis their employers in our capitalistic societies. Many studies have recently been conducted in this regard. Because of the power provided to those who own the means of production by their ownership, those who do not own the means of production are dominated by them, i.e., exposed to their arbitrariness. Thus, scholars have started advocating workplace democracy to prevent workers from being at the mercy of their bosses (Gourevitch, 2013; Anderson, 2015).

However, workplace democracy addresses only part of the problem by leaving "citizens outside the firm at the mercy of those within it" (O'Shea, 2020, p. 559). Besides, this issue is even more worrisome if we consider the relationship between owners of the means of production and non-owners not only as an interpersonal kind of domination but also, and above all, as a systemic one (Gädeke, 2020). Non-owners are dominated by owners even if they do not directly face them. Within a capitalist system, indeed, those who do not own the means of production are systemically disempowered vis-à-vis those who own them even if they are not employees – in a similar way in which in patriarchal society women are systemically disempowered vis-à-vis men even if they do not have a husband. How could such a structural economic domination be solved?

This is the question that the present paper aims to address. Two alternatives are hence taken into account: the provision of an economic minimum (Lovett, 2010; Taylor, 2017), on the one hand, and the public ownership of the means of production (O'Shea, 2020), on the other. I argue that while the former is not enough to solve the abovementioned problem, the latter goes too far. Even if they do not need to work

because of their economic minimum, those who do not own the means of production are exposed to the arbitrary power of those who own them who discretionary set the rules of the labor market. Moreover, the bargaining power following such an economic minimum would not change the existing power asymmetry among them. On the other hand, the public ownership of the means of production appears too demanding. Although, to solve the shortcuts of workplace democracy, economic decisions should indeed be taken by citizens in the broad democratic process, substantive choices (e.g., who should own the means of production) should be left in the hands of citizens themselves or else risk being arbitrary. Therefore, more than a workplace democracy, I argue, we need democracy to really take care of labor market's rules so as to avoid their arbitrariness.

A defense of the state's refusal to enforce unconscionable (exploitative) contracts

Soo Jin (Suzie) Kim_
_Kyung Hee University

ABSTRACT Libertarian proponents of freedom of contract have argued against the state's refusal to enforce unconscionable (exploitative) contracts on the grounds that such a refusal tends to worsen the situation of the vulnerable party, or restricts individual liberty on the basis of paternalistic or perfectionistic reasons.

Against these objections, I argue that unconscionable contracts are problematic for three main reasons, contrary to those who argue that unconscionable contracts are fine as long as the procedural requirements of valid contract formation are satisfied (viz. competence, sufficient information, and consent). Even if we assume that unconscionable contracts are procedurally valid, unconscionable contracts are problematic because they allow A to take unfair advantage of B's vulnerability which is simply due to B's bad luck (and not B's fault or choice). Second, unconscionable contracts undermine the social bases of self-respect by promoting meaningless forms of work that diminish the agent's sense of herself as a being who is capable of pursuing worthwhile goals that others too, can recognize as worthwhile. Thirdly, unconscionable contracts tend to create a self-perpetuating cycle of oppression that undermines fair equality of opportunity for success in the long run. For these three reasons, I argue that under certain conditions, the state's refusal to enforce unconscionable contracts is not merely permissible, but positively desirable.

Furthermore, I argue that the above account of the wrongness of unconscionable contracts is superior to existing accounts that purport to explain the wrongness of unconscionability (or exploitation). On one existing account, put forth by Margaret J. Radin, unconscionable contracts are wrong in virtue of their tendency to commodify things that ought not to be commodified, such as sexual labor or reproductive capacities. According to another account, suggested by Debra Satz, exploitative or unconscionable labor relations constitute noxious markets which exhibit morally problematic features such as creating opportunities for A to profit from B's extreme poverty,

lack of access to information, or producing extremely harmful outcomes for B. But none of these accounts, for reasons I will clarify more fully in the paper, sufficiently explain why unconscionable contracts are problematic on terms that can overcome the arguments that proponents of an unlimited freedom of contract advance in support of a regular enforcement of unconscionable contracts. Specifically, although Radin's commodification argument and Satz's pluralistic argument appeal to our moral intuitions, their accounts lack the resources to explain why commodification or choices made in response to extreme poverty are wrong even if the agents voluntarily consented to the contract and the contract is mutually advantageous (at least, in the short run). The account I suggest in my paper, however, can explain why these intuitively repugnant features of unconscionable contracts are problematic, without appealing to question-begging intuitions.

In the final part of the paper, I elaborate on the conditions under which the state's refusal to enforce unconscionable contracts is permissible (or perhaps also desirable). The first is that the refusal does not make the vulnerable agent worse off relative to the situation of no restriction. Second, the refusal expresses due respect for the agent's status as a moral person, capable of rationally revising and pursuing her own chosen conception of the good. Third, the rationale for the refusal is not be grounded in any particular comprehensive conception of value. I claim that the state's refusal to enforce unconscionable contracts is desirable when (and only when) all three conditions are jointly satisfied. I use the case of unconscionable contracts in the market for sexual labor in order to show how refusals to enforce such contracts may be rendered compatible with the three conditions suggested above.

Working-From-Home and the Gendered Division of Labour

Rebecca Clark_
_University of Oxford

ABSTRACT In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, working-from-home (WFH) has rapidly become commonplace for white-collar workers across rich industrialised economies. No doubt because of its novelty, the practice is yet to receive critical attention from political philosophers. This paper makes a step towards remedying this by considering the impact of more opportunities to work-from-home on gender justice. The contribution of this paper is two-fold: first, I diagnose what is pro tanto beneficial and objectionable about greater opportunities to work-from-home from a feminist perspective; second, I offer policy solutions to address the feminist dilemma that results.

On the face of it, more opportunities to work-from-home are unequivocally good; if we value individuals' autonomy and wellbeing, then we should welcome workers being able to decide the location of their work. Indeed, since working-from-home improves the labour market participation of people with caring responsibilities, many claim that the ability to work-from-home is especially beneficial for women.

Against this view, social scientists have warned that working-from-home typically harms a person's own career prospects relative to their in-person colleagues; since women are predicted to work-from-home more than men in the future, women will disproportionately suffer these career penalties. However, this objection is relatively weak since individuals can rightly be held responsible for the outcomes of their choices so long as they are reasonably well-informed and have adequate outside options.

A much stronger feminist objection to greater opportunities to work-from-home focuses on the aggregate effect of individuals' choices on other individuals and social structures. Firstly, women's choices to work-from-home will likely have negative spill-over effects on other women. For example, if fewer women reach 'top' positions over time due to having worked-from-home more than men, this will likely have a knock-on impact on who gets hired due to implicit biases. Secondly, the ability to work-from-home is likely to increase the amount of unpaid reproductive labour carried out by women and to ease the pressures associated with the double burden, thereby perpetuating gender-unjust social structures (namely, the dual-breadwinner model).

Feminists must trade off these two deleterious aggregative effects against the fact that more opportunities to work-from-home benefit caregivers through better employment prospects. This feminist dilemma is structurally analogous to feminist debates around a universal basic income, part-time work, and parental leave.

In response, I propose that governments implement gender-egalitarian interventions into WFH; an example of this is Article 166-A in the Portuguese Labour Code, which grants parents with children up to eight-years-old the right to work-from-home so long as each parent exercises this right in consecutive periods of equivalent length. This must be combined with greater state provision of childcare to ensure that the ability to work-from-home does not undermine the basis for the success of the feminist demand for more childcare support. This policy package would retain the benefits of WFH whilst reducing negative spill-over effects (since more men would work-from-home) and challenging gender roles (since the policy would have an expressive effect that would encourage men to perform more domestic labour and caregiving).

Free time isn't working

Simeon Goldstraw_
_Nuffield College, University of Oxford

ABSTRACT There is a burgeoning view in political philosophy that citizens have a right to free time. Sometimes, philosophers argue that free time can counteract unjust work conditions or offset some of work's more damaging effects. Quite often though, the arguments for free time are not directly connected to work, and are instead grounded in giving people a temporal resource which they can choose to use as they wish. In this paper, I argue that these arguments for free time need to be clearer about why it is that free time is important, because this will affect how we prescribe free time and what other goods and conditions ought to be introduced to complement that free time.

Existing arguments tend to shy away from stipulating how citizens ought to use their free time due to worries about paternalism and perfectionism. This may be reasonable under ideal conditions, when we can assume that any fair distribution of free time would be supplemented with a just distribution of other all-purpose goods like income and wealth, but it is less helpful in conditions like the real-world where there is likely to be a maldistribution of resources and opportunities to use in one's free time. Under these conditions, simply giving citizens free time may either do little to expand the opportunities that are available to them, or may even have malign effects if they have more time and little they are able to do with it.

Being clearer about what it is that we envisage citizens dedicating their free time to can show us how much time they require and what other conditions and resources they may need to make the most of that free time. I identify three separate motivations for free time: exercising one's basic rights, rest, and being at leisure. I claim that which of these motivations we are most committed to will likely affect how we should allocate free time and what resources we should prioritise ensuring people have to make the most of their free time.

I demonstrate this by discussing the idea of a four-day week, which is gaining growing traction due to successful and ongoing trials in Iceland, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom. I argue that the primary motivation for a four-day week is to maximise people's opportunities to be "at leisure". I then argue that in order for people to be at leisure, they require a wider bundle of "leisure goods" that provides them with fulfilling opportunities, and that we must tackle social norms that tend to make peo-

ple feel guilty about not working. A failure to secure these goods and conditions may either undermine the motivation for the four-day week, or lead to inequalities in how people enjoy the four-day week that track and exacerbate existing class, gendered and racial inequalities.

On two problems for workplace democratization and their solution via a workers' dictatorship

Philipp Stehr_
_Utrecht University

ABSTRACT The workplace democracy debate has articulated the idea that workplaces are arbitrary exercises of power by employers that have unjustifiably wide discretion over their employees. The focus of the debate so far has been the normative basis for rejecting such structures and the development of alternatives. Far less attention has been paid to the feasibility of alternatives. With this paper I contribute to filling this gap by building on Marx's idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In doing so I shed light on an underappreciated kind of problem of internal stability for democratizing workplaces and I show that transitional dictatorial forms of corporate government can, like the dictatorship of the proletariat, be justified from a democratic point of view.

Existing approaches to workplace democracy only offer static understandings of the establishment of institutional alternatives. They envision reforms in corporate law for example that are supposed to bring about more democratic institutions. But they lack serious consideration of the social conditions under which such change will take place. These social conditions can however threaten the transition to more democratic institutions. In the first part of my paper I offer two examples of such threats. First, democratizing workplaces means giving power to those not used to having it. When the formerly disenfranchised are given power they lack experience in wielding it. This might lead to detrimental outcomes. Second, democratizing workplaces means taking power from those who are used to having it. Former bosses might be unwilling to cooperate with their former underlings, also hampering the transition.

In the second part of my paper I suggest that we therefore need to develop alternatives that are not only more democratic but also resilient to threats so that they enable the transition to a fully democratic alternative. Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat is an example of such a resilient transitional structure. Marx foresaw problems similar to the ones mentioned above for the overthrow of a capitalist society and suggested the dictatorship of the proletariat to deal with them. Lea Ypi has recently reconstructed

how Marx's dictatorship of the proletariat can be democratically justified. A corporate dictatorship of the formerly disenfranchised can be justified in the same manner, appealing to its transitional status, its sharply defined goals, and the fact that it is working towards its own superfluousness.

The corporate dictatorship of the workers is a worker-elected body that will take over the existing positions of authoritarian power within the corporation to further the goal of democratization. It is tasked with dismantling authoritarian relations wherever possible, providing opportunities for worker education, and securing the cooperation of indispensable capitalists. Its dictatorial character lies in the fact that it is only elected by the formerly disenfranchised. The capitalists will have no say in appointing the dictatorship because the problem we are concerned with is precisely that these capitalists are incentivized to work against democratization.

Neither Self-realization nor Needs Satisfaction: A Dilemma of Marx's View of Unalienated Production

Man-kong Li_
_Hang Seng University of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT This paper attacks a much neglected aspect of recent Marxist and social-ist attempts of invoking self-realization in work or production as a normative ideal in reforming the capitalist organization of work. In a recent article, Jan Kandiyali argues that according to Marx's view of unalienated production, people self-realize through producing goods and services that others need. Kandiyali's article is by far the most comprehensive reconstruction and defense of Marx's view of unalienated production along similar lines. This paper would show that Kandiyali's reconstruction, however, would be caught into a dilemma: either the producer's self-realization or the satisfac-tion of others' needs has to be prioritized, but Marx's view of unalienated production could afford to prioritize neither. I shall dub this dilemma 'the socialist dilemma', and illustrate in this paper its problem vividly by a hypothetical case of Jane the engineer who was also aspiring to be a moral philosopher: according to Marx's view of unalien-ated production, I shall show, she should neither be coerced to be an engineer nor be allowed to be a moral philosopher. I argue that there could be no way out for Marx's view of the socialist dilemma. It is because the root cause of the dilemma is due to a structural defect of Marx's view, despite Kandiyali's rather successful defense of its substance. Indeed, it is precisely because Kandiyali's reconstruction and defense is so faithful to the general outlook of Marx's social and political thought, that the prob-lematic aspect of Marx's view could now be made clear. The problem of Marx's view, I argue, is rooted in its very theoretical structure, namely that there are no priority rules from within the theoretical resources of Marx's writings to decide the normative weight to be accorded to people's self-realization in production and satisfaction of people's basic needs. Classical Marxists appealed to the proposition that there will be material abundance in the communist future to evade this problem, which, I contend, contem-porary Marxists and non-Marxist socialists have good reasons to set aside. Therefore, in conclusion, I argue that Marx's view of unalienated production can only be rescued

from the socialist dilemma by incorporating normative concepts that Kandiyali and many Marxists rightly reject as not fitting with the general outlook of Marx's social and political thought, namely the duty or social responsibility to satisfy others needs, and/or the incentives to induce people to work or produce for what other people urgently need. The important lesson to be drawn from the discussion of this paper, then, is that while self-realization in production or work is an attractive ideal, socialists should be more cautious and attentive to the trade-off in value and policy that might arise in defending it.

Democratic Platforms

Adrián Herranz_
_University of Pompeu Fabra

The most widely used argument to justify democracy in the firm alludes to an analogy between the requirements of self-government in the political and labour spheres. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring how to apply the argument to the case of labour-based platform firms: First, it sets out how labour is coordinated on the platform. Workers respond to signals encoded in algorithms to make exchanges with customers. In this way, platforms shape the rules of the game that allow workers to access and manoeuvre in the market. Even if they do not respond to a boss's orders, workers are subjected to the conditions of the platform, which thereby have an arbitrary or uncontrolled power that compromises workers' interests. Since workers are subjected to the rules, they should be able to participate in the firm decision-making and have a say in how the algorithm works. Second, the paper addresses the criticism that workplace democracy would erase worker flexibility. Currently, platform workers can choose when to work and how much time expend doing it. This fact enhances the flexibility they enjoy vis-à-vis the conditions of a regular salaried worker. In order to respond to the criticism, the paper shows different institutional models of platform cooperatives. Some models are similar to traditional worker cooperatives, where workers receive regular payment. Other models are akin to producer cooperatives, where workers own and manage a common infrastructure but individually decide when to work. These are compatible with the flexibility of the on-demand economy. Third, the paper addresses the criticism that platform cooperatives are less convenient than other policies, mainly because they are hard to implement due to network effects and firms' economies of scale. On the one hand, even if other worker-friendly policies would be desirable, they cannot replace the distinctive features of workplace democracy. Democratic participation is a dynamic feedback and accountability mechanism between workers and the company. This point becomes increasingly important considering the role of information in the platform sector, given that the handling and processing of data on workers and consumers is an integral part of the business. On the other hand, besides economic incentives and public ownership, we have other tools to make the transition easier. If we make some of the vital technology interoperable by different

firms, that will decrease the costs of entry. The transition then is also desirable to create a more competitive market.

Would a worker-managed market economy have normatively undesirable properties?

Angus Hebenton_
_University of York

ABSTRACT Philosophical discussion of a possible right to workplace democracy often fails to distinguish if such a right is an absolute or a conditional requirement of justice. For many liberal political theorists of justice, such as Rawls, political democracy has a quasi-absolute value. Arguments for workplace democracy based on strict parallel case arguments, whether based on equality or non-domination, might therefore also hold workplace democracy to be a constitutionally protected right. Alternatively, if the analogy between political and workplace democracy is a looser one then arguments for the justice of workplace democracy might only be true pro tanto. Given the instrumental goals of economic institutions, it is arguably implausible that we should be indifferent to the welfare outcomes of different economic systems, or to the distribution of these outcomes. Moreover, the nature of such outcomes is inevitably speculative since the mere empirical fact that worker-managed firms often compete successfully with conventional capitalist firms does not demonstrate that the systemic properties of a hypothetical economy in which worker-management was dominant or universal are comparable to those of existing market economies.

To investigate this speculative question, I present findings from my extensive review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of worker-management and identify its likely effects on aggregate social welfare and its distribution. I suggest that aggregate welfare may be affected by the impact of worker-management on: (i) static economic efficiency; (ii) investment, innovation, and long-run economic growth; (iii) macro-economic stability and (iv) social and environmental externalities. I also assess the effects of worker management on working conditions themselves, including not only presumed benefits but the possible dangers raised by some Marxist critics of the market of competitive 'self-exploitation'. Finally, I assess the justice of the distributional outcomes of an economy dominated by worker-managed firms. My conclusion is that there is little serious reason to be concerned that a democratic,

regulated, worker-managed market socialism – provided it also maintained a significant public non-market sector – would have significantly worse welfare or distributive outcomes than democratic, regulated, welfare state capitalism. Indeed, there are compelling reasons to think that it would tend towards improved worker well-being, more socially responsible economic activity, and the reduction of unjust distributive inequalities. As such, if there is a valid pro tanto case for the justice of workplace democracy, then this should suffice to establish its general desirability, outside of exceptional cases (e.g. the state administration or armed forces).

Efficient Production Without Domination: The Case of Labor-Managed Firms

Íñigo González Ricoy_
_University of Barcelona

ABSTRACT Nondomination and productive efficiency are often seen as compelling, yet competing, requirements we have reason to hold firms to. Here, I will argue otherwise: in most cases, these requirements are closely intertwined. And I will also argue that labor-managed firms, if suitably organized to economize on transaction costs, can satisfy both—better indeed than investor-controlled firms can. I will start with the view, usual among critics, that normative theories of labor-managed firms overlook efficiency considerations or see them as mere feasibility constraints. This invites the worry that labor-managed firms trade efficient production for other values, and that pursuing such values may yield poorer outcomes, harming not just investors but consumers and workers as well. On the view I will offer, by contrast, productive efficiency is not a constraint but a central normative requirement to hold firms to—a requirement whose centrality is not merely grounded on serving distributive justice or on firms' fiduciary duty to create wealth but on relational reasons, including reasons to minimize domination, too. I will next argue that we have reasons—partly grounded, to repeat, on relational considerations—to make extensive use of hierarchy and open-ended authority in organizing production in labor-managed firms, and will lean on the theory of the firm in transaction costs economics to pinpoint the efficiency benefits that workplace hierarchy can yield. To be sure, in pursuing productive efficiency, employers may no doubt be tempted to cut down on toilet breaks or fire pregnant women, and so the efficiency and the relational requirements may sometimes drift apart. But most often the latter need not undermine, but rather serve, the former—both by constraining the ways in which bosses deploy their authority over staff and by serving the interest employees have in their firms being efficiently run. I will close by unpacking the basic principles that should guide the organization of labor-managed firms, if these are to deliver efficient production without domination, and with various objections.

KEYWORDS workplace democracy, relational equality, nondomination, productive efficiency

PANEL 8_INFLUENCED BY TECHNOLOGIES. ETHICAL ISSUES

CONVENOR: STEFANO CALBOLI

The panel wants to promote the investigation of ethical issues in employing technologies (e.g., social robots, wearable technologies, and virtual agents) to purposely influence users through typically concealed means, e.g., nudges and persuasive attitudes. Literature concerning, on one side, the ethics of nudging through technologies (see Borenstein & Arkin 2015; Yeung 2016) and, on the other side, the ethics of persuasive technology (see Siegel et al. 2009; Fogg 2003) revealed phenomena that need of an in-depth investigation. Considering cases in which humans influence humans, nudges and persuasive attitudes are influences primarily investigated within behavioral sciences, cognitive sciences, and social engineering. Insights from such disciplines seem extensive and featured by a precision high enough to provide choice architects with means that effectively mold human behaviors. However, the relevance of such insights when human-technologies interactions are in focus would deserve a more exhaustive investigation. In particular, the ethical implications of influencing technological tools deserve further analysis, especially in those cases in which it is easy that its influences to remain unnoticed by those who are influenced. Evidence and ethical considerations regarding potential concealed influences exerted directly by humans could not be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the cases in which technologies are instead employed. This potential asymmetry is the ratio behind the panel.

The panel aims to develop an interdisciplinary research agenda that connects behavioral economics, cognitive sciences,

behavioral sciences, social robotics, social engineering, and captology. Questions to be addressed include – but are not limited to – the following:

- Should influences by technologies be expected to be as effective as when implemented by humans?
- Are there specific ethical challenges in place when technologies are exerted?
- Does the use of technologies open new solutions to the ethical challenges associated with nudges and means of persuasion?
- What kind of (if any) new knowledge or epistemic influences are typical of influences exerted by technologies?
- Could influencing technologies help us to taxonomize influences and identify the ethical issues specifically related to each kind of influence?
- How should the responsibility of detecting influences through technologies be shared among influencers and those who are influenced?

Nudging AI

Laura Miller_
_Webster University, Shadowing.ai

ABSTRACT When we trust someone, we recognize that we have good reasons to do so. What is often subconscious is that when we give our trust to others, we also allow them to nudge or influence our views. I will argue that due to the ability of technology and notably artificial intelligence (AI), to nudge us, that we must hold technology accountable as if it were an epistemic peer. Therefore, a new approach to evaluating technology as trustworthy, one that includes both ethical considerations and epistemic peer status, is needed.

It is my assertion that those seeking to identify trustworthy AI should undertake their review using an ethical and epistemic inquiry (EEi). The value in this view is that it correctly recognizes that the identification of something as ethical does not reveal the quality of the information that is shared. In fact, it may add to our presumption of accuracy if we believe the source is ethical. Instead, ethical people and technology can make mistakes, even consistent ones, despite their good intentions. Similarly, a reliable source does not mean that it has acquired or provided information in an ethical manner. The EEi approach, then, recognizes the present understanding of responsible AI has been limited by focusing on AI's capabilities, rather than what it may be credited to know.

Current evaluations of technology occur through ethical AI frameworks whose emphasis is focused on ensuring that our technology is "valid and reliable [performs as designed], safe, secure and resilient, accountable and transparent, explainable and interpretable, privacy-enhanced, and fair (with harmful bias managed)" (NIST). Whereas epistemic peer status is directed towards those who are like us in terms of intelligence, shrewdness, honesty, and exposure to evidence and arguments, and who evaluate claims and arguments like we do (Gutting, Kelly, Elga). The benefit of the EEi approach is that AI would now be evaluated on quality of the information it provides to us in addition to its ethical development and behavior. This approach would allow us to have a vehicle to determine when and why we should or should not allow ourselves to be nudged by the AI we create.

Some may object to this view by stating the EEi seeks to bolster the idea that technology can be our epistemic peer. While this is a valid concern, it misses an important

point. EEi provides a litmus test to remind us that AI is not our epistemic peer but our hallucination of one. Without the EEi we cannot recognize this hallucination or remind ourselves of the limits of AI and when we should refuse nudges from it.

Problematic Rational Persuasion in Digital Technology

Thomas Mitchell_
_University of Oxford

ABSTRACT Rational persuasion is often considered a morally innocuous mode of influence and contrasted to manipulative, coercive, and paternalistic practices. However, this paper argues that this picture is incorrect. It will be shown that rational persuasion can be pro tanto wrong and that wrongful rational persuasion is particularly apt to be used in online contexts. Some, such as George Tsai (2014), Moti Gorin (2014a; 2014b), and Robin McKenna (2020), have argued previously that rational persuasion can be wrongful, but there is a threefold novelty to the current paper. First, it identifies further kinds of wrongful rational persuasion. Second, it applies the issue of wrongful rational persuasion to digital communication. Third, it shows how the dangers of the online world are not limited to the much-discussed issues of fake news, conspiracy theories, and hate speech.

For current purposes, a complete definition of rational persuasion is not necessary. Instead, we present a set of three jointly sufficient conditions: A rationally persuades B to adopt attitude α if (i) A brings B to rationally adopt α, (ii) A does so by giving reasons to B in favour of their adopting α, and (iii) B adopts α on the basis of the reasons given by A.

We next consider what makes pro tanto wrongful modes of influence like coercion and manipulation wrong, when they are wrong. Six wrong-making features are identified. These are: reducing autonomy; misleading; treating another as less than a moral equal; causing net harm; bypassing rationality; and subverting rationality.

We then turn to four prima facie problematic methods of rational persuasion and show that they each bear at least one of these wrong-making features. We discuss, in turn, carefully selecting an audience to maximise the impact of a rationally persuasive message; giving unsolicited advice or opinions when one lacks the standing to do so; rationally persuading another of something one knows to be false; and rationally persuading someone to have an attitude that is likely to have a negative impact on their wellbeing, such as excessive self-doubt or fear.

Finally, it is shown how these wrongful kinds of rational persuasion can be used online. The Internet allows persuaders to precisely target those who are most sus-

ceptible to their message by gathering data and employing sophisticated algorithms. 'Influencers' and bloggers who provide their views to others can be easily found without being specifically searched for. There is also plenty of misinformation – not just outlandish conspiracy theories, but also more plausible claims with some degree of evidence, but which are nonetheless known to be false by the claimants. Finally, the Internet can have a severe impact on users' mental health; by emphasising certain issues rather than others, social media echo chambers can persuade users into being depressed or fearful.

Of course, there are many other kinds of immoral influence online. But it is interesting that even exclusively using rational persuasion is no guarantee that one's influence is unproblematic and that Internet users are particularly vulnerable to such techniques.

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KEYWORDS Persuasion; Technology; Rationality; Manipulation; Internet

We can personalize nudges' transparency. What should we do? If so, how?

Stefano Calboli_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT In this paper, a subset of nudges, digital nudges, are considered, namely cases in which nudges are introduced within digital environments and are meant to influence a choice made within that environment. It is explored how employing digital nudges unfolds the possibility to personalize not only nudging processes but as well the kind of safeguards citizens should be guaranteed to consider nudges legitimate policy tools in modern liberal democracies. Making nudges transparent to citizens is an ethical requirement whereby individual deliberation and public scrutiny are highly valued and, at least in certain cases, the same holds for making available information salient for public scrutiny. Safeguards of this kind can be tailored based on individual citizens' traits when digital nudges are in place. In the final part of the paper the answer to the normative question begs for an answer: should policymakers factually take advantage of personalized safeguards? If so, are there any limitations? The last section is devoted to discussing a challenge that arguably will emerge in further discussing personal transparency and to pointing out the merits of a specific multidisciplinary methodology in investigating descriptive and normative aspects of personalizing transparency.

KEYWORDS nudge, ethics of nudging , personalized nudges, personalized transparency of nudges

Methods and Conditions of Creating Hybrid Ethics for Agi-Machines

Krzysztof Sołoducha_
_Military University od Technology Warsaw

ABSTRACT The classical problem of naturalistic fallacy in ethics in the era of AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) takes the form of a question about the model for creating decision-making patterns for machines operating in autonomous modality of unsupervised learning which is the base of "Transfers" technology of current AGI systems like GPT. The need to build active trust, in Giddens meaning, in these machines is forcing an ART (Accountability, Responsability, Transparency) approach, which calls for data-driven methods. On the other hand, these types of methods reveal culturally conditioned, non-egalitarian patterns of behaviour that may be socially objectionable and rather point to the need to use top - down methods that correspond to universal, normative ethical expectations. In my speech I want to examine the paradoxes associated with the use of both methods and outline the need to develop a hybrid approach that would perhaps help to create ethical benchmarks for the selection, from ethical point of view, of statistical reasoning performed by contemporary AGI systems. As a result of my presentation, I will try to identify the philosophical conditions for developing "Moral Turing Test" addressed to AGI machines. Because Turing test is based on comparing a machine with a benchmark - which is a human being - for the preparation of such tests, we can use the results of contemporary research in the field of core cognitive systems theory by Elisabeth Spelke or Stanislas Dehaene. According to these theories, empirical subjects are provided with certain rudimentary natural models of the world, which, in order to maintain equilibrium with the environment, are modified by the downloading and exchange of information. In case of absence of sufficient information for full representation of the world they give the ability to model the world according so called background knowledge. On the other hand, such tests can take their principles from the well-known theory-of-mind tests in psychology that check the ability to empathise with human beings. Such a capacity is based on a certain assumed theory of other moral agents. When exploring the ethical potential of AGI machines, we should test the features of such a theory used by AGI systems.

KEYWORDS ethics of AGI systems, data driven ethics, ethical Turing test

Challenges and opportunities for consumers in data-driven market

Katarzyna Wisniewska_
_Jagiellonian University

ABSTRACT In the data analytics society, platform operators can (potentially) access previously unimaginable amounts of data about consumers, both personal data concerning individuals and statistical data concerning various communities. On February 23, 2022, the European Commission proposed a regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act). This project aims to investigate the legal and ethical issues in employing technologies to purposely influence consumers through the use of such data and answer the question of which of them should be assessed negatively and which positively under various normative theories of consumer law. The project follows an interdisciplinary approach, combining doctrinal analysis with qualitative and quantitative empirical research on online platforms' terms of service and privacy policies.

The Data Act has been proposed due to the need to facilitate access to and the use of data by consumers and businesses while preserving incentives to invest in ways of generating value through data. This includes increasing legal certainty around the sharing of data obtained from or generated by the use of products or related services, as well as operationalising rules to ensure fairness in data-sharing contracts. The regulation complements the Digital Markets Act, which requires certain providers of core platform services identified as 'gatekeepers' to provide, inter alia, more effective portability of data generated through business and end users' activities.

The research question this project aims to answer is what kinds of activities do corporations engage in while collecting and using data, which of them should be assessed negatively and which positively and what is the place of these activities in the broader context of the digital single market assumptions and Commission's regulations' proposals? The hypothesis is that the use of technologies to influence consumer behaviour can be assessed differently under various normative theories, including economic efficiency (Posner, 1986), socialisation of risk (Howells, Twigg-Flesner & Wilhelmsson, 2019), weaker party protection (Weatherill, Vogenauer & Weingerl, 2017) and freedom to conduct a business (Usai, 2013). The argument proceeds in

three steps. First, the paper briefly outlines the changes introduced by the Data Act, using a doctrinal method to reconstruct them and present them in the broader context. Second, it presents the results of empirical analysis of one hundred terms of service and privacy policies of online platforms representing 15 sectors (cloud storage, communication, dating, finance, food, games, health, music, shopping, social, sport, transport, travel, video, work) of companies with HQs in four legal environments (US, Poland, other EU countries and non-US, non-EU countries). Third, the paper provides a critical normative evaluation of both the state of the market and the legal regulations themselves.

The contribution of the piece will be twofold. On the one hand, by pairing the doctrinal analysis with empirical studies of contracts in use, it adds to the state of knowledge about the normative environment governing online influencing technologies. On the other, by demonstrating where the legal measures come short, it provides insights for policymakers and normative scholars of the new technologies and consumer law.

KEYWORDS data analytics, consumer law, online platforms, new technologies, empirical research

Do students commit plagiarism when they use powerful chatbots to assist their assignments?

William Chan_
_University of Southampton

ABSTRACT People rarely disagree that plagiarism offends the value of academic integrity. However, launched in 2022 by OpenAI, the chatbot ChatGPT has caused concerns among educators over its tendency to encourage plagiarism. The chatbot employs powerful algorithms to produce intelligible, coherent and logical responses, in various languages, to almost all questions raised by humans. While those responses are sometimes faulty, the chatbot is nevertheless able to produce decent solutions to many undergraduate-level assessments. Some students, therefore, have used the tool to assist or even complete their assignments. Because the chatbot frees students from certain tedious thinking, writing and research processes, various schools have limited if not banned the uses of ChatGPT, on the ground that they are instances of plagiarism and academic dishonesty. It is important to ask whether this plagiarism charge of ChatGPT (and other similar chatbots) is sound, since how this question is answered will have implications for first, whether and how schools should regulate students' use of the tool, and second, whether schools should be prepared to rely less on take-home assignments to assess students, if ChatGPT, which is accessible to students at home, were indeed a plagiarising tool.

However, by indiscriminately condemning all academic uses of ChatGPT as offences of academic integrity, it is easy to overlook the tool's potential to assist if not transform students' learning. This article, therefore, seeks to do justice to the tool. It (1) clarifies several ways in which students might use ChatGPT to help their assignments, and (2) develops some general principles to classify which uses of ChatGPT as acts of plagiarism. In particular, I consider the following applications of ChatGPT, which are some paradigmatic ways to aid assessment completion by the tool:

(a) directly quoting (parts of) its responses;
(b) indirectly quoting its responses by paraphrasing them; and
(c) using ChatGPT's responses to guide further research.

The article makes three claims. First, application (a) should always be seen as an instance of plagiarism, even if students have made proper acknowledgements. Second, application (b) should not be counted as an act of plagiarism if (i) the student does not rely excessively on what was given by ChatGPT, and (ii) she has acknowledged her use of the tool. Third, application (c) should in principle be considered an instance of plagiarism when it is not acknowledged, although this could be hard to detect in reality.

The first and third claims are more controversial, however, as they deviate from how academics often treat similar cases with respect to other academic resources (e.g. books and journals). One purpose of the article is to clarify what features of ChatGPT call for special treatment over questions of plagiarism.

Yet, the claims of this article do not apply to ChatGPT alone. It also has implications for how, in general, we should respond to powerful technological tools that provide students with decent if not high-quality solutions to assessments, whereas these tools are emerging or improving quickly.

KEYWORDS Chatbots, AI, ChatGPT, plagiarism, integrity

An Aristotelian Framework for a Theory of Persuasive Technologies

Giovanni Galli_
_University of Urbino

ABSTRACT Social Robotics is a flourishing field of study focusing on robots as social agents. As robotics is growing as a scientific field assuring its own methodology and research practice standards (Schiaffonati, 2020), leading to the qualitative production of assistive robots in many work and research areas, social robotics (SR) scholars are asking for major clarification and analysis towards the ethics of human-robot interaction (HRI) and the theory of persuasion applied to HRI. Scholars working on the HRI field focus on the persuasive nature of social interactions with robots (Shinozawa et al., 2005) in many areas, e.g. healthcare, commercial services, and education, in a way that we can define some robots as nudgers (Calboli, 2022). Recent research (Siegel et al., 2009) shows that the act of persuasion is a crucial component in the interaction between humans and social robots in a way similar to human-human interaction (HHI). There are three main theoretical frameworks SR scholars refer to: planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2011), self-determination theory (Ryan and Deci, 2000), and elaboration likelihood model (Petty, 2012). We can identify three main differences between HHI and HRI in the fact that robots cannot persuade themselves, that the perception of robots as non-humans influences the human attitude and behaviours toward them and, lastly, that interaction with social robots implies a cognitive process of social interaction and interaction with an artefact (Ham et al., 2012). Given these differences between HHI and HRI, and due to the lack of explanation we can gather from HHI to understand the processes involved in HRI, the study of persuasion specific to HRI is necessary. In this paper, I will focus on the theory of persuasion proposed by Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. 2-26) and compare its tenets with the theory-based persuasion techniques implied in the field of SR. Given the importance of Aristotle's theory for HHI, it can be useful to detect the features of the persuasive process between two peers and to see what is missing to give an account of persuasion in HRI. The main purpose of this paper is to understand how the theory of persuasion advanced by Aristotle should be refined to cope with HRI. A study of the theory of persuasion in SR can advance the analysis of the role of AI in HRI and give us some clues about

the epistemic status of persuasion and rhetoric (Scott, 1967; Harpine, 2004). In the first part, I will present the main claims and definitions proposed by Aristotle to define the persuasive process. In the second part, I will compare Aristotle's theory with the categories advanced by scholars studying persuasive social robots as NAO, Pepper, iCat, robovie-mR2 and SociBot; and in the third and last section I will argue for the continuity between HHI and HRI, proposing a sketch to adapt the Aristotelian theory of persuasion to HRI. Aristotle aims to distinguish what is persuasive from what is not, and a theory of persuasion for HRI has to do the same. We need, indeed, a complete analysis of what is possibly (technologically) persuasive.

KEYWORDS Theory of Persuasion, Social Robotics, Aristotle,
Human-Robot Interaction

The limits of Persuasive Social Robotics to sustainability: an alternative approach

Ilaria Alfieri_
_IULM University, Milan

ABSTRACT This abstract deals with the emerging topic of "social robotics for sustainability" (Alfieri, Fleres, Damiano, 2022) which can be defined as the application of social robotics technologies, exploiting multimodal communication modes based on social cues (e.g. emotions, body language), to promote sustainable behavior among users. Within this new research direction, an interesting option of development is related to the use of persuasive social robots, which are designed to use persuasive strategies in order to influence humans and orient their behavior (Siegel et al., 2009). Recent studies have shown how social robots may be used as persuasive agents to encourage people to behave in a sustainable way (Beheshtian et al., 2020). For instance, these robots can influence users' awareness on environmental resources, they can have an impact on reducing energy consumption (Ham, 2014), contributing to the improvement of waste sorting by children (Castellano et al., 2021), and implementing sustainable behavior (Beheshtian et al., 2020). The aim of this article is two-fold: on the one hand, to highlight the ethical limits of using persuasive social robots for sustainability, on the other hand, to propose a new possible vision of social robotics for sustainability, based on the emergent approach of Virtuous Robotics (Cappuccio et al., 2020). For these purposes, I will proceed as follows. In the first part, I will explore the use of persuasive social robots for sustainability by highlighting their potential and limitations: indeed, while the employment of these persuasive strategies for sustainability opens up new solutions, it also presents several limits. Specifically, I will focus on the ethical problems of using persuasive strategies, that usually are acceptable in a human-human context, but that might be seen as ethically problematic when we refer to the human-robot context. Indeed, in human-robot interaction, there is a clear asymmetry between the persuader and the persuaded (Ham and Spahn, 2015). Moreover, there are various ethical issues related to manipulation, coercion, nudging, paternalism, autonomy, and the choice of goals to be promoted by robots.

All that considered, in the second part of my paper, I suggest an alternative approach to move beyond these problems, by proposing a new possible role for social robotics in the field of sustainability, building on the emergent theory of Virtuous Robotics. I will show how this approach could be a valid alternative to the mainstream tendency of Persuasive Social Robotics. Indeed, unlike Persuasive Social Robotics, in Virtuous Robotics, the robot does not have to convince or persuade humans of the positive value of an action or behavior by changing their initial beliefs. Instead, as I will show through the case-study analysis of the robot Shelly (Ku H. et al., 2018), by interacting with the user, the virtuous robot can provide a moment of self-observation that can lead to self-reflection on one's own conduct and, in our case, to a more ethically and environmentally sustainable lifestyle.

KEYWORDS Persuasive Social Robotics, Virtuous Robotics, Sustainability, HRI, Ethical Argumentation

PANEL 9_METHODS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

CONVENOR: LEONARDO MENEZES

All disciplines tend to be chaotic, to some extent, in their development (Abbott, 2001) and political philosophy is certainly no exception. However, the variety of methodological approaches and debates explored in recent years are also a symptom of its richness and growing maturity. Political philosophers have started to interrogate the methodology they use to develop normative prescriptions, which include, among others, contractualism, reflective equilibrium, positive political theory, and thought experiment.

In this context, debates revolving around methodological concerns about justification in political philosophy – namely the ideal/non-ideal theory debate (O'Neill, Stemplowska, Valentini), the moralism/realism debate (Williams, Geuss, Sleat & Rossi), the facts/principles debate (Cohen, Miller, Ronzoni), and the practice dependence/independence debate (James, Sangiovanni) – have reframed the Rawlsian consensus. Yet, driving this 'methodological turn' in political philosophy has also been a frustration with the subject's perceived lack of influence on real- world politics. For instance, some voiced the concern that the dominant - Rawlsian - paradigm in the discipline was somehow too detached from reality to guide political action. From this perspective, much of the current work in political philosophy is defective because it is of little (possibly no) practical help.

But methodological questions are equally central to many other debates in political philosophy, including debates about feminism, experimental methods, the relation between political philosophy and empirical disciplines, ethnographic approaches to political theory, ethics of public policy, and comparative political theory.

In this panel, we seek to focus greater attention on what kinds of problems in political theory might require researchers to use a particular method, the basic principles behind the method being proposed, and an analysis of how to apply it. Whether these are

analytical, empirical, interpretive and/or critical, our main purpose is to shed light on the diverse methods that political philosophers could employ and refine in order to better frame their theoretical and normative models. We welcome paper proposals on any topic related to these and other methodological debates.

The Esoteric Approach to the History of Political Thought

Max John Edward Morris_
_The University of Toronto

ABSTRACT Fierce methodological debates concerning the history of political thought (HPT) continue to plague academia. Not only is there disagreement among adherents of the esoteric approach inspired by Leo Strauss, the contextualist approach inspired by Quentin Skinner, and (in classical scholarship) the analytic approach, but many scholars find themselves outraged with one another. The reason for their vehemence is that the question is not merely about whose interpretative practices allow for the most accurate readings of old texts, but about how we should relate to these old texts. Should we study them as relics of the past or as inspiration for how to live our lives? I argue that each of the approaches has something important to offer. However, rather than constructing an entirely new methodology, I substantially revise the esoteric approach to accommodate the concerns and insights of contextualist and analytic interpreters.

The esoteric approach is centered around the idea that old books were sometimes written on two levels: the surface, where the author stated a superficial message in such a way that it would be understood as the true message; and the interior, where the author expressed his/her true thoughts. All would agree that such texts need to be read esoterically. Yet, analytic interpreters, such as Myles Burnyeat, argue that texts are not written in this way. For them, the esoteric approach surreptitiously and arbitrary modifies texts, going beyond "what the words say". However, I show that the esoteric approach is not only compatible with the principle of not going beyond "what the words say", but it must and can hold more consistently to that principle than the analytic approach can. Contextualists charge esoteric interpreters with failing to distinguish between spurious and accurate interpretations of inconsistent texts. The only way to do that, contextualists argue, is to recognize that all texts are written for "a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the solution of a particular problem". However, I show that contextualists are unable to substantiate their claims to know authors' intentions better than they understood them themselves in cases where the authors declare that they are discussing perennial problems or ideas, and

that the esoteric approach is therefore open to a greater variety of authorial intentions than contextualism. I demonstrate these conclusions, along with the peculiar interpretative payback of the esoteric approach, by comparing esoteric, analytic, and contextualist interpretations of Book 10 of Plato's Laws. Because the contextualist and analytic interpreters are forced to resolve real inconsistencies in the text and neglect the dramatic context in which those issues arise, neither approach is able to formulate a consistent reading that does not go beyond "what the words say" or appreciate the political dimension of Plato's "theology". Thus, I argue that the esoteric approach to HPT can accommodate important concerns and insights raised by both contextualist and analytic interpreters and yet still provide important insights that the other approaches conceal. I therefore develop a more inclusive, expansive, and open esoteric approach to HPT.

Michel Foucault's Methodology in the Study of Normativity

Tomás David Rocha Correia_
_University of Beira Interior _PRAXIS-UBI

ABSTRACT The twenty-first century is characterized by drastic changes in epistemology, as a result of academical shifts in important fields since the 60s. The decline of metanarratives – defined by Lyotard as grand-narratives about narratives (which, in turn, legitimate historically-situated events) – provided a fertile research ground for new methodological practices based on sharp critiques of Enlightenment rationality.

One of the founding authors of the "postmodern condition" (as Lyotard labels it) is Michel Foucault. Foucault's archaeological and genealogical project regarding epistemology redefined our conceptual approach to knowledge and its legitimation, by situating both concepts in specific historical contexts, at specific historical times. Recurring themes in the Foucauldian project involve skepticism about objective truths, anti-historicism and subjectivity. I seek to answer the question "Why is Foucauldian methodology relevant in the (post-)modern world, especially in light of the decline of metanarratives?". The main goal is to address the role of Foucault's works in the rethinking of historically given narratives and expose the contingency of practices embroiled in power-knowledge relations, while keeping in mind the dispersibility of the origins of those narratives. This is particularly relevant under the framework of an emptying of over-arching narratives about knowledge and the human condition, i.e., the Lyotardian metanarrative.

Human societies are usually seen in a context of a larger narrative to which each of our lives is an element. The metanarrative serves as an umbrella for smaller narratives in which other epistemic and moral narratives find their place. There seems to be a clear intersection in Lyotard and Foucault's works: the former studies the conditions in which the metanarratives empty themselves, while the latter occupies himself with the archaeological/genealogical study of the narratives within the metanarratives that, in turn, occupy the vacuum left by the original metanarrative. There is, nonetheless, a distinction between both authors: while Lyotard sees this replacement as normative-laden, Foucault focuses on a strictly analytical view of discourse and practice.

KEYWORDS Deviance; Discipline; Metanarrative; Normativity; Power.

Upbraiding the Pastor: How the Right to Bodily Integrity is Arbitrarily Justified in Rawls' Political Liberalism

João da Rocha Rodrigues_
_Uminho

ABSTRACT Should we allow retributive justice in our liberal societies? A theory of justice should have an answer to this question. Rawls' *Justice as Fairness* answers in the negative. A person has a right to the integrity of their body, to violate this right for reasons of retributive justice is absolutely forbidden. This right is even invoked by the likes of David Dolinko in his well-known paper arguing against the permissibility of retributive justice.

But how is this right justified? What is the methodology used to arrive at the principles which contain it? This is done through the device of the original position, in which, starting with certain conceptions of society and person, we can test different principles and see which are the most appropriate based on those starting conceptions.

I will attack this methodological device and argue that the justification of the right to the integrity of the body is arbitrary, and therefore illegitimate.

The ends of retributive justice are non-voluntaristic, much like religious ends when we see these, as Sandel did, as constitutive of the self who possesses them. Rawls, as was rightly pointed out by Sandel, has a bias for a "voluntarist" conception of the self. This bias shows itself in the restriction of the veil of ignorance, which demands that we set aside our conceptions of the good when deliberating about justice in the original position. This bias would, supposedly, make the principles of justice illegitimate.

But this isn't a problem for Rawls when it comes to people's conceptions of the good, since to allow them to have justificatory influence in the principles of justice would make it impossible to agree on any principles at all. The bias, in that case, is justified. But claims of retributive justice are moral claims about justice, not about the good. Moral claims of revenge are therefore illegitimately excluded from influencing the content of the principles of justice. The principles derived henceforth are therefore illegitimate.

Political liberalism starts with a conception of the person as free and equal and of society as a reciprocal system of cooperation. The principles of justice that are borne out of that can only have morally binding force within the scope defined by those two conceptions. The right to the integrity of the body extends itself beyond that scope, to situations that are not reciprocal, and where retributive justice would possibly be warranted. Therefore, it has no morally binding force in these situations.

Using the case of retributive justice, I will expose the difficulties with the methodology of ideal theory that is implicit in the original position, and show how we must be really careful to not extend the principles of justice beyond the scope that is set by the conception of society that Rawls starts out with.

Future-Oriented Methods in Political Theory: The Realist Challenge

André Santos Campos_
_IFILNOVA. Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas. Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT A standard view of political theory is that it tells 'us not how politics worked in the past, or how it works in the present, but how it should work in the future' (Floyd 2019). This future-oriented character of political theory is far from being this clear-cut, though, as it is also true that it relies fundamentally on the analysis of concepts and institutions of the present, which in turn were (at least partly) shaped by conceptual and historical analyses of the past. Political theory seems then closer to being multi-temporal.

This multitemporality has recently been put to the test, especially in democratic settings. Current societies have developed forms of technological power capable of affecting and perhaps seriously harming future societies. This is problematic as our moral intuitions seem to suggest that we should care about the future. This intuition has spawned an entire field of futures studies in political theory that combines genera-tional timescapes with theories of justice, called 'intergenerational justice' (Gosseries 2023). However, democratic rule is future-oriented but also depends on time limits concerning accountability and legitimacy mechanisms. Are democratic societies suffi-ciently legitimized, then, to govern for future generations, especially in cases involving trade-offs with people in the present?

This problem affects the methodology of political theory itself. On the one hand, it entails that intergenerational studies cannot be a mere form of political moralism when set in democratic settings. On the other hand, if we adopt the viewpoint of real-ism in normative political theory, which assumes the primacy of legitimacy vis-à-vis justice and other moral values (e.g., Williams 2005, Rossi 2012, Bavister-Gould 2013, Larmore 2013, Sleat 2013, Waldron 2013), is it even possible to engage in intergen-erational studies within the task of political theory?

In this talk, I reflect on the methodology of intergenerational studies in political theory from the viewpoint of realism. My focus lies not on the future methods of politi-cal theory but on the legitimacy of (non-overlapping) future-oriented methods in polit-

ical theory. Are such future-oriented theoretical tasks compatible with the need for past-and-present concepts and institutions that ground democratic legitimacy in the first place? And, if not, is political realism incapable of providing a relevant contribution to the intergenerational challenge?

I divide the inquiry into three sections. First, I introduce the novelty of intergenerational studies for political theory and briefly survey the different methods applied in the available literature. I conclude that it overwhelmingly sides with ideal theory, political moralism, principles rather than facts, with a particular emphasis on institutional design. Second, I show that such methodological commitments are at odds with some of the basic tenets of the institutional and conceptual units of analysis in democratic theory and intergenerational studies (e.g., legitimacy, accountability, the default institutional position, the emphasis on incentives, etc.). Third, I inquire into the possibility of developing a far-off future-oriented theory of democratic legitimacy from the viewpoint of political realism. I conclude that it is possible to justify a realist long-term friendly democratic arrangement, although hardly within a non-overlapping framework.

Theoretical and Practical Ideals – Or Ideals for Non-ideal Methodologies

Tom Bailey_
_London School of Economics

ABSTRACT What role can ideals have in political theory given the increasing diversity of methodologies within the discipline? This paper addresses the question through two related claims. The first is a general methodological claim that it is useful to think about political theory in relation to political judgment. The paper takes a minimal understanding of political judgment as a kind of practical judgment asking 'what should be done?', but which is political so does this in a collective context. The first claim of this paper is that thinking about how political theory is supposed to relate to political judgment so understood is useful for thinking about its methodological structure.

The first claim is bold, and it is not the purpose of this single paper to fully justify it. It is, however, a presumption of the second claim this paper makes. The second claim is that thinking about ideals in political theory in relation to political judgment allows us to delineate two very different ways of conceiving the role of ideals in political theory. So, whilst this paper cannot justify the first claim in full, the second claim serves as an example of the methodological utility of thinking about political theory in relation to political judgment.

The first conception of ideals is that which operates in classical ideal theory. In ideal theory, ideals are formed and justified in abstract philosophy. They are third-personal yet are claimed to be universally binding. Political judgment plays a subordinate role and is exercised in trying to realise the ideal. For ideal theory, ideals are taken orientate political judgment. Call this conception of ideals 'theoretical ideals'.

There is a second way of conceiving of the role of ideals in political theory. Rather than a theoretical ideal that orientates political judgment, the ideal takes its orientation from political judgment. On this conception, an ideal is formulated not abstractly and third-personally, but as a response to prior political judgments and commitments. The ideal takes a subordinate place within political theorising, though still serves as guide for political action. Call this conception of ideals 'practical ideals'.

Why is this distinction between theoretical and political ideals useful? The final part of this paper suggests that it opens up the possibility of the use of ideals for cer-

tain non-ideal, realist, fact-sensitive, engaged and practical methodologies. Despite meta-normative differences between them and with ideal theory, considered solely in terms of their normative role, ideals are compatible with these diverse methodologies. As an example, the paper considers in detail Raymond Geuss' realist account 'utopia' in "Realism and the Relativity of Judgement" and argues that it plays the normative role of a practical ideal.

Moreover, the final section of the paper aims to motivate the use of practical ideals in these alternative methodologies. In so far as political theorists are interested in radical or at least substantial political change, practical ideals serve and important role in orienting political judgment beyond the confines of present political circumstances.

External coercion and the obligation of right: an antinomy between realism and idealism?

Joel Thiago Klein_
_Federal University of Paraná

ABSTRACT A relevant group of Kantian scholars have been arguing for a deeper separation between moral and right than that which Kant textually admits (see Willasheck 1998, 2002, 2009, 2012; Wood 2002, etc.). Their main argument is the following: despite the fact that Kant explicitly insisted on a direct link between moral and right, between the categorical imperative and the categorical imperative of right, he did not provide sufficient justifications for the use of external coercion as an analytical connection to the obligation of right or justice. This appears to be the case insofar as external coercion precisely implies a manner of binding individuals to an action for which they might lack any rational agreement. External coercion would make moral obligation irrelevant for the effectiveness of law and, therefore, does not seem to be analytically contained in the concept of right. The traditional position in Kantian scholarship is non-independentist. According to this position, all the fundamental concepts that make the doctrine of law possible, such as innate freedom, moral person, imputability, categorical imperative, are all practical concepts whose origin and justification depend on the theory of the fact of reason (see, for example, Weinrib,1992; Mulholland 1990; Kersting 1993; Guyer 2002, 2016; Seel 2009, Nance 2012).

This could be characterized as a legal antinomy. On the one hand, there is the feasibility, effectiveness, and security of the legal guarantee of external freedom, which is possible at the expense of a necessary rational justification and the acceptance of the law for the very same subjects. On the other hand, a rational justification exists for the bindingness of the law, namely, only insofar as it is a self-imposed law. However, this is the case only at the expense of legal effectiveness as an empirical and constant force that does not rely on the arbitrariness of individual will. This kind of antinomy is a version of the ideals present, on the one side, in the realist tradition, while, on the other side, there are the normative standards of idealism. My aim in this paper is to

show how Kantian legal and juridical philosophy found a way of balancing these both demands by a position that could be understood as juridical constructivism.

Transitional Legitimacy: Non-Ideal Theory in Circumstances of Structural Racism

Jonathan Kwan_
_NYU Abu Dhabi

ABSTRACT Much of the methodological debate on ideal versus non-ideal theory is centered around the value of justice, which follows Rawls' lead who initially formulated this distinction and treated justice as the "first virtue of social institutions." However, we cannot simply assume that arguments about ideal and non-ideal theory (the roles they should play, their merits and demerits, etc.) designed for the value of justice automatically generalize to other values—such as, in particular, legitimacy, which will be the focus of this paper. On the other side of the coin, the existing debate about the value of legitimacy insufficiently reflects on whether and how theories of legitimacy should be ideal versus non-ideal.

In this paper, I aim to remedy both gaps by showing why it is especially important to engage in non-ideal theory when thinking about the value of legitimacy, understood as a political entity's right to rule—a weaker but prior demand to justice. I develop a concept of transitional legitimacy by analogy with the concept of transitional justice (itself a non-ideal notion concerned with the aftermath of war, conflict, or widespread human rights abuses) to theorize non-ideally how to realize legitimate political institutions within societies structured by racism, oppression, and past wrongdoing.

In §1, I argue that Rawls's conception of ideal theory (based on assumptions of a well-ordered society and strict compliance) along with the arguments for prioritizing it over non-ideal theory do not neatly map onto the theorization of legitimacy precisely because of how legitimacy serves a different function from justice of establishing the right to rule even if that rule is not fully just. In §2, I contend that existing theories of legitimacy based on consent, public reason, and human rights are inadequately non-ideal. Existing theories either explicitly work in ideal theory or implicitly assume idealized circumstances as their context of application even while purporting to specify what conditions constitute legitimacy simpliciter in all or most circumstances.

In §3, I demonstrate how the concept of transitional legitimacy can contribute to the non-ideal theorization of legitimacy because of how the notion of transition interlinks backward-looking concerns of rectifying past wrongdoing with forward-looking concerns of realizing a political entity's right to rule. Furthermore, I argue that transitional legitimacy necessitates democracy because of how democracy provides both horizontal (citizen-citizen relation) and vertical (citizen-state relation) normative resources for resisting and transforming circumstances of oppression that threaten legitimacy. In §4, I apply the notion of transitional legitimacy (though I do not provide a fully-fledged theory) to the context of anti-Black structural racism within the United States. I argue that transitional legitimacy will generally require, at least, the public acknowledgment of past injustices and the reaffirmation of the equal political status of members of oppressed groups (through truth commissions, apologies, etc.), the rule of law to guard against racial discrimination (and hence the dismantling of the United States' system of racialized mass incarceration), effective de facto protection of democratic rights rather than voter suppression laws, and reparations for past wrongdoing.

Who Is to Judge What Gives the State a Right to Rule? A Preliminary Methodological Problem for Legitimacy Theorists

Davide Saracino_
_University of Milan

ABSTRACT Legitimacy theorists notably diverge as to the normative sources they identify to ground the state's right to rule (e.g., the state's respect for a given set of natural rights; the state's correspondence with the subjects' consensual preferences; the state's realisation of certain non-deontological values). However, in order to assess the relative merit of their normative theories, a preliminary dispute ought to be addressed—namely, the methodological quarrel over how to evaluate different possible sources of legitimacy. The question I wish to address thus reads as follows: how is a legitimacy theorist to judge different normative grounds for legitimacy? In other words, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a relevant judgment on the matter? First, I defend the choice to address legitimacy issues as pertaining to practical rather than theoretical rationality. I thus consider in turn the two conditions that are most often associated with relevant practical judgments: rationality and reasonableness. As to the former, I move from the assumption that a normative judgment on legitimating sources is only relevant insofar as it is intelligible. I suggest that only rationally maximising judgments as defined by Parfit's (1984/1987, p. 117) Instrumental Theory satisfy this condition. Therefore, rational maximisation is a necessary property of full-fledged normative judgments on legitimacy. I defend this view against a possible objection according to which the judgments of non-maximising rational individuals (Gauthier, 2022) may be equally intelligible. Furthermore, the practical relevance of this criterion is attested to by the fact that most people are rational maximisers (Rawls, 1971/1999, pp. 358–359). Moving on to reasonableness, I explore whether there is any condition such as intelligibility that is equally only met by reasonable judgments. In particular, I seek to determine whether we can ignore the utility functions of unreasonable rational maximisers with respect to their theories of

legitimacy (Rawls, 1993/1996, pp. 48–54). Following Young (2005, 2006), I contend that no independent reason can be found to adopt reasonableness (or moral sense) as a criterion to discriminate among the views of different rational maximisers. Finally, I address the metaethical implications of these findings. In particular, I wish to address the objection according to which a refusal to make space for reasonableness as a necessary condition for legitimacy judgments proper amounts to an abandonment of the moral dimension altogether and reduces the quest for legitimating sources to a clash of amoral rational maximisers advancing their own preferred theory on legitimating sources. If desire-maximisation is the only decision-making criterion available to rational individuals to judge these theories, then one might worry we are stuck with a might-makes-right clash of powers wherein the most powerful theory triumphs. I partially accept the objection but defuse its bleak characterisation of such a condition. This conceptualisation of legitimacy theories correctly points to the power-based nature of their clash. Nonetheless, it is still possible to win someone over to the theory of legitimacy one endorses by appealing to their core interests (Walzer, 1977/2006, p. xxiii). Therefore, the normativity of legitimacy theories is preserved.

Methods in political philosophy and the 'desiderata' for human rights theories

Antal Szerletics_
University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary)

ABSTRACT Although the philosophical discourse of human rights is characterized by a huge diversity of human rights theories, relatively little attention is devoted to the so-called 'desiderata' used to evaluate specific accounts of human rights. Authors, for example Tasioulas (2012), Valentini (2012), Van Duffel (2015), Sangiovanni (2018) and Kahn (2021) produce partly overlapping lists of such requirements with seemingly modest theoretical sophistication; after briefly introducing each desideratum, they immediately put them to use to assess human rights theories, leaving the reader with the impression that they were selected somewhat hastily, if not arbitrarily. My paper aims to investigate the nature of these requirements in a more systematic manner. More particularly, it tries to uncover the extent to which these requirements can be perceived as 'offshoots' of the more general methodological constraints of normative political and moral theories. I argue that the overlap between the lists of different authors is no coincidence; some requirements seem to be 'universal' in the sense that they apply to any sound normative political theory, while others are specific to the domain of human rights and seem to be partly defined by the dominant human rights discourse. Special attention will be devoted to a requirement that appears – although under different names – by every author, the requirement of 'fidelity to human rights culture' (Tasioulas 2012) and its theoretical counterpart, the requirement of 'normativity' (Sangiovanni 2018) or 'critical capacity' (Valentini 2012). One possible way to account for the regular presence of the fidelity and normativity desiderata is by interpreting them as 'manifestations' of the dominant methodological paradigm of political philosophy, i.e. the reflective equilibrium of Rawls. My aim is to explore whether human rights theories are really based on the method of reflective equilibrium, and if so, what are the implications of this for the requirements of fidelity and normativity. A different explanation would relate these requirements to the methodological debate about practice-dependence (Karlsson Schaffer and Maliks 2017). Understanding this debate does not only help us to understand more precisely the content and the nature of the fidelity desideratum, but it also seems essential for understanding the differ-

ence between moral and political conceptions of human rights. My analysis will focus particularly on the question whether fidelity applies differently to the moral and the political conceptions or it is rather a minimum requirement that all plausible human rights theories shall satisfy.

What is wrong with methodological nationalism?

Anna Milioni_
_King's College London

ABSTRACT The assumption that states are the natural and necessary form of contemporary social organisation is prevalent in the way people in western societies tend to think about migration. This assumption, characterised by social scientists as methodological nationalism has important implications for our understanding of migration: it gives rise to a state-centered approach which naturalises national communities, exaggerates the differences between citizens and migrants, and leads to the perception of international migration as exceptional and potentially threatening to the unity of the state.

While widely criticised in the social sciences, methodological nationalism goes broadly unnoticed in other contexts. This affects the arguments that people make about migration. Migration ethicists such as Alex Sager, Alison Jaggar, Amy Reed Sandoval, and Christopher Bertram have recently started to demonstrate the presence of methodological nationalism in the way that we tend to think about migration. However, their critique of methodological nationalism is incomplete. Descriptively, it might be true that states are historically contingent forms of social organisation and that the perception of migrants as foreigners overemphasises national belonging over other forms of identification. But does this mean that we should drop the perspective of methodological nationalism? After all, when we think about migration in a normative way, we are not only concerned with how the world is, but also, primarily, with how the world should be. If national belonging constitutes an important value, then why should we not adopt a state-centered perspective that prioritises the links between citizens and perceives migrants as foreigners? To properly criticise methodological nationalism, it is necessary to demonstrate that it is not only an empirically inaccurate, but also a morally problematic way of looking at the world.

In this paper, I argue that methodological nationalism does have morally problematic implications. I begin by briefly explaining the notion of methodological nationalism, clarifying some common misconceptions. I then provide one moral reason to avoid the perspective of methodological nationalism: its contribution to the adoption

of discriminatory migration policies. I argue that, regardless of whether states have a right to control their borders, contemporary migration policies are discriminatory toward migrants and members of other socially salient groups. I claim that methodological nationalism contributes to the adoption of discriminatory migration policies in three ways. First, by prioritising one's identification with the state, exaggerating the differences between members of the state and migrants, and exceptionalising migration, methodological nationalism lends credibility to xenophobic arguments in support of discriminatory migration policies. Second, methodological nationalism obscures potentially shared experiences of mobility between migrants and citizens. This erodes the grounds for the development of widespread social identifications between migrants and citizens, making it less likely that citizens would protest against discriminatory laws in solidarity toward migrants and demand the abolition of discriminatory migration policies. Last, methodological nationalism prevents us from reframing questions about migration in a way that would enable people who reject discriminatory policies to counter anti-migrant narratives. I conclude by considering the implications of my argument for migration ethics.

Historical Materialism as Philosophical Method

Vanessa Wills_
_The George Washington University

ABSTRACT I propose a paper extending the argument of my recent, «PPE in Marx's Materialist Conception of History». Philosophy as a discipline generally takes itself to investigate that which is true, objective, universal, and even eternal. Karl Marx, however, openly advertised that what he and Engels called "the materialist conception of history" is an analysis of human social existence from the specific point of view of the working class and its struggle against the bourgeoisie under capitalism.

Marxist theory – historical materialism – takes a definite side in the political struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie that it analyzes. If that is so, then it might seem reasonable to suppose that Marxism is inherently subjective and particular in a way that renders it non- or even anti-philosophical, calling into question any respectability it might have as a mode of real scientific inquiry.

Marx recognized, and regarded as a kind of intellectual ill, the tendency for academic study to be fractured into a proliferating and increasingly distanced array of intellectually isolated specialties and subspecialties. He saw this phenomenon as one that represents and helps further the expansion of human knowledge and subject matter expertise, but that also makes the relationships among these various areas of knowledge harder to keep in view, so that we increasingly lose sight of the whole.

Marx thought of philosophy – a discipline that concerns itself with pure abstract thought as one of its chief subject matters – as particularly susceptible to this. It fails to recognize its incapacity to resolve its own questions while isolating itself from the resources made available by more empirical fields.

By contrast, historical materialism – Marxist theory – is a unifying, integrative approach to comprehending a reality whose character can be fully grasped only as its elements come to be, develop, and cease to be, as the result of more or less rational and conscious human intervention carried out in the course of time. The key lesson of Marx's and Engels's historical materialism is that human life is a product created by human beings intervening into their natural and social environment, under definite natural and social circumstances, to satisfy their needs. Thus, to understand thought

itself, much less particular concepts and ideas, one must first proceed by investigating the practical human activity that gives rise to it, and the particular human needs and conflicts to which it gives expression.

So Marxism has the following to say in response to the well-worn canard that it is problematically "ideological" because it picks a side in the class struggle and is for that reason inherently "interested" and unscientific. Ironically, Marx counters, to claim impartiality with respect to class interest – to fail to adopt the proletariat's class standpoint and fail to engage in the pursuit of knowledge as a theoretical expression of the proletarian movement which seeks to reconcile social antagonisms and bring about true human emancipation – is to flee real, concretized universality and embrace mere partiality and subjectivity draped in universalism's illusory shadow.

It is only in reconciling social antagonisms and producing ourselves as a species that is aware of itself as having conditions of flourishing that belong to us all jointly as members of a single species, that human beings can produce the kind of perspective on themselves and on their relationship to nature that is a precondition for fully scientific knowledge of what is."

Political Critique and Normative Overextension

Nadia ben Hassine_
_University of Cambridge

ABSTRACT Normative concepts are distinguished by their evaluative role. We use normative concepts not only to describe and categorize, but also to criticize. The origin of such normativity is often suggested to be a concepts' use: normative concepts have a certain evaluative use in political debate. Under this view, we can characterize normative concepts by picking out the normative role with which they are semantically associated. Through these semantic ties with practical uses, the concepts' evaluative component is carried across a wide range of contexts. Whatever you ascribe the predicate "terrible" to, for example, its use will express a negative evaluation, as that is the allocated normative role for this concept. In this paper I address a concern with this view, namely that taking a normative role to be "tied" to a concept will result in overlooking important divergences from the associated normative convention. Such divergences in normative convention can, as I will suggest, be found in critical and subversive uses of a concept, and have to be afforded a valuable position in political thought.

As such, I will be arguing for the importance of normative flexibility for evaluative concepts in political philosophy. The normative component of political concepts such as "equality", or its inverse, "inequality", play a principal role in recommending societal interventions due to its negative normative component. Simultaneously, there are spaces where the concept "unequal" does not carry a strong negative force, for instance in cases where local inequality is justified through its alleviation of wider social asymmetries. Think, for instance, of cases where quotas are enforced to increase accessibility of the job market for previously disadvantaged social groups, or suggestions to place higher taxes on those with higher incomes. Although these cases may fit certain descriptive features of a given equality-concept, they do not have to fit its commonly associated normative component. In this paper I will identify and map such cases, where the application of a concept generates tension brought forward by its associated normative component, as cases of normative overextension, these are cases where a straightforward extrapolation of the associated normative role of a concept do not generate a fully considered evaluation.

Well-considered evaluations look for critical and divergent uses of a normative concept, which will differ in crucial ways from the 'standard' normative role of a concept. In developing an account of normative overextension as a particular form of overextension, I will first lay out a Wittgensteinian account of general conceptual overextension. Conceptual overextension is a philosophical phenomenon where a concept (or a cluster of concepts) is applied to cases beyond its reach. In focusing on normative overextension, I am suggesting that even in cases where a concept is used which is fine-grained enough to capture the relevant descriptive features, normative overextension can arise. By laying out the idea of normative overextension and its implications, I will be developing the wider argument that a fixed normative role lacks the flexibility necessary to generate apt social criticisms.

PANEL 10_ETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY: DISCUSSING POVERTY

CONVENOR: LEONARDO MENEZES and MARIA CLARA OLIVEIRA

What is fundamentally wrong with poverty? Few would deny that poverty is a social evil and that there are circumstances in which action should be taken to reduce or eliminate it. But how can we understand poverty? The most basic notion of poverty is relatively uncontroversial: not having enough money. But enough money for what, exactly? And is money the only relevant factor? Since a variety of answers can be given to these questions, the understanding of poverty is contested, for both conceptual and political reasons.

The first questions listed at the start is 'what is wrong with poverty?'. A life that faces the diminished capability sets associated with poverty is a diminished life. It is commonly argued that people in poverty will have difficulty salvaging their basic humanity, their dignity, or their self-respect (Jones 1990). As Narayan et al. (2009, 4) point out, people in poverty find themselves without voice or power. Hennie Lotter (2011, 22) makes the interesting observation that only human beings are ever described as living in poverty. Animals can suffer but are not described as living in poverty, which indicates that poverty is some sort of degraded humanity. All these charges are plausible and go some way to explaining why poverty is morally challenging. Poverty, understood as a form of degraded humanity, is a serious injustice from a wide range of moral positions, not only those based in the egalitarian tradition. On most philosophical views, it is clear that governments have an obligation to try to prevent people falling into poverty, as well as to help those who find themselves in this situation escape it, where possible. Few governments have ever shirked that responsibility entirely, but it is clear that many could do more and some are currently moving

in the wrong direction (i.e. policy drift).

In this panel, we seek to focus greater attention on the ethics of anti-poverty policies. We ask, in short : What should governments do to eliminate poverty? What anti-poverty policies can governments design and implement? What must be guaranteed by the State and what responsibilities can be attributed to private and/or non-governmental actors? And, critically, what ethical issues arise in the monitoring and/or evaluation of such policies? We welcome paper proposals on any of these topics or in related ones.

The Moral Harms of Homelessness as Multidimensional Poverty

Bradley Hillier-Smith_
_University of St Andrews

ABSTRACT It is well established that those facing homelessness suffer severe harms and deprivations. Homeless persons are, or at least are among, the worst off people in a given society. And yet, homelessness is a relatively neglected issue in ethics, and social and political philosophy, and remains an enduring feature of affluent, liberal democratic societies. This paper aims to provide an account of the under-acknowledged moral harms of homelessness that can ground and motivate adequate durable solutions and urgent public policy reform. I argue that the few existing philosophical accounts of understanding and responding to the moral harms of homelessness (the Freedom-Based, Privacy-Based and Care-Based Accounts) each reveal important insights but nonetheless suffer from serious limitations. I advance a new Status-Based Account that foregrounds the moral and social status poverty of homeless persons. This account, I suggest, reveals an under-recognised but fundamental moral harm of homelessness, addresses the limitations of existing accounts, reaches a more complete understanding of the harms of homelessness, and grounds adequate durable solutions. This more complete account can then help challenge the unsettling tacit acceptance of homelessness in contemporary societies and provide the normative framework for necessary and urgent reform.

KEYWORDS Homelessness ; Poverty ; Status Poverty ; Disadvantage

Poverty means: 'not having enough' — Defending a sufficiency perspective on the normative problem of poverty

Dennis Pirdzuns_
_Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT)

ABSTRACT Poverty is an obvious moral and political problem. An exceptional unanimity prevails in both philosophical literature and public discourse that poverty is morally bad and deeply unjust. Yet, strong disagreements still exist on what poverty is and what makes it morally bad, or in formal terms: how poverty is properly defined and what kind of just demands arise from it. One immediately plausible answer to both questions is that poverty means 'not having enough' and that 'not having enough' is morally bad. But defining poverty and its just demands in terms of insufficiency has attracted varied and vehement criticism. This paper / presentation aims to defend the sufficiency perspective on poverty.

The first kind of criticism is that the sufficiency perspective misconstrues the definition of poverty, and fails to understand what poverty actually means. Critics argue that poverty is not a distributive problem concerned with a deficit in relevant goods but a relational problem concerned with a deficit in social relations. Instead of conceptualising poverty in terms of deprivation, so the claim, poverty should be conceived of in terms of social exclusion. While relational definitions of poverty have much merit, they cannot dismiss its distributive dimension: a lack of relevant goods is still a necessary condition for poverty. Some critics accept this distributive dimension but object to the absolute understanding of poverty that a sufficiency perspective entails. Instead they argue, deprivation needs to be understood relatively. But this makes a definition susceptible to the Levelling-Down objection and fails to define poverty as a unique distributive problem.

The second kind of criticism is that the sufficiency perspective misconstrues the normative demands of poverty, and fail to appreciate why poverty is morally bad. Critics have objected to the absolute priority that a sufficiency perspective awards to demands raised by deprivation. This, they claim, ignores much debated considerations of responsibility, both of those affected by poverty, and of those able to aid.

This paper / presentation will show, however, that if demands of poverty relief are restricted by any kind of responsibility requirement, it would lead to some people left to suffer theoretically unlimited degrees of deprivation. Thus, the absolute priority towards those suffering from deprivation can be defended as sufficient condition for the just demands raised by poverty. Again, some critics accept the absolute priority of poverty relief but claim the difference principle to be a better theoretical account. This overlooks that an absolute priority to the worst-off could play off people in poverty against each other, and potentially forgo major benefits to those in less severe poverty for minor benefits to those in more severe poverty.

This paper / presentation concludes that a sufficiency perspective offers a plausible and well-suited approach to the moral and political problem of poverty. Understanding poverty as 'not having enough' means that deprivation is a necessary condition for the definition of poverty as unique distributive problem, and also that deprivation is a sufficient condition for the especially urgent normative demands raised by poverty.

"For whoever has will be given more": accumulation of opportunities and the meaning of poverty.

Oriol Alegría_
_University of Pompeu Fabra

ABSTRACT Positional goods are those whose value is determined by the relative position they give to the possessor of the good towards other possessors of the good (Brighouse & Swift: 2006, p. 474). That means their value is tied to the chances they give −priority access− to acquire other resources in the future.

Two questions flow, at least, from this. 1) That positionality can be key to explore the debate on opportunity distribution and 2) that the notion commonly employed to understand 'poverty' can also be expanded. This paper ties 1) and 2) through a term I coined 'cumulative tendency'.

Imagine two competitors for a college grant (Mark and Martha) . If Mark is awarded the grant, he will have advantage in the competition for grants in the future, since a key factor to give grants is the amount of grants received in the past. One can expect, all things equal, that the gap between Mark and Martha to get grants will be widened in Mark's favour each time. In this sense, grants are not only positional (Mark has an advantage to get a job at universities), but also have 'cumulative tendency', that is, a part of their value resides on the fact that they give better chances to acquire more units of the same good in the future.

This paper analyses the possibility of the resource 'money' to have both 1) positional aspects and 2) cumulative tendency. 1) is argued following T.H. Ben Shahar's work (2017, p. 5-6). 2) is argued in section I of the paper. Following this, section II argues that poverty has to do with equality of opportunity, more precisely, with a worse off position in the share of resources that have cumulative tendency. The paper questions that poverty can be solved solely with monetary growth (accumulation) and argues that poverty is solved whenever the gap to acquire certain resources is reduced.

Two counterarguments can be made to the paper, analysed in section III. First, that money does not have cumulative tendency itself but through intermediaries. Money

can buy other resources that can be sold for a better return, but does not increase, by itself, chances to get more money. The argument is replied pointing out the existence of rates of return (RoR) and referring to the 'quality' of differential investments.

Second counterargument criticises the link between poverty and equality of opportunity. If poverty is only based on opportunity distribution, there could be the counterintuitive need to give resources to the wealthy to balance their worse-off position in the acquisition of certain resources. This counterargument is replied by stating that poverty can be defined as resource poverty, hence, being poor is having low resources, but that some resources widen this gap as they have cumulative tendency. Hence, distributing this resources is priority to solve poverty.

The paper does not give, however, any precise 'institutional design' that solves the issue on positionality or cumulative tendency tied to poverty or equality distribution.

A Means to an End: Adding Value to the Preference Debate

Laura Miller_
_Webster University

ABSTRACT Helping disadvantaged people involves trusting them to make the best possible choices. Under scrutiny, however, it seems that the disadvantaged often fail to make the best choices for themselves. In this paper, I oppose both the traditional philosophical view that some choices of the disadvantaged are deformed or adaptive and the view of preference utilitarians, who favor aiming to satisfy all preferences.

My rejection of the traditional views of preference is founded on my identification of two distinct kinds of preferences and their relationship to each other: means preferences and end preferences. Means preferences are those choices that are made to satisfy a deeply held value while end preferences are those deeply held values. I also claim that persons reprioritize their values as their circumstances change through appropriately adaptive reevaluations. This allows for the rational adaption to circumstances by the disadvantaged. My view licenses intervention to satisfy some but not all preferences. End preferences are protected due to their value and connection to challenging circumstances, while it can be appropriate to try to persuade someone to alter their means preferences.

The title of this work makes clear its aim: to rightly situate a new theory of preference, one that adds value, among the other philosophical theories that have previously been established. This view offers more than a different perspective of preferences. It also assists interventionists on the grounds that aid should be targeted to what matters most to the disadvantaged, their end preferences.

KEYWORDS Adaptive Preference, Choice, Means Preferences, End Preferences, Intervention, Adaptive Reevaluation

PANEL 11_(RE-) CONFIGURING THE LEFT: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO LEFT-WING POPULISM AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY

CONVENOR: JUANA LORENA and PEDRO PINHEIRO

The discussants in this panel will include Samuele Mazzolini (Ca' Foscari University of Venice).

The view that most societies have been experiencing constant and multiple crises in the last years is consensual. The world has been facing global challenges such as the Covid-pandemic, climate crisis, continuous financial crisis, and a crisis of liberal democracy and, relatedly, crisis in political representation, to keep the list short.

The crisis of liberal democracy has been discussed in the field of political theory for about 30 years. The concept of post-democracy, coined by Colin Crouch in the early 2000s became paradigmatic for this debate as it suggested that political participation was hindered by the personal interests of lobbyists, oligarchic elites, and the political establishment. Along those lines, theorists like Chantal Mouffe, for instance, called for the necessity of "re-politicizing the political" to suggest left-wing populist alternatives for the crisis of liberal democracy. Leftist movements aiming at a populist articulation of society through discourse and the mobilization of affects and emotions arise since the early 2000s.

The long-standing consensus around neoliberalism, both as an economical doctrine and as a way of life, has been put in question, for instance, by popular movements against the Troika during and after the Euro crisis of 2008 in non-central European countries like Greece, Portugal, and Spain. And in Latin America, a new wave of left-wing governments (including some left-wing populist governments) claiming the expansion of democracy and social inclusion has emerged in the last years.

However, the political terrain has been strongly disputed. Rather than proposing a mere re-politicization, some theorists, such as Wendy Brown, suggest that we are living in a period of hyper-politicization. They note indeed that attempts to provide answers to the crises come not only from the left, but from the right as well. Right-wing forms of populism has achieved significant success in many parts of the world. Sometimes, this response from the right has consisted in a strong radicalization as a way out the crisis of representation, as can be observed in the cases of Donald Trump in the USA and Bolsonaro in Brazil. Hence the world seems to be facing a dynamization of crises and conflicts, which still needs a careful theoretical analysis. With this in mind, the panel seeks to connect research on left-wing populism and radical democracy - both within the fields of political theory and political philosophy - and explore different ways the left could take to overcome the current challenges outlined above.

In the last decades, there was a growth of interest in left-wing populism approaches. In this context, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who proposed a discursive approach to populism, emphasizing emotions, have been particularly influential in shaping the discussion, creating a line of thought that significantly developed their original insights (e.g. Stavrakakis, Panizza, Katsambekis, and other theorists of the so-called Essex School). Other more recent contributions to the debate on left-wing populism have pointed instead towards 'plebeian' theories of democracy along materialist and institutional lines (e.g., Vatter, McCormick, Vergara, or also Fraser).

In this sense, theory and practice of inclusionary left-wing populism mutually impact each other, as we see in the cases of Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece, bringing hope to the left.

However, considering the (empirical) developments of left-wing populism, some critical considerations should be made

about left-wing populism. Although left-wing populism demands horizontality and equality, the possibility to accomplish these goals has been disputed, for instance, by theorists like Müller or Urbinati, who question the very democratic core of populism. Furthermore, the recently nationalist turn of left-wing movements like Aufstehen! ("Stand Up!") in Germany has also provoked a reflection on the limits of left-wing populism, to the extent that, as Celikates has argued, it shows that populism can easily turn against those excluded from the demos (especially migrants). More deeply, for Celikates, it is the very ontology of populism that hampers the radicalization of democracy toward the left.

Considering these debates, this panel aims to explore possible paths for the left to expand and radicalize democracy, focusing on two possibilities: left-wing populism and radical democracy.

Questions to be addressed include, but are not limited, to the following:

- Is populism a suitable instrument for the radicalization of democracy, or is it structurally contradictory to left principles?
- Does populism – left and right – inevitably entail a nationalist logic?
- Or rather than populism, is radical democracy a better way for the left?
- And relatedly, what are the possible synergies and contrasts between them?
- Which approaches in radical democratic theory are the most appropriate to address the present challenges for the left?
- Which role should the mobilization of affects and emotions play in left-wing politics?

Can green populism prevent and defeat eco-fascism?

Xan Fernando Boullón Tato_
_Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT It is widely accepted that the next decades will be decisive for the determination of the conditions in which humans will live on our planet (UN, 2019). In the face of the climate emergency, there are two possible choices: trying to keep going with the actual model of unlimited economic growth or assuming that radical changes must be made in order to stop its most pernicious effects. The latter is assumed not only as desirable but as necessary, by a large part of the world's left and progressive movements. But it is unclear how this change —unavoidable if we want to keep away a future of post-apocalyptic characteristics- will be carried out. The potential emergence of neo-fascist green groups (Satgar, 2021) in rich countries as a response to the climate emergency and its effects —not only in terms of weather but mostly in terms of its social effects, such as massive migrations and wars for basic resources (Kaczan, D.J., Orgill-Meyer, J., 2019)- is a threat that left and progressive movements ought not to underestimate.

In this paper, I will propose that the left can find some useful tools in populism to be able to defeat eco-fascism in terms of discourse, political action, and policies. Actually, "environmental populism" (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021) has already taken place in practice and worldwide movements such as Fridays for Future —with a clear and recognised leadership, Greta Thunberg- and Extinction Rebellion have been gaining weight in recent years (Sabherwal, A & Ballew MT, 2021). Still, I will not take an open stand for classic populism, as presented mainly by Laclau (2005) and Mouffe (2018). Instead, following Fernández Liria (2016), I will try to integrate some of the insights populism presents, which had been largely unattended by modern theories —liberalism, republicanism, marxism-, with classical proposals of these political traditions.

In this way, I will dispute the idea that republicanism is a necessary alternative to populism (Villacañas, 2015), and defend a dialogue between both points of view, whether it be a plebeian democracy (Møller Mulvald & Møller Stahl, 2019) or another outcome.

I will conclude that only by learning from some populist teachings and maintaining some unwavering republican positions can the left be better equipped for the political struggles that are coming. Whether a 'populist moment' is already happening (Mouffe, 2019) or not, it seems inevitable that it will come at some point hand in hand with climate emergency and its effects. In order to be prepared for this moment, defeating authoritarian alternatives, and being able to establish political and economic structures that are more just and respectful of the planet, we must provide ourselves with the theoretical tools we have at our disposal.

KEYWORDS Populism, eco-fascism, ecology, climate emergency, left

The radical democratic road to Socialism: two critiques of libertarian populism

Thor João de Sousa Veras_
_Federal University of Santa Catarina

ABSTRACT In taking up the need for post-socialist strategies in the contemporary debate on populism, this paper aims to contrast two conceptions of radical democracy as critical models in dispute of the recent phenomenon of extreme right-wing populism - which I name "libertarian populism". To do this, I will first reconstruct the diagnosis of how the grammar of freedom that has come to be mobilized by the alliance between neoliberalism and far-right populism in the contemporary public sphere around an authoritarian and libertarian platform in the antisocial and anarcho-capitalist sense. Second, I will present two conceptions of radical democracy: the deliberative engaged by Jürgen Habermas and the agonist advocated by Chantal Mouffe as critical models of the far-right populist capture of the idea of freedom and the normative erosion of the emancipatory core of contemporary democracies. Such models defend positions of radical reformism, conceptions of popular sovereignty and sovereignty of a people, as well as of social freedom opposed to the negative and ultra-individualistic notion of libertarian populism. By analyzing the advantages and limits of each theoretical-political strategy of radical democracy - Mouffe's left populism and Habermas's transnational republicanism - I will argue for the resumption of the idea of socialism as a guiding political struggle that can be embodied, despite theoretical tensions and political-ontological distinctions, around a conception of democratic socialism that communes elements of both perspectives against the libertarian-authoritarian populist threat of the far-right.

KEYWORDS Populism. Radical democracy. Socialism. Habermas. Mouffe.

Left Populism and Agonistic Democracy in Laclau and Mouffe

Mark Wenman_
_ University of Birmingham

ABSTRACT In his *On Populist Reason* (2005), Ernesto Laclau identified populism with a binary division between the people and the established authorities and with the emergence of a part that embodies or claims to speak in the name of the 'people-as-a-whole'. Notwithstanding criticisms of the abstract quality of Laclau's theory and his tendency to present populism as synonymous with democracy as such, contemporary accounts of populism have largely absorbed the details of his description of this most significant political phenomenon of our times. Laclau's theory builds on his earlier account of 'hegemony' which can be traced to his work in the 1970s and 1980s, including the influential *Hegemony and Social Strategy* (1985) co-authored with Chantal Mouffe. The final chapter of Hegemony outlined a vision for rebuilding left politics around a model of 'radical and plural democracy'. In her subsequent work, Mouffe went on to stress the importance of 'agonistic democracy' and the need to institutionalize contestation and plurality as a way of transforming 'enmity' into constructive modes of 'adversity'. This emphasis on pluralism and the value of contestation is significant because critics have stressed the 'anti-pluralist' qualities of contemporary populist movements. What is the relationship between populism and pluralism? Can a populist mobilisation of the popular will be compatible with democratic institutions that institutionalize contestation and plurality? And, in particular, how should we figure the relationship between a progressive left populism and a commitment to the institutions and values of pluralist democracy? This paper explores these issues by re-examining the tensions between populism and agonistic democracy in Laclau and Mouffe.

Populisms of rage: police brutality, judiciary crises, and social mobilization

Natalia Botonaki_
_Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

ABSTRACT A common criticism levelled against both populism and radical democracy as viable routes for the left political project of the 21st century is the emphasis placed on the mobilization of anger, rage, indignation – affects characterized by negativity and by the creation and sustenance of enmity. Peter Sloterdijk (2016), even attempted to write a history of (left) insurrection in the Global North by tracing the transactions of this "capital of rage". Implicit in such criticism is the common sense argument that the irrationality of rage specifically, and affect more broadly, renders people susceptible to demagoguery, as is the case with populism (Urbinati, 2019), and undermines the value of dialogue and political opposition, as is the case with radical democratic theory (Volk, 2022) . This presentation parts from a lacuna in this line of argumentation – namely the limited engagement with the motivations of this negative, enmity breeding passion. Srinivasan (2020) addresses the "counterproductivity critique" of anger by shifting attention to its aptness, and identifies as a crucial characteristic of it a moral violation, namely a violation of "how things ought to be." This presentation will explore cases in which the Judiciary system and the Police act in ways that constitute such violations, and the political responses these produce. In particular, it will look at grass-roots protest movements and explore how these mobilize anger and rage in order to highlight and (radically) intervene in the problematic areas of representational and constitutional democracy. Using the 2020 BLM protests as its main example, the presentation will turn to Peter Strawson's (2008) argument about the importance of anger and resentment in the construction and sustenance of social – and in this case, political – community. Against the argument that the radical-democratic critique of democracy and the Law (i.e. Wolin, Ranciere, Badiou, Zizek) fails to take into account that it is within this framework that radical demands can form by mobilized people (Volk, 2022), the presentation will suggest that demands such as "#AbolishThePolice" acknowledge the importance of these institutions (Democracy, the Law) by seeking

to address flaws in them. The "Blue Lives Matter" countermovement will be used as an example of the construction of friend-enemy distinctions which rather than subvert or criticize crises of Democracy, re-animate the "friend-enemy" distinction, and ultimately sustain Democracy in a state of crisis. The juxtaposition of the two will serve to highlight how, within the area of study of populism and radical democracy, a generic conception of anger as problematic as it limits the scope of academic engagement with its causes and its constructive potential.

Global Left and Populism: From Incompatibility to Convergence, and Back

Tamara Caraus_
_University of Lisbon

ABSTRACT From a standard perspective of political theory and public debates, populism and Global Left are opposing concepts – populism usually sees persons as embedded in national or ethnic communities, while a potential global left has to envisage human beings and political action across and beyond boundaries. However, the global left, as it was configured in the discourses and actions of the social movements around the world from the last three decades, emerged through a logic that instantiated the recent approaches of populism as an emancipatory practice. The aim of this presentation is to examine the convergences of these two phenomena and to assess the limits. The first section examines briefly the recent re-definitions of populism seem from the perspective of populism as pathology and, more extensively, approaches of populism as an emancipatory politics in works of Laclau, Mouffe, Balibar, Stavrakakis, and others. In spite of differences, these approaches assume some common minimal features: both view 'the people' as the unavoidable political agency, and both refer to the distinction between 'elite' and 'the people', with the crucial difference that that for emancipatory populism 'the people' is never given, but processual and always in construction according to the new chain of equivalence articulated in a context or another, and this emancipatory perspective on populism was instantiated by the global left as configured until now.

Thus, the second part of the presentation will map the logic of emancipatory populism in the protests and social movements from the last three decades, by examining the discourses of Zapatista movement, World Social Forum, alter-globalisation movement, migrant movements such as 'No One Is Illegal', 'No Borders', and others. Thus, the main features of this global emancipatory populism are (and this abstract illustrates these features with the discourse of Zapatista/EZLN, and the paper will expand the analysis to the discourses of other movements): (i) the configuration of an inclusive 'we': "Brothers and sisters from five continents" (Zapatista/EZLN); (ii) a "we"

from bellow against those from above "the powerful who want to turn the planet into a private club"; (iii) a chain of differences becoming equivalence: "We are the same simple and ordinary men and women that are repeated in all races, painted in all colours, speak in all languages and live in all places"; (iv)representing/imagining the world-as-one "the beginning of the construction of a new and good world, that is, a world which admits all these worlds". Thus, the section will conclude that, according to the discourses of global social movements, the fate of world depends on those who will say (in a populist discourse) "our world", "our planet" or "we, the people of the world".

The third part examines the advantages and limits of conceiving/theorising Global Left in terms of populism, mainly by pointing out that most of the criticisms of populism in the state context are not valid for populism in a global context, e.g. a 'global people' is not reductionist or simplistic, on the contrary, a 'global people' is possible only after understanding the complexity of global problems; as well, 'global populism' is not a pathology of democracy, it could be inaugural of democracy on the global scale and could work as a democratising power. The main limit in conceiving a populist global democratic politics concerns the political theory as such, thus the section will ask how legitimate are political theorists to export the concepts from the context of nation-state politics at the global level. In conceiving a politics beyond nation-state, should not we get rid of old concepts, especially contested ones as populism? Do not we have more innovative ways of thinking politics and collective political action at the global level?

The concluding remarks will argue that a global populism viewed as a contestatory global politics and agonistic global democracy is a plausible way of conceiving politics beyond the nation-state, and this does not exclude other ways of thinking a global democratic politics.

"Left-wing populism" from Latin America to Europe: theoretical and practical considerations

Felipe Rafael Linden_
_École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales

"POPULISm" is a central category in Latin American political and social sciences since the second half of the twentieth century. The traditional theories built in the sixties around this concept were the first to develop a general interpretation of political phenomena with strong popular support, such as Peronism, that did not correspond to the marxist schema and were commonly described before as "(left-wing) fascism" (Seymour Lipset). That is, they sought to theorize a novelty that could not be reduced to the application of European explanatory models, and for this reason they made use of the concept of "national-popular" and later "populism". The italian-argentinian sociologist Gino Germani is a pioneer in the construction of a theoretical discourse on "populism", taken up by other authors such as Torcuato Di Tella and notably in Brazil by Francisco Weffort. They stressed, among other characteristics, the inclusion of popular sectors in the political process thought these phenomena and the ideological hybridity derived from both nationalism and demands of social justice. E. Laclau's first theoretical draft on "populism" in 1977 makes a critical review of this literature (absent later in *On Populist Reason*) in order to overcome these analyses, but it is still tributary of his Latin-American predecessors, if only by the use of the same category to describe the same phenomena and the comparison to democracy and socialism. However, this intellectual tradition, a moment of great theoretical effort, is today considered outdated and little analyzed in the field of "populism studies". The center of current theoretical debates on "populism" shifted to Europe, where they were re-formulated to think about political experiences, associated above all with the rise of the radical right, particular to the old continent and to the West in general. In the last decades, the "left-wing populist" approach shad light to a more progressive understanding of it, inspired by Latin American experiences and by E. Laclau's late work. Still, it seems that there are misunderstandings across the Atlantic back-and-forth exchanges on "populism". In this paper, we will share a critical review of the first contributions of Latin American

theorists and also repatriate Laclau in this tradition. Our aim is to clarify some theoretical and empirical blindspots, such as the national dimension of the "(left-wing) populism" in Europe and its difference with Latin American experiences.

KEYWORDS "Left-wing populism"; Latin America; Populism studies; Gino Germani; Francisco Weffort; Ernesto Laclau

Between spontaneity and automatism. Post-Foundationalism, Critical Theory, and the problem of how to relate to the world

Guido Barbi_
_KU Leuven _ULB Brussels

ABSTRACT The impact of critical theory on left-wing movements has decreased substantially after the 1970s. In its lieu, radical democratic conceptions underpinned by post-foundationalist ontologies have progressively gained ground. It is thus surprising that the current crisis of democracy has coincided with a widespread criticism of post-foundationalist theories. Due to its social "weightlessness", post-foundationalism is considered unable to distinguish between different kinds of protest and normatively evaluate them. (McNay 2014) The imputation is that the central insight into the foundational contingency of society, epistemologically disqualifies any normative judgment with a validity claim. Yet, against the backdrop of post-metaphysical reason, validity claims can only be rescued by subordinating them to the same fixed foundations that post-foundationalism criticizes – thus, seriously threatening the critical potential of political judgments themselves. (Zerilli 2016, Ferrara 2022) At its core, the theoretical issue of contention is how politics relates to the world: can politics understand and describe the world in neutral terms? Do the conditions of the world – like material social relations, or climate change – dictate priorities to politics?

My paper reconstructs how post-foundationalism and critical theory differently conceive of the relation between politics and the world. In (1) and (2), I identify and analyze an impasse either subordinating critique to systemic constraints, or unbinding critique from systemic analysis. In (3), I suggest that possible correctives can be found in the pre-modern rhetorical tradition – as suggested by an a-typical line of post-Heideggerian thought (Gadamer, Arendt, Grassi).

(1) By focusing on the contingency of foundational systems of meaning, post-foundationalism has difficulty in making binding statements about the world. The contingency of such statements stems directly from the continued contingency of

any foundation (hegemonic or counterhegemonic). Such statements remain structurally incapable of grounding critique – as critique by necessity will continuously have to deal with the contingent system of meaning itself. Against such a backdrop, post-foundationalism seems at best capable of producing a meta-normativity distinguishing between positions more or less apt at furthering the critique of foundations, remaining unable to judge the critique itself. (Ramin 2021)

(2) In the case of critical theory, concentration on systemic constraints grounds critique at the expense of its capability to question foundations themselves. While critical theory can produce normative validity claims, they are grounded on accepting a world-description dictated by contingent systems of meaning – which it becomes increasingly harder to challenge. The foundational framework used to adjudicate the normative claim becomes impermeable to critique. Against this backdrop, political movements can be normatively differentiated. Yet, not only undesired normative claims are dismissed. Rather, anything undermining the foundational framework is made unavailable for critique.

(3) As a possible corrective, I discuss the concept of sensus communis and ingenium in pre-Kantian, Humanist thought. Within such a paradigm, normative judgments never take the shape of a validity claim. Rather, they are the product of a plural, and continuous re-description and re-evaluation of the world – proceeding by analogy and imagination. Such a process captures the world unencumbered by hegemonic conceptual schemes but maintains that the world itself has an impact on the priorities politics has to set. Instead of identifying world-description as always already subject to foundational biases, the continuous re-definition of foundations is tied to the plural activity of world description and evaluation itself.

KEYWORDS Post-Foundationalism, Critical Theory, Radical Democracy,
Political Judgment, sensus communis

The hegemonic resistance of neoliberal capitalism: analysing the practical limits of left-wing populism

Guilhem Mevel_
_Sciences Po - CEVIPOF

ABSTRACT The theoretical roots of European left-wing populism can be found in the subjective turn of postmodernism. In Mouffe and Laclau's centerpiece, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, the subject is no more defined on an objective basis – the relations of production, but on a discursive and contingent background. Subjects are constructed in the duality of power and conflict, which shapes differentially the initial emptiness of their identity. Therefore, the Marxist categories of hegemony (Gramsci) and overdetermination (Althusser) are displaced on the field of articulation of heterogeneous identities beyond "classism". Against the privilege given by classical Marxism to the working class as a revolutionary subject, Mouffe and Laclau's post-Marxism favours horizontality and plurality in the sites of egalitarian struggles.

In practice, left-wing populism in Europe has emerged as a strategic response to the subordination of traditional social democracy to the neoliberal consensus. Even more so, counter-hegemonic struggles based on heterogeneous identities have prevailed in the context of the fragmentation of productive spaces in the post-Fordist international economy. While this context creates objective conditions for the emergence of the populist strategy on the left, two types of critique can be addressed based on the contradictions between democratic egalitarianism and populism. I will raise those critiques by comparing the cases of France and Greece since the 2010s.

The first type of critique concerns the personality of populist leaders and the nature of populist organizations. Indeed, left-wing populism in practice is unable to articulate an ethics of popular practice with self-emancipation. The leader's discursive ability to provide symbolic and external articulation of heterogeneous struggles lacks a strong material capacity of sustaining them on the long term.

More fundamentally, another type of critique touches upon the social ontology of populism. The relative indetermination of its principles generates confusion between the neoliberal ideology and the capitalist structure. In other words, popular-demo-

cratic appeals can be dispossessed when facing liberal and institutional constraints, because of the structural character of capitalist states. The state apparatus does not only "conserve" or modulate the hegemony of dominant classes but sustains dynamically capitalistic interests in negating class conflict and creating a fragmented and weakened working class.

Facing the practical limits of left-wing populism, the overcoming of an "economist" reading of Marxism can also be formulated within the Marxist conceptual framework. Against the segmented approach of orthodox Marxism, which differentiates the most advanced and conscious elements of the vanguard from the action of popular masses, I propose a non-essentialist and radical-democratic conception of Marxism by providing a different reading of Gramsci's philosophy of praxis. Qualifying social classes is itself a political act, turning classes into political agents around a hegemonic practice able to transform class divisions when incorporated to state apparatuses. In opposition to the post-Marxist horizontal discourse, such a perspective favours a material articulation of classes around the project of self-emancipation. By analysing the confluence of class exploitation, women's oppression and environmental destructions, class consciousness extends praxis beyond any reductionist interpretation – whether economist or discursive.

KEYWORDS Left-wing populism, France, Greece, Marxist theory, praxis

Towards a non-populist theory of direct democracy?

Nenad Stojanović_
_University of Geneva

ABSTRACT If there is one political claim and vindication that is common to both left and right-wing populism, it is the demand for "more direct democracy", i.e. to add and/or broaden the channels of political participation to "the people".

Yet, apart from few exceptions (Saward 1998), direct democracy – by which we mean the possibility for citizens to influence (via popular initiatives and referendums) political decision-making process between the elections – is undertheorized in contemporary political philosophy. Few theorists who have engaged with direct democracy (e.g. Christiano 2008, Urbinati 2006) are very critical of this form of democracy, especially because it would allegedly open the doors to anti-democratic populism.

The ambition of my paper is to present a theory of direct democracy that is sufficiently robust to resist the charge of populism. The paper shall show that, under certain conditions (both theoretical and empirical), far from being an easy tool in the hands of populist leaders, direct democracy can structurally undermine populist rhetoric and support institutions of representative democracy. The bulk of the paper will consist in defining the theoretical and normative conditions under which a non-populist direct democracy can be successful.

In the final section I will argue that direct democracy can be further enriched and/or made populism-resistent if it is complemented by the tools of deliberative democracy, such as "deliberative minipublics" selected via sortition. This is claim is far from being self-evident, given that deliberative minipublics and the use of democratic lottery generally speaking are another political demand that is common to the most recent social movements (some of which may be qualified as left populist), such as Extinction Rebellion or Youth for Climate.

KEYWORDS direct democracy, deliberative democracy, populism, sortition

Populism, left and right

Anat Ascher_
_The Open University of Israel

ABSTRACT Ever since world war II, the prevailing form of democracy in the western world was liberal democracy. The first two decades of the 21st Century, however, have witnessed the rise of several right-wing populist governments, thus evoking the old tension between different aspects of democracy, particularly democracy as the rule of the majority versus democracy as the safeguarding of individuals' rights and liberties. According to Rancière, this tension, along with all the concerns and anxieties it brings about, cannot be separated from what he calls the "hatred of democracy". In a 2005 book by that same title, he formulates this conundrum as follows: "The thesis of the new hatred of democracy can be succinctly put: there is only one good democracy, the one that represses the catastrophe of democratic civilization."

In the years that had since passed, it seems that the catastrophe has become very much apparent. Populist governments around the globe are inciting social groups against each other, promoting racist legislation, persecuting minorities, and undermining the rule of law. Now, one can suggest, as does Rancière himself in a 2020 interview, that the leaders of these governments do not truly represent the underprivileged masses, but are rather supported by the economic elite, and that therefore this does not pose a true challenge to democratic government (as this is not democracy we are dealing with here, but rather oligarchy). However, one can alternatively claim that these leaders do in fact represent significant parts of their respective societies, and that in a sense, their political endeavors uncover some of the most inner truths of democracy and its tight connection to populism, thus making its autoimmune nature ever more clear.

This paper will take on this later alternative. Understanding the populist governments of the 21st Century as a most troubling, yet authentic, manifestation of the innate contradiction found in democracy, it will try to unravel where does this leave the democratic political project. On the one hand, it is possible that liberal democracy as we used to know it, upholding both the rule of majority and protection of human rights, can no longer exist in our times. On the other hand, as more and more people are also taking to the streets and protest against their right-wing populist governments, thus actively engaging in the political realm, it might also be the case that our age calls

for new ways of participation in the political, and perhaps for the formation of a more direct form of democracy. Rancière's own political ontology, it will suggest, obliges us to understand right-wing populism as a form of genuine political action. However, it is that same political ontology that also enables us to construct an account that might contribute to our understanding of left-wing populism, and harness the force of populist engagement towards goals such as diversity and equality.

The need of normativity in the theory of hegemony and its relevance for populist politics

Ivane Lomidze_
_The University of Münster _Ilia State University

ABSTRACT Recent debates about the nature of populism and its potential to challenge and transform global neoliberal hegemony constitute one of the central – if not the most central issues in contemporary political theory. While populism is seen as a solution to the crisis of liberal democracy by prominent leftist thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau (1977, 2005, 2006) and Chantal Mouffe (2018 2022), the democratic potential of populism and collateral damage it could cause to democracy remains questionable (Müller 2017; Urbinati 2019, 2020). In this paper, I accept the central theoretical premises of the so-called "discursive approach to populism" and argue for the progressive transformative power of populist political projects. Nevertheless, I think that the way Laclau and Mouffe define populism is not normatively adequate and does not offer a reliable ground to prevent damaging democracy. Namely, when defining "normative" as "the ontic raw material" that is invested in the universal (2000, 81), where universal is understood as "a contingent historical product" (2007, 122), "a pragmatic social construction" (2007, 103-4) that is "an act of radical construction" (1990, 29), Laclau risks to fall into arbitrariness of a thoroughgoing decisionism. Even the most progressive leftist political project could turn into authoritarianism and there is nothing in Laclau's discursive understanding of social formations that would prevent it.

This paper has two aims: the first is to illustrate the problem of normativity in Laclau's post-Marxist political theory in general and its consequences for the populist political project in particular. To achieve this objective, I bring two distinct albeit fundamentally interlinked discussions Laclau was engaged in the 90s – discussions about pragmatism and deconstruction (1996) and contingency, hegemony and universality (2000) – within the context of the debates about populism. Most importantly, I will follow Simon Critchley's (1996, 2007) criticism of the lack of normativity in Laclau's theory of hegemony. But in contrast to Critchley, who sees Levina's idea of infinite responsibility to others as a solution, I do not consider morality as a pre-po-

litical phenomenon (being this Levinasian ethics or any other sort) that could inform our political judgments. Here, Laclau is right when argues for the politico-discursive production of ethical norms. But the problem itself – the lack of normativity and danger to democracy - remains unsolved.

Thus, after illustrating the normative deficit in the theory of hegemony and its negative impact on the conceptualization of populism, the key challenge is to re-theorize the idea of normativity in a way that on the one hand, maintains central premises of the anti-essentialist ontology of post-Marxist theory and on the other hand, gives adjudicative mechanisms and principles through which one could judge between authoritarian and democratic practices. This is the second aim of the paper. Here, my central suggestion is to understand the normative reason in a way as some moral particularists offer, in a "holistic" way (Dancy 2004; Little 2000; Lance & Little 2008; McNaughton & Rawling 2000; 2008).

KEYWORDS Populism, Normativity, Ernesto Laclau, Moral Particularism

The people embodied: Lefort, Laclau, and the (un)democratic status of populism

Jan Šíma_
_Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts -
  Charles University

ABSTRACT When Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe formulated their radical democratic project, the work of Claude Lefort was one of their theoretical inspirations. His analysis of the symbolical dimension of power and the fluidity of social identities in modern democracy informed their conception of democratic politics. In contrast, when Laclau offered his theory of populism, Lefort´s thought has become an obstacle to populist politics (Laclau 2005). Does this mean that Laclau´s turn to populism came at the expense of some radical-democratic principles? Both of these authors would provide different answers. While Lefort´s description of democracy in terms of an empty place of power that resists embodiment implicitly puts populism in conflict with democracy (Arato 2013), Laclau´s conception of populism as a political logic consisting in the division between the people and the elite leads to an equivalence between populism and democratic politics (Arditi 2010). In my paper, I will show that these verdicts concerning the relation between populism and democracy cannot be exhaustive because they conceive these phenomena mainly at the ontological level of the political. Therefore, neither conception fully captures the varieties and possible articulations between populism and democracy. I will claim that we can understand the relation between populism and democracy only in the more "ontic" (Moffitt 2016) and context-specific sphere of political practice.

While the theories of both Laclau and Lefort rest as points of departure, I find it more helpful to embrace the current performative turn and other approaches emphasizing the role of the body in populism. This turn towards political performance shows the body as the main vehicle of populist representation. This representation must bridge two different principles – the role of the populist leader and the principle of popular sovereignty. While demonstrating their capacity to represent the people, populist leaders must perform (by using gestures, clothing, or manners) their closeness

to the people, and at the same time they must prove their capacity to lead them (Diehl 2017, Casullo 2020). On this level of ordinary political practices and performances, the relationship between populism and democracy is therefore more ambiguous and can develop in different directions. Against performances emphasizing the distance between politicians and ordinary people, as can be found in certain forms of technocratic or liberal politics, populist performances may bring the sovereignty of the people back into politics. In more inclusive populist performances, politics can get closer to the people and become more understandable. On the other hand, the construction of the people in populist representation always includes certain exclusions and empowers the role of the leader at the expense of other political actors. While I agree with Laclau that constructions of the people are always open to further contestations, the mimetic representation in populist performances can suppress the uncertainty of modern democracy by reiterating already existing political identities and therefore limiting the possibility of new articulations. The relation between populism and democracy is thus more ambiguous and can be captured only in particular contexts of populist politics.

KEYWORDS Laclau, Lefort, populism, democracy, embodiment, performative turn

Populism as a perennial possibility of democracy?

Kristina Vasic_
_CEU

ABSTRACT The aim of my paper is to analyze the normative relationship between democracy and populism and determine whether there is a way to justify populism by appealing to values that also justify democracy (such as political equality, personal autonomy). If one understands political equality in democracy as the equality of opportunity for influence (Dworkin, 2000), the prospect of exerting influence over the outcomes of collective, majority-rule decision-making in democracy, in large communities, is fairly low. This problem is known as the problem of negligible influence (Josse, 2019) and it is connected to personal autonomy as much as to the notion of political equality, if autonomy is understood to imply a level of shared-control over matters of the common concern (Wilson, 2021). When citizens in a democracy have unequal political status (which can occur due to inequalities in possessing social/material resources outside of the formal political sphere, which translates to the political sphere), democracy can be said to lose its legitimacy. Populism, on the other hand, claims legitimacy by representing the people, which is, originally, a democratic ideal. It could be that, once there is unequal distribution of political power in a democracy, the candidate that aims to reclaim the balance is populism and that it looms as a possibility every time democracy distances from its ideal picture. What makes this possibility internal to democracy could be the idea advanced by Margaret Canovan (1999) that democracy has two faces, redemptive (which reflects popular control) and pragmatic (focused on institutions and rules), whose tension can trigger populism, which compensates for the loss of a redemptive aspect of democracy; this aspect of democracy, in her view, has an anti-institutional impulse (just like populism). Because of this, populism could be "a shadow of democracy," which cracks in every time there is a tension between institutions and the people, which could also be read as a consequence of the violation of political equality.

I will argue for the plausibility of the understanding of populism (defined as a political logic of opposition of the people to the elite) as a "perennial possibility" of democracy, trying to show that populism is not only an internal possibility of democracy but

is also morally justified by the very normative grounds that justify democracy (mainly, political equality). In other words, if populism is understood as the organization of the people with the aim to reclaim political equality (or opportunity for the same) vis-à-vis the representatives that are perceived as more powerful and illegitimate (the elite), the motivation that drives populism is the same motivation that grounds democracy.

Does left populism short-circuit itself? Podemos in the labyrinths of cultural elitism and radical leftism

Samuele Mazzolini_
_ Ca' Foscari University of Venice

ABSTRACT Podemos' initial left populist strategy and electoral success have been the subject of much academic debate. However, amid the party's rapidly declining numbers at the polls, scholarly attention towards the Spanish party has been on the wane. Based on a discussion of the existing literature and a mixture of qualitative methods, this paper attempts to capture the distinctive features of the early populist gamble and two internal elements that progressively short-circuited it. The first is related to the cultural elitism of Podemos' leadership, a phenomenon observed especially within the faction of Íñigo Errejón, former number 2 of the party. The intellectualist distinction of many of its members proved to be a repressive instance that jeopardised the populist practice. The second is instead the return to a radical left fold, which is instead to be attributed to Podemos' former leader Pablo Iglesias, and his successor Ione Belarra. Party factionalism, strong leftist symbolism and the promotion of identity politics stand here among the most visible factors that negated the initial transversal approach. In different ways, those elements reestablished the previous symbolic space that Podemos' populism had been trying to supersede and sabotaged the possibility of securing a broad and durable popular identity.

The people as political subject in left and right-wing populism: A critical review of Alexandre Franco de Sá's book

Pedro Miguel Martins_
_CEPS - UMinho

ABSTRACT This paper intends, in a non-exhaustive way, to present a critical review of the perspectives on left and right-wing populism exposed by Alexandre Franco de Sá in his book: *Ideas without a Centre - Left and Right in Contemporary Populism* (2021).

This work stands out for developing, in an enticing style, a profound, and in some points, pertinent critique of the theory that supports left-wing populism as proposed by Ernest Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. To that extent, it represents a remarkable theoretical challenge to this current of the "new left", which deserves careful and systematic examination. As it is not possible to assess the pertinence of all of Franco de Sá's critiques and enumerate them, we focus our analysis on a central question in the structure of the book and in the theoretical framework of populisms: the "construction" and affirmation of the people as a democratic political subject, as opposed to an elite.

In Franco de Sá's analysis, Laclau & Mouffe's left-wing populism incurs in an insurmountable problem, which lies in the fact that the affirmation of the people as a democratic subject derives from an ideological "construction" of the people itself, alien to its existence as a genuine, concrete and historical being. This process would thus not derive from a "pre-political sociability", from shared traditions and customs, but rather from a relationship of antagonism established with the oligarchy that seeks to cement a new hegemony, based on an egalitarian, progressive and radically democratic vision. In fact, according to Franco de Sá, this perspective presupposes an elitist position, tinged with "moral superiority" and not authentically pluralist - despite trying to conjugate and establish a chain of equivalences between plural demands - which would seek to mould and educate society and the people (in the wake of Jacobinism, Marxism and post-Marxism). However, although this new left-wing ideology (radically feminist, anti-racist, post-colonial and marked by gender theories) would already be

"hegemonic" at the level of the restricted core of the academy and in the media - an assertion that is not satisfactorily proven by the author -, for this very reason it would not reflect the perspectives and customs of "ordinary people".

In contrast, for the author, certain manifestations of right-wing populism (associated with the "original populism" proposed by Vincent Coussedière) would not arise the same problem since they would be founded on a conservative and authentic notion of the people - that is, not artificially constructed within a new leftist imaginary produced by a distanced academic elite - but derived from the traditions and a "pre-political sociability" of "ordinary people".

We intend to argue that, despite the brilliant, convincing and erudite way Franco de Sá argues in favour of this "conservative populism" - electing it as a non-identitarian possibility of renewal of contemporary democracy - his notion of people as a pre-political democratic subject seems as "constructed", ambiguous, "imaginary" and even sociologically and historically implausible as that of left-wing populism. Thus, some of Franco de Sá's fine critiques of Laclau & Mouffe's theories could be, in our interpretation, applied to the notion of people intrinsic to the 'original populism' which the author praises and theoretically legitimates.

KEYWORDS Left-wing Populism, Right-wing Populism, People, Antagonism, Hegemony.

PANEL 12_ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF BIOTECHNOLOGIES

CONVENORS: JORGE MATEUS and RÚBEN BATISTA

Emerging and converging technologies like nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science (NBIC) are creating a fast-paced environment of symbiotic contact, dependence, and merging between human beings and intelligent machines. New and disruptive technologies such as these are progressively spawning new opportunities and needs, changing the way we perceive ourselves as free, autonomous agents and challenging many of our moral and social values. Along with the ability to make our lives more comfortable and changing the patterns of action of our societies for the best, existential threats loom behind our ever-growing power to manipulate our human, biological constitution.

The devices that could once be used to monitor (and, in some cases, punish) and that are now instruments of control and self-control (i.e., devices that we entrust ourselves to, whether physical or digital), are becoming increasingly not only ready-to-hand, but embedded in our biological constitution, threatening soon to transpose the very ontological character of the human being.

The growing digitalisation and transhumanisation of our culture and its Promethean ethos has not only set us on the path of a deep ontological crisis, but also carried with it pressing ethical challenges. An example of this is how the steady progression from the Internet of Things (IoT) to Internet of Bodies (IoB) is taking place and augmenting the very dimensions of our existence, permanently connecting, and digitalising us. The IoB is a prime example of how human beings are transitioning towards a fully connected life, where bodies and minds are not simply flesh and blood but connected network systems integrated with other digital technological systems.

Hence, ethical challenges dealing with our ever-growing integration with NBIC technologies are the main topic of this panel. We welcome papers exploring value conflicts arising from human-nonhuman relationships and from our technological integration, the challenges of genetic edition to identity, the contemporary ontological crisis, among other topics. A non-exhaustive list of other possible relevant problems to be addressed in the panel includes:

- Gene editing, well-being, and flourishing;
- Autonomy, authenticity, and gene editing;
- Social and economic impacts of human digitalisation;
- Transhumanism and posthumanism;
- Policy, safety, and regulation;
- Other topics.

The Right to Access Psychedelic Drugs and Therapies: The Case for Legal Reform

Otto Lehto_
_New York University

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the current regulatory environment of human en-hancements, in practically all Western countries, is excessively rigid and maladaptive from the point of view of human welfare. This is exemplified by the banning and heavy regulation of psychedelic and related drugs (such as psilocybin, LSD, mescaline, and DMT). Despite the fact that government has made it very hard to study these substances scientifically, which are among mankind's oldest Human Enhancement Technologies (HETs) (Earp, Douglas, & Savulescu, 2017), the best available scien-tific evidence suggests that psychedelics, although they come with risks, have a lot of therapeutic promise to help people who are struggling with serious illnesses like cancer and depression. (Griffiths, Johnson, et al., 2006) And yet, in most countries, today it is almost impossible for patients to get legal access to such drugs and thera-pies outside of a few limited clinical trials (often at elite universities). (Bryock, 2018) For example, Belouin & Henningfield (2018) have argued that the restrictive regula-tory environment surrounding psychedelics "developed during a time of fear, political concern, and misinformation about psychedelic substances that led to establishing substantial barriers impeding their research and potential clinical uses." This paper argues that it is cruel for the regulatory state to keep on insisting that patients cannot have access to them. This argument could be extended to some other experimental drugs and therapies as well, but this will not be attempted here, since the case for reform seems especially strong, and most defensible, in the case of the relatively narrow class of psychedelic drugs and therapies. Regardless of where one stands on the appropriate level of ethical and political regulation on other human enhancement technologies (such as gene editing, cloning, and smart drugs), this paper argues that the safety concerns and ethical worries surrounding the class of psychedelic (and re-lated) drugs can be addressed satisfactorily to warrant both clinical access and even (given stringent safeguards) consumer access outside of the clinical setting. There-

fore, although it remains important to guard against scientific malpractice and substance abuse (Bonson, 2018), most ethical and scientific considerations, in my estimate, support relaxing regulations compared to the stringent contemporary baseline. Thus, the right to access and use psychedelic drugs and therapies, with appropriate regulatory safeguards, is a right that all people, but especially poor, sick, and disadvantaged people (such as mental health and cancer patients), should arguably have at their disposal with minimal hurdles, and without having to ask anybody for permission.

KEYWORDS human enhancement, psychedelics, drugs, therapy, access

Who controls the present controls the past
The role of memory in digitalization

José Pedro Fabião Rodrigues_

ABSTRACT This work aims to reflect on the role of memory, with a particular focus on the work of Bernard Stiegler. The concept of memory has undergone a fundamental shift in recent years as we have begun to disentangle technology from human beings. Humans are inherently technical beings, and cannot detach themselves from this characteristic. The deproletarianization of humans from work, or the separation of humans from their essential characteristic, occurred more prominently when we relinquished the power of technology to the free market, which began primarily during the Thatcher and Reagan era. This privatization of technology resulted in the separation of memory from technology, and what is now selected as memory is determined by the capital and market annex. Thus, memory is essential to the understanding of cultural heritage.

Orwell famously declared that "who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past," highlighting the danger of regimes of power, such as the free market, which creates a political force outside of state power, thus altering our notion of past, present, and future, even if sometimes unconsciously. The concept of memory becomes a key concept for all knowledge, as those who define the present necessarily control the past. Therefore, the analysis of memory should be a free and impartial attitude. It is essential to develop a critical awareness of how memory is produced and transmitted, to prevent it from being manipulated for political or economic gain. In this context, the concept of psychopower, as theorized by Bernard Stiegler, becomes particularly relevant. Psychopower refers to the power of technology and media to shape human consciousness, desires, and behaviors. In this process, memory is separated from technology, and what is selected as memory belongs to the capitalist and market-driven attachment. To counteract this loss of existential and ontological significance, it is necessary to recover control over our memory and promote a more democratic and diverse culture that values critical thinking and creativity

Bernard Stiegler's work has emphasized the importance of memory and its relationship with technology. He argues that technology has become a prosthetic extension of our memory, and that our use of technology has led to the devaluation of memory in contemporary society. However, Stiegler also acknowledges that technology can be used positively to promote memory, such as through the use of digital archives and social media.

In conclusion, memory plays a crucial role in shaping our understanding of the world and our place in it. We must be aware of the power dynamics that shape memory and how it is used to control the present and future. By promoting a culture of critical thinking and creativity, we can reclaim our memory and our forgetfulness.

KEYWORDS Stiegler; Memory; Psicopower; Knowledge.

PANEL 13_THE RISE OF UAVs IN CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

CONVENOR: SARA CRUZ

The discussants in this panel will include Helen Frowe (Stockholm University).

Following past year Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the world, and particularly Europe, was confronted with threats and challenges that many mistakenly or wishfully believed to have stayed in the past. The event made even the most convict pacifist question its stance and prompted the resurgence of old debates and idea such as that of a cooperative joint European force (European Army). Although prospects for such idea to materialize remain very low, the invasion undeniably led many member states to considerably increase their defense expenditures, Germany being the most notorious case.

While substantial attention and speculation has understandably been given to the threat and possibility of a nuclear war, other worrying features of contemporary warfare like the increasing introduction of UAVs in the battlefield seem to pass by quite unnoticed in mainstream media debates and commentaries. Despite all the controversy they have ignited since and during the U.S led War on Terror, drones' popularity and appeal only seem to have increased. The rise of this "dangerously tempting technology" as Walzer (2013) called it, triggered a heated debate among war ethics academics in the last decades with some enthusiastically endorsing their deployment (Statman; Schulzke), even advocating the existence of a moral duty to do so (Strawser), others reluctantly stressing the need for a more careful and nuanced approach(Walzer, McMahan, Enemark) and some rejecting them completely (Archambault; Chamayou; Waldron). Additionally, the erosion of circumscribed warzones and the increasingly non-state or mixed character of armed

conflicts worldwide seem to further emphasize already existing complexities.

Far from being a settled question, the ethical debate surrounding drone warfare now seems more urgent than ever as we witness the increasing deployment of UAV by both sides of the conflict. The intention behind this panel is to stimulate the debate surrounding this matter by addressing questions such as:

- Is the use of UAVs compatible with the orthodox just war theory and/or the emergent revisionist approach of reductive individualism that emerged specially from McMahan's critique of Walzer? And what about international humanitarian law?
- Do drones lead to "bloodless wars", enable more discriminate attacks and diminish the occurrence of collateral casualties, as their proponents claim?
- Can drones alleged advantages be said to benefit equally all those involved in the conflict?
- Should we set drones' moral status by ignoring their use in reality? Is it ethical to do so?
- What challenges does drone warfare pose to orthodox and/or revisionist just war theory?
- How does drone warfare change the human experience of war itself?

Notwithstanding the questions above, feel free to submit your proposal even if it falls beyond the scope of drone warfare, as any research within war ethics will be equally welcome in the panel.

Drone warfare and just war theory: the controversial status of signature strikes during the war on terror

Sara Cruz_
_ CEPS - Uminho

Abstract: Since the aftermath of 9/11 and subsequent US-led *War on Terror*, we have been witnessing the increasing deployment of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV aka drones) in armed conflicts worldwide. Given the variety of challenges and dilemmas the use of this technology entails, such trend was understandably accompanied by a surge of interest in just war theory and the ethics of war. Theoretically speaking, those on the more orthodox spectrum were threatened by the idea that riskless and asymmetric warfare could undermine the justification for killing in war (Kahn 2002; Walzer 2004). Others worried that the remoteness of combat could prompt a gamer mentality in so-called 'cubicle warriors' (Royakkers & Ests 2010) that facilitate gratuitous killing. On more long-term grounds, there is a fear that lessening both economic and human costs of war might make states and politicians more prone to engage in *ad bellum* unjust wars in the future, hence making this a "dangerously tempting technology" (Walzer 2013), especially at the hands of the ill-intended. Drone enthusiasts have, however, derided such worries and objections as exaggerated or the result of outdated (mis)conceptions of warfare (Statman 2015). Emphasizing UAVs heighted capacity for precision and enhanced ability to comply with *in bello* demands – by lowering instances of collateral damages without sacrificing one's own troops – they argued that using UAV is not only morally permitted but actually morally required (Strawser 2013). Due to a pervasive tendency to conflate objections to drones with arguments against targeted killings – as separating the two became an inglorious task since the "*war on terror*" – proponents stress how drone skepticism stems less from the weapon or technology itself than the infamous policies they were instrumentalized to enforce, noting that most of these objections are not drone specific and could be raised towards other weapons as well (Carvin 2015). Notwithstanding, the fact remains that drones are on the rise, particularly since the victory of Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh was largely attributed to the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone, which

ignited a drones' race all over eastern Europe, including Ukraine (even before the Russian invasion). Though fortunately a brief one, this conflict seems to have proved that smaller states, who often lacked the means to form or sustain large armies, could also assert themselves in the international arena if they own the right weapons. Yet, little has been discussed among just war theorist about how ought we to interpret this trend of worldwide drone proliferation: are drones democratizing warfare and, if so, is this something we must value or pursue? Or, on the contrary, can they function as equalizers, a useful tool for deterring prospective imperialist aggression that could recalibrate the balance of power in favor of the less resourceful, and act as an emancipatory weapon for those under unjust aggression with low prospects of success? This work hopes to contribute to narrow this gap by looking at how drones have been used in the ongoing war in Ukraine and their emancipatory potential for Ukrainian resistance.

KEYWORDS Drone warfare; drone proliferation; war in Ukraine; just war theory.

Knowing war through "all-seeing eyes" of UAVs: Towards hyperrealistic representation of warfare?

Srđan T. Korać_
_ Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade

ABSTRACT The presentation provides an account of how the military utilisation of burgeoning technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution applied in designing drones dramatically reshapes the visualization of war and discuss the plausible epistemological, social and ethical implications for the military. Throughout history, the complex reality of warfare and its visual presentation have generally partially coincided, or even conflicted each other. The visualization thus has had a limited epistemological value despite its strong narrative significance for the collective memory of a political community and its military. The ways of seeing warfare, i.e. the process of constituting socially reproduced image of it, has largely displayed dominant discursive practices on heroism, spreading an incomplete, and rather romanticized, depiction of the soldier`s experience of brutality of combat. The increased utilisation of advanced technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution to monitor events on the battlefield in real time and with high-resolution imagery is best exemplified in the use of UAVs. UAVs serve a variety of purposes (reconnaissance, patrolling, intelligence gathering and combat) and have many praised advantages as they fly longer, continuously, at higher altitudes and with no fatigue. While many analyses delve into the combined practices of information gathering, targeting, and killing aimed at enemy, I focus on operationally relevant utilisation of technical properties of UAVs that enable a hyper-realistic visualization of war. I draw my thesis from the abundance of detailed video footage of combat operations in the ongoing war in Ukraine recorded from the perspective of an "all-seeing eye", available to the general public through digital media and social networks (primarily via YouTube). The starting assumption of my analysis is that the hyperrealistic visualization of war to some extent reduces room for imaginative interpretation of the reality of combat operations. Representation of the course and outcome of the combat operation entangled in the fog of war, particularly what exactly look like being on the battlefield from the perspective of soldier, is now more reliable when it comes to

research on war. In contrast to the narrative practices constructed through the official discourse on war as a laudable and sacred collective undertaking, the advanced visual technology now reveals the brutality of armed violence making it easily, and almost instantly, accessible to millions around the world through digital media and social networks. The hyperrealistic visualization of war brings up additional social and ethical implications regarding the way war is or will be conducted and the ontological status of soldiers and commanders.

Autonomous weapons and Just War Theory

Mansi Rathour_
_ OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, India

ABSTRACT This paper aims to address the moral permitting of using autonomous weapons in wars. Wars today involve the use of sophisticated weapons such as autonomous one's, with decreased human control, and it becomes pertinent to evaluate the ethicality of using such weapons in contemporary warfare. Just war theory has been the long-standing doctrine on ethical restraining of wars, as such, the usage of autonomous weapons will be assessed for their incompatibility with just war theory and their moral impermissibility in ethics of war broadly.

The International Humanitarian Law (IHL), that regulates warfare to limit its harmful effects is underpinned by the just war theory doctrine. On the debate on autonomous weapons, there are scholars who advocate the use of autonomous weapons based on precision of targets (Arkin 2018) and not being clouded by emotional judgements (Marchant, et.al 2011) and thereby complies by the IHL, while others who comment on the ethical and legal implications of autonomous weapons (Sharkey2019; Blanchard 2022). Amongst the scholarship questioning the ethics of the use of autonomous weapons, there has been relatively little development of compliance of the autonomous weapons with all the principles of jus in bello, as a whole. When it comes to wars or conflicts, it was soldiers and human beings who were the ones to decide, act as well as face the consequences. But with autonomous weapons, and diminishing role of human agents in determining targets, etc. we have the systems or machines that act and decide while humans to still bear the consequences.

To analyse the compliance of autonomous weapons, the paper closely examines them as per all the three principles of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality that make up the legal body of IHL to have greater restrain and ethical conduct during wars. The inconsistency of autonomous weapons with just one or two principles like that of discrimination and proportionality overlook a crucial principle of the use of force and may even lead unrestrained lethal acts by the autonomous weapons. Employment of lethal or not lethal force by autonomous weapons against human beings has grave

implications for the ethical convention of just war theory, especially the just conduct during war.

Through a close analysis of the principles of necessity, discrimination, proportionality against the use autonomous weapons, this paper will result in the incompatibility of such weapons with the ethical framework of just war theory. It will thereby lead to a further reflection over the compliance of autonomous weapons as per jus in bello and the IHL, and will illustrate the moral impermissibility of autonomous weapons in wars.

Collective Responsibility and Killer Robots

Isaac Taylor_
_ Stockholm University

ABSTRACT While much concern has been voiced about the use of remotely-operated drones in warfare, the potential for these to operate independently of humans through the use of AI raises new ethical questions. Within a matter of years, it may be possible to construct lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS): military robots that are capable of selecting and engaging targets without any direct human input. Many worry that this would create a morally troubling responsibility gap: that is, a situation in which no human being could is responsible for the deaths that are brought about. Because the machine itself would make the decision about who to kill, it is thought, no individual has the necessary control over the outcome to be properly viewed as responsible.

Even if no human being could be responsible for the actions of LAWS, however, some philosophers and practitioners (including the UN's Group of Governmental Experts) claim that groups of individuals could nonetheless be – that is, individuals would somehow share responsibility. The groups could include programmers, designers, military decision-makers, and even regulators. They thus claim that the responsibility gap is either non-existent or easily avoidable. Despite this claim being repeatedly made, existing discussions do not engage substantially with the philosophical literature on collective responsibility. This paper corrects the oversight. It investigates whether philosophical models of collective responsibility can be appealed to in order to close the responsibility gap. It arrives at a skeptical conclusion: appealing to collective responsibility will not always be sufficient to assign responsibility for LAWS and, even when it is, many of the moral costs associated with the responsibility gap will remain.

Some models of collective responsibility hold that collectives can be responsible even if none of their members have any corresponding responsibilities. Even if this could be used to assign responsibilities for LAWS to collectives, I argue that this will not avoid the moral costs that some authors associate with the responsibility gap. If we want to avoid responsibility gaps in warfare because they show a lack of respect to

those who are killed, or because doing so will result in there being a clear identifiable agent who can be blamed and asked for compensation when things go wrong, for instance, it looks like the entity responsible must be a human.

According to other models, all collective responsibilities have corresponding individual responsibilities. It is an ongoing debate in the literature what form these individual responsibilities take, but some authors hold that they are responsibilities relating to dispositions: to care sufficiently about what is at stake and be prepared to act on the basis of this where necessary, for example. When collective responsibility for an outcome obtains, according to these models, individuals making up the relevant collective have control over that outcome in the sense that a change in their dispositions, together, could change the outcome in predictable ways. I argue that no such relationship between individual dispositions and outcomes obtains when LAWS are deployed, owing to their unpredictable and autonomous nature.

KEYWORDS artificial intelligence; collective responsibility;
lethal autonomous weapons systems; responsibility gap; war

PANEL 14_

UNDER EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES. HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST IN TIMES OF EMERGENCY

CONVENOR: DANIELE SANTORO, JOÃO CARDOSO ROSAS and PAULO ANTUNES

The discussants in this panel will include Daniele Archibugi (CNRS, Italy, and Birkbeck College, University of London).

This panel is part of the project "The Public Interest: A Politico-Philosophical Investigation", funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (EXPL/FER-ETC/1226/2021).

Political uncertainty peaks under extreme circumstances, when democratic decision-making often defers pragmatic calculations dictated by governments and their experts. In the wake of 9/11 and the ensuing war on terror, political and legal theorists have insisted on models of balance or trade-off to adjudicate conflicting normative claims about security. More recently, appeals to public interest have been made during the pandemic to adjudicate between the competing goods of public safety,

public health, and individual freedom. In this panel, we
focus on contributions that deal with both the historical
reconstruction and the normative theorization public interest
principles. We are particularly interested in discussing
the historical roots of these principles in the liberal,
utilitarian, and republican thought, and the models that can
improve our understanding of public interest in exceptional
circumstances, when conflicts between individual rights and
public goods become manifest.

- Among the questions that we would like to address are the following:
- What are the historical roots of public interest, and which paradigms can be identified in the history of political thought?
- How is the notion of public interest conceptualized in the post-war political philosophy?
- What conception of public interest should govern decisions in extreme conditions?
- Under what conditions deference to expertise is justified?
- Does dissent in democracy represent a public interest value?

"This cannot be done in accordance with public law but it can be done by an executive decree": Kantian Sovereignty and the Public Will in Cases of Necessity

Tom Bailey_
_LSE

ABSTRACT This paper argues that Kant's political philosophy justifies the violation of the rule of law by the sovereign in 'cases of necessity'. The ground for the sovereign's illegal action is the public will. Kant's republican political philosophy is thus a surprising historical source for the notion of the 'public good' under extreme political circumstances.

This is 'surprising' because of how Kant's political philosophy is read in the leading school of interpretation I call 'Kantian Legalism'. It is this interpretation that has received increasing attention of the last two decades, including seminal texts such as Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom (2009) and Kant and the Law of War (2021), as well as Sharon B. Byrd and Joachim Hruscka's Commentary to The Doctrine of Right (2010).

As is implied by its name, Kantian Legalism interprets Kant's political philosophy as thoroughly legal one. The questions that matter are what the law should be and how it should be applied. Substantively, the rule of law is absolute. Against this, the paper aims to recover a distinctively political aspect of Kant's politics, focused on the role of the sovereign in representing the public will.

The Kantian sovereign ought, ideally, to rule through law. This is a moral imperative on them, but Kant's commitment to the rule of law is not absolute in political terms. Though the rule of law is an imperative, Kant argues that law is dependent on the existence of the state. Without a state there is no legislator and so no law. This creates a second imperative on the sovereign: to maintain the existence of the state.

Although not inherently incompatible, the imperatives of the rule through law and to maintain the existence of the state can become contradictory under extreme empir-

ical circumstances. Sometimes, in case of necessity, the sovereign might be required to act illegally to maintain the state as the condition for the possibility of law.

Kant's discussions of sovereign violations of the rule of law vary from the familiar if extreme cases of forcibly raising funds beyond legally permitted taxation when the state is threatened militarily, through to the outlandish concern that the legal requirement of the death penalty might leave the state without population in the case of a 'population-wide murder conspiracy'.

What could ground such illegal sovereign action in these cases? I argue that it is the sovereign's role as the representative of the public will. In Kant's political philosophy, the public will grounds both the necessity of the rule of law and the necessity of the state. Because the sovereign acts in violation of the law only to maintain the state, they do so in accordance with the public will. The Kantian sovereign is permitted to assert the public will in cases of necessity, even in violation of the rule of law and legal rights.

Parliamentarization of Necessity – the Glorious Revolution and the consequences of statutory regulation of salus populi

Maciej Wilmanowicz_
_Teologia Polityczna / Political Theology (Editor)

ABSTRACT The purpose of the paper is to explore the philosophical and legal consequences of the fundamental shift in institutional responsibility for the defense of the public interest in a state of necessity that occurred within the English political system in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. As the traditional royal ability to act for the common good on the basis of discretionary prerogative was finally rejected, England's constitutional system faced a pressing dilemma. Heretofore the main goal of Parliament's statutory regulation was primarily to protect the rights of citizens and to preserve the legal guarantees securing the time-honoured rationality of the English politico-legal system, while the challenge of taming the contingency associated e.g. with foreign policy, war or royal debt belonged to the monarch – entitled – in extraordinary circumstances – to transcend the rigidity of the legal system in order to fulfill the demands of salus populi. After 1689, however, Parliament drastically expanded its sphere of competence by statutorily regulating the areas of commonwealth's existence previously belonging to the king (e.g. statutory: suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1689; guarantees for repayment of public debt; acceptance of trade-companies charters), thus blurring the line between the notions of dominium politicum/regale, potestas absoluta/ordinaria, and ratio/voluntas. Serious consequences followed as the control over Westminster was gradually becoming the aim of increasingly formalized political parties – now equipped with the ability to interpret the extraordinary demands of the common good and to adopt uncontestable statutory regulations necessary to fulfill them. Institutional shift of responsibility for salus populi thus resulted in Parliament's growing constitutional importance (if not outright supremacy) as well as in a substantial change of the role of representatives, parliamentary majorities etc. (as the outpour of extra-parliamentary political demands – such as the Kent Petition

of 1701 hostile towards Parliament's new role – clearly showed). More importantly it also resulted in an unprecedented instrumentalization of the law itself, no longer perceived as a localized version of natural/divine rationality but rather as the most important tool used for the preservation of a particular vision of the public interest. In the final analysis the titular "parliamentarization of necessity" opened the way to a quasi-permanent state of necessity in which all parliamentary acts could be perceived as guided by and relying on the public interest, thus possibly transcending every other political, legal or moral consideration and posing serious questions regarding e.g. the existence of the "right to resist", tenuous grounds of citizens' rights or the philosophical justification of judicial control.

The theory of hegemony between the public interest and the common good

Leonardo Fiorespino_
_Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy

ABSTRACT In the relatively scant literature on the idea of public interest, a few attempts exist to categorize the different approaches to the concept (e.g., Cochran 1974, Bezemek and Dumbrovsky 2020). Comprehensive as they are, such analyses never include one philosophical family, namely the agonistic democratic theories of poststructuralist and Marxist descent. To fill this gap, I will try and reconstruct the view of the public interest implicit in the theory of hegemony of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. What does public interest mean within their framework? Does it even actually assume a notion of the public interest, or perhaps a cognate concept, namely the 'common good', better fits its features and aspirations? The hypothesis I wish to suggest is that the theory of hegemony adopts some version of both: it operates a peculiar twist by which a notion of public interest defined as the rhetoric articulation of disparate group interests flows into a questionable – because contingent and unjustifiably exclusivist – hegemonic notion of the common good as the imperfect normative crystallization of an ethical "impossible fullness".

In the first part of the paper, I will shortly review the existing literature on the public interest. In the second part, I will focus on Laclau and Mouffe's notion of hegemony. Firstly, their antagonistic logic of construction of political identities will be discussed. Group identity is the product of a rhetoric process through which different demands – construable as group interests – become equivalent, and merge into a unified discursive structure which creates objectivity from the experience of a lack. For this process to be possible, an antagonist is necessary: it is only negatively, by antagonizing a form of otherness, that disparate demands can coalesce into a discursive whole. The political field is thus split into two camps, each with its own ethics and view of objectivity, shaped by the rejection of the Other. For Laclau, at stake in this strive is precisely hegemony. The hegemonic group is the one which succeeds in imposing its own symbolic framework, which constitutively excludes the other. The normativity that it imposes is thus the normativity that a part shapes in order to exclude the other; likewise, the ethical fullness that such normativity seeks to realize is the ethics of a part,

resulting from its needs and experience. In the face of such a radical antagonism, in which the two parts have nothing to share, the hegemonic order seems impossible to justify to the excluded: exclusion proceeds from mere force. Therefore, whereas the equivalential process of identity formation might be construed as the attempt to forge a claim on the public interest out of a set of separate interests, the successful establishment of a form of hegemony seems to come with the establishment of an exclusivist view of the common good, whereby the ethics of the hegemonic part constitutes the horizon within which collective decisions can and should be made.

Governing Global Commons
for Global Public Good

Petra Gümplova_
_Friedrich Schiller University Jena

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to provide a systematic critical assessment of the extension of sovereign rights to natural resources into the ocean global commons in light of the necessity to govern global commons for global public good of mitigating climate crisis and biodiversity loss. The main question this article asks is what is problematic about the reconstitution of global ocean commons towards maximum national control? This question is addressed from three perspectives – the perspective of international distributive justice, the perspective of resource politics and the defects in the exercise of sovereign rights to natural resources by states, and from the environmental perspective. Concerning the first, I argue that the extension of sovereign rights into ocean global commons gave individual agents exclusive but disproportionately large access to natural resources, reflecting the existing inequality of territorial holdings and thus undercutting fairer benefit-sharing of resource from this common domain. Concerning the second, I focus on how the extension of sovereign rights seaward expands the scope of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. I show that this prerogative is insufficiently constrained to ensure the fair and legitimate governance over resources; and that it is embedded in global legal-economic system which facilitates unjust exercise of resource sovereignty leading to corrupt and authoritarian governments sustained by resource rents and other human rights violating resource politics. Third, I show that sovereign rights to natural resources construct natural resources as extractable economic goods to be subjected to property rights. The construction of natural resources as economic goods facilitates states' strategies to extract marine natural resources for the economic benefit, disregarding demands for more stringent environmental limits and the protection of fragile marine ecosystems as well as the possibilities of collective management for global public good.

KEYWORDS global commons, climate crisis, rights to natural resources,
         ocean justice

Diachronic Rights

Jelena Belic_
_Leiden University

ABSTRACT This paper is about the intergenerational conflict of rights and how to lessen it. It is a salient feature of rights that they conflict. Rights conflict when a duty generated by one right is not compossible with a duty generated by another right, and thus, hard choices need to be made (Waldron 1989). While the debates about the conflict of rights take contemporaries as right-holders, the debates about intergenerational justice bring more complexity to this. In some views, future people also have future rights that correlate with present duties (Gosseries 2008, Bell 2011). Increasing the number of right holders as well as the number of rights (and duties) themselves clearly increases the number of competing interests, and consequently, the potential for conflicts of rights. So not only that the rights of contemporaries can conflict among themselves, but they can also conflict with the rights of future people.

In the paper, I argue that intergenerational conflicts of rights are morally worse as they cannot be resolved in the way the conflicts of the rights of contemporaries can. If anything, future people cannot directly claim their rights and current institutions do not sufficiently protect their interests. While some think that institutional transformations can be a part of the solution (Gardiner, 2022), I argue that this does not go far enough. For, conflicts of rights at least partly stem from the dominant concept of rights itself. In the paper, I problematize the dominant accounts of the individualism of rights, and I argue that the intergenerational conflict can be lessened by prioritizing those rights that correlate with what I will call diachronic duties. In its essence, these are individual rights to public goods that avoid intra-right conflicts among both contemporaries as well as future people. In particular, I focus on the right to a clean and healthy environment and show how prioritizing at least the most important duties the right entails when these conflict with duties entailed by other rights can lessen the intergenerational conflict of rights.

KEYWORDS rights; conflict of rights; future generations; climate change; environment; public goods

PANEL 15_DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPANT'S PERSPECTIVE

CONVENOR: ANNABELLE LEVER (SCIENCE PO, PARIS) and ATILLA MRÁZ (STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY)

How should democratic theory and the ethics of political participation take into consideration the participants' perspectives in their theories of rights, institutions and the ethics of political participation? Recent work in democratic theory has revived perspectives on democratic politics that account for the value of democratic institutions, rights, and participation without much regard for how participants of democratic practices see these values. Realism in political philosophy asks us to refocus our attention from individual and collective agency and political equality to the sheer anti-oligarchic potential of democracy (e.g., Schumpeter 1942; Przeworski 2018; Shapiro 1999, 2016; Bagg 2018). Some new work on political equality also supports mostly anti-oligarchic institutions of participation–notably, sortition instead of or in addition to elections, and deliberative mini-publics (Guerrero 2014, 2021; Stone 2016; Abizadeh 2020; Landemore 2020). But how can we redeem the methodological significance of grounding democratic theory–together with its commitment to political agency and political equality–in the moral phenomenology of participants of democratic politics, while acknowledging they may not always be accurate? This panel aims to address this broader methodological question from both critical and liberal democratic perspectives, while engaging with substantive issues in the

design of democratic institutions concerning elections, sortition and deliberative mini-publics; the right to vote and the right to stand for election in democratic and arguably non-democratic regimes; and the implications of realist and practice-dependent methods for democratic theory.

- The panel addresses the following particular questions:
- Why is the democratic participant's perspective important for accounting for the value of democracy?
- How can we make sense of the value of democratic rights—the right to vote, and also the right to stand for election—by reference to the perspective of the voter or aspiring candidate, rather than an external perspective on the functions of these rights?
- How can the partisan perspectives of democratic politics be reconciled with democratic innovations such as sortition or deliberative mini-publics? What is the significance of participants' conflicting perspectives for democratic innovations?
- What does the voter's perspective in non-democratic regimes tell us about the applicability of democratic norms to the ethics of voting in non-ideal democratic or non-democratic contexts?

Democracy and authority: assessing the site of democratic legitimacy

Ludvig Beckman_
_Stockholm University and the Institute
  for Futures Studies, Stockholm

ABSTRACT Although widely accepted that decisions traceable to democratic proce-
dures have a special claim to legitimacy, it remains unclear whether all decisions can
be subject to demands for democratic legitimacy. The view defended here is that only
decisions that claim the authority to regulate the conduct of others can be legitimate
by democratic standards. Consequently, decisions that do not claim the authority to
impose norms or directives that others should comply with are not the kind of "ob-
jects" to which theories of democratic legitimacy apply. In addition, I argue that per-
sonal decisions are not claims to authority over others and consequently not included
in the "site of democratic legitimacy".

The first half of the paper elaborates and explains the basis for these claims
and how they serve to inform judgments about democratic legitimacy. The second
half of the paper responds to varieties of the objection that all decisions can be
subject to principles of democratic legitimacy although there are good normative
reasons for why others are not entitled to democratic participation in personal
decisions.

Following what I term the state-based objection, there is no basis for democratic
legitimacy with respect to decisions that are regulated by democratic laws. To the
extent they are regulated by laws enacted by a state with democratic legitimacy,
the legitimate interests of others are already taken into consideration. Following
the rights-based objection, democratic legitimacy should not extend to personal
decisions since each person has a moral right to make personal decisions without
interference from others. In response, I contend that these arguments are inconclu-
sive such that they fail to establish that democratic legitimacy should never extend

to personal decisions. The conclusion is that the present account of the site of democratic legitimacy better explains why democratic standards do not pertain to personal decisions.

The Right to Stand for Election: A Millian Account

Annabelle Lever & Atilla Mraz_
_Sciences Po & University of Stockholm

ABSTRACT The right to vote has received ample theoretical attention recently (see, e.g., Beckman, 2017). However, there has been little philosophical reflection on the right to stand for election, although the latter is commonly seen as an equally important democratic right. This paper aims to fill the gap between our understanding of the right to vote and to stand by offering an account of the latter in the spirit of John Stuart Mill's (1861) defense of the right to vote. First, we identify which fundamental interests of individuals as political agents should be protected by rights. Second, we explain why these interests cannot be protected by the right to vote alone. Third, we show that grounding the right to stand for election in the agential interests of the aspiring candidate—rather than in the public interest—does not collapse into a right to rule over others.

We draw attention to three policy implications of the account. (i) One: the increasingly popular lottocratic forms of involving citizens in the conduct of public affairs (Abizadeh, 2020; Bouricius, 2018, Courant 2017; Guerrero, 2014; Landemore, 2020) may enrich democratic deliberation and decision-making, but cannot replace the right to stand for election. (ii) Two: elitist conceptions of democracy (in the spirit of Schumpeter, 1949) are likewise misplaced: a full democratic ideal should provide for citizens' agency not only in selecting, sanctioning and authorizing candidates, but also in shaping the choice set of candidates by standing for elections. (iii) Finally, more attention to how the fair value of the right to stand for election—rather than only the right to vote—should be guaranteed can contribute to mitigating the contemporary threat of populism to democratic decision-making (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Müller, 2016, Tushnet & Bugarič, 2021)

KEYWORDS democratic rights; right to stand for election; right to vote; political agency; democratic participation; representative democracy

Democratic ideals, institutions, and a non-ideal ethics of voting

Attila Mraz_
_University of Stockholm

ABSTRACT How should voters vote, if at all, in non-democratic elections or elections held in highly non-democratic polities? Elections are held in highly non-ideal democracies too—and not only in democracies but also in competitive / electoral authoritarian or hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002, Levitsky & Way 2010, Morse 2012, Schedler 2013, 2018). Still, there is little theoretical reflection on how democratic ideals should inform the normative situation of the voter in such regimes (except Kirshner 2018, Schedler 2013 & 2021). This paper aims to (1) provide a methodological map to the different ways in which democratic ideals can be applied to these highly non-ideal contexts, and (2) a substantive argument for the relevance of one (contested) democratic ideal—namely, that of normative mandates (Guerrero 2010)—to the ethics of voting in such contexts.

First, I argue that that we should distinguish between institution-dependent, institution-sensitive and institution-insensitive democratic ideals in democratic theory (cf. Sangiovanni 2008, 2015 on practice-dependent principles of justice). Institution-dependent ideals cannot be applied in a highly non-ideal democratic context if their subject matter concerns institutions which simply do not exist in such a context—e.g., positive responsiveness (May 1952) in contexts without voting. Institution-sensitive ideals norms can be applied in a highly non-ideal democratic context but their content depends on the institutional context—e.g., the ideal of normative mandates (see below). Institution-insensitive ideals can be applied in a highly non-ideal democratic context and their content does not depend on the institutional context. I argue that no distinctively democratic ideal belongs here.

Second, in the substantive normative part of my paper, I show that the democratic ideal of normative mandates is an institution-sensitive ideal that can inform an ethics of voting for hybrid regimes. Normative mandates are degrees of authorization that elected officeholders may receive depending on the magnitude of electoral support gained in an election. The ideal of normative mandates entails different principles, though, for different contexts. In an ideal democracy, it is intertwined with a positive

ideal of representation: the higher electoral support one receives, one may be more clearly authorized to act as a trustee rather than a delegate (Guerrero 2010). In a hybrid regime with little to no freedom of speech and assembly, it is hard to establish such a positive link between high levels of electoral support and a moral authorization to act as voters' trustee. Yet one may establish, I argue, a negative link between low electoral support and the lack of wide-ranging authorization. While the positive link requires institutional guarantees of meaningful deliberation (such as free speech), the negative link does not. Hence, the ideal of normative mandates can offer normative guidance to voters' behavior in hybrid regimes too: ceteris paribus, they should reduce the electoral support of particularly objectionable leaders, including by lesser-evil voting or abstention (if possible).

The wider significance of these findings is that due attention to the relationship between democratic ideals and institutions can help elucidate the relevance of these ideals to highly non-ideal or even non-democratic contexts.

PANEL 16_
CONTEMPORARY NORMATIVE AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRACIES

CONVENOR: SANDRA KRÖGER (UNIVERSITY OF EXETER)

Contemporary democracies struggle with a range of ethical and normative challenges, some of which are long-standing, others are newer. These can be institutional and relate to how democratic and inclusive societies and their electoral systems and political bodies are; they can be ideational and relate to the apparent exhaustion of the standard liberal conception of democracy which seems to have lost traction for parts of the populace worldwide; they can be ethical and relate to modes of conduct of political leaders and office-holders as well as citizens; they can be ethical and address how contemporary forms of governance and governing reinforce historical structures of discrimination and inequality; or they can relate to how digital technology and infrastructure reinforce old problems of governance and create new forms of domination and inequality, to name but a few. This panel addresses some of the related challenges. It looks at

1. the democratic justification of elections that enable us more successfully to distinguish democratic from aristocratic elections in theory and practice than is possible at the moment;
2. the integrity of leaders in democratic societies and how to evaluate it comparatively;
3. the privatization of democracy by means of privately created algorithms entering the spheres of public will formation and implementation, leading to new forms of domination and the hollowing of popular sovereignty; and

4. the ethical challenges algorithms pose for the enjoyment of fundamental rights in terms of accountability, privacy, non-discrimination and responsibility attribution.

The public/private distinction and a democratic case for elections v sortition?

Annabelle Lever_
_Science Po Paris

ABSTRACT This paper provides a feminist-inspired perspective on the democratic justification of elections that should enable us more successfully to distinguish democratic from aristocratic elections in theory and practice than is possible at the moment.

The recent literature on the democratic potential of sortition in constituting a democratic legislature raises the question of what a democratic public/private distinction should look like in a society, such as our own, where citizens do not own slaves and in which women, as well as men, are full citizens. Very few of those selected for citizen assemblies are willing or able to participate – nor is this surprising when most of us have familial and economic aspirations and obligations that we cannot put on hold just like that. Hence the inherent limitations of lottocracy as a democratic way of selecting a legislature – whatever the attractions of randomly selected assemblies for promoting public interest, debate and participation in politics.

By contrast with lotteries or appointment, the right to stand as a candidate for office, implicit in a democratic conception of elections, grants people the right to increase or decrease their political participation over the right to vote as baseline, in determining how they should be governed and by whom. The right to stand is not a right to be elected. But within that constraint, it can be institutionalized in ways that attenuate conflicts between personal and political obligations – at least, if we are willing to reconsider the hold of parties and of money on the way we currently organize elections.

KEYWORDS Sortition - Democracy - Elections - Feminism

Lies, Truthfulness and the Crisis of Representative Democracy

Richard Bellamy & Sandra Kröger_
_Hertie School Berlin/UCL & University of Exeter

ABSTRACT Recent years have witnessed a heightened disrespect for truthfulness in democratic politics. This development has been generally associated with the rise of populism. Our analysis adds a new dimension in arguing that truthfulness forms an intrinsic part of a working system of representative democracy that not only populism but also technocracy work to undermine. Both overlook how representative democracy both relies on and to some degree promotes an ethic of truthfulness among policy-makers and citizens alike. We shall argue that representative democracy respects the 'circumstances of truthfulness' and that it is precisely the competition among parties and the system of representation within a pluralist society that encourages truthfulness. We start by exploring the nature of 'truthfulness' and why it forms a necessary condition for democratic representation. We then explore how representative democracy requires and promotes an ethics of truthfulness which is promoted by processes of public deliberation and interest mediation by political parties. Finally, we discuss how both populism and technocracy betray the ethic of truthfulness.

KEYWORDS democracy, representation, truthfulness, populism, technocracy

Ethical challenges of dataveillance

Sandra Kröger_
_University of Exeter

ABSTRACT Capitalism today is characterised by surveillance capitalism, based on the collection, selling, and re-purposing of data (Zuboff 2019). Surveillance capitalism creates a wide range of societal problems and risks. It is based on datafication and dataveillance processes that transform online activity into datapoints which are used to influence people's behaviour. It has become a new paradigm and a new frontier of accumulation and reinforces the 'neoliberal attack on the social'. The deeper effects of surveillance capitalism include, but are not limited to: the transformation of citizens into consumers, who lose their electoral relevance and participatory opportunities in the process; the transformation of our subjectivity and a new way of constructing knowledge and reality. As a result, confronting capitalism entails confronting dataveillance and its hidden forms of control. To confront dataveillance, digital users need to a) be aware of dataveillance and understand its wide-ranging implications, and b) explore alternatives. My research approaches these questions by analysing dataveillance through the lens of normative political theory, focussing on the concepts of privacy and autonomy on the one hand, and on power and domination by large tech corporations on the other.

PANEL 17_JUSTICE ACROSS GENERATIONS

CONVENOR: DEVON CASS (NOVA UNIVERSITY OF LISBON) and MANUEL SÁ VALENTE (LEIDEN UNIVERSITY/HOOVER CHAIR)

This panel will examine a range of issues in intergenerational justice, including novel contributions on intergenerational subjection, the future of work, as well as connections between global, territorial, and intergenerational justice.

Territories, Periods and the political theory of intergenerational relations

Axel Gosseries_
_Hoover Chair, Université Catholique de Louvain

ABSTRACT Political philosophers have recently revisited the nature and justification of territorial rights. In this paper, I want to explore what can be learned from such philosophical investigations for the nature of the entitlements that generations may want to claim on given periods of time, e.g. through ideas such as generational sovereignty. I will try out analogies and check whether they succeed or fail to enlighten us about possible and defensible moral and political relationships between generations and the time periods during (or beyond) which they exist

KEYWORDS intergenerational justice; territorial rights; generational sovereignty

Should We Make Future People Work? Future Generations in the Digital Age

Charlotte Unruh_
_Oxford University

ABSTRACT New technologies hold the promise of making the future better for our descendants, and they might help us to communicate and make vivid the potential impact of our actions on future generations. Building on the view that we owe it to future generations to provide them with adequate life prospects, I ask where risks and opportunities of new technologies for fulfilling such duties lie. I explore the implications of my argument for the issue of technological mass unemployment.

Global justice, anti-cosmopolitanism and future generations: What kind of theory of intergenerational justice can anti-cosmopolitan statists endorse?

Tim Meijers_
_Leiden University

ABSTRACT The hypothesis of this paper is that liberal political philosophers who embrace a limited scope of justice internationally – statist anti-cosmopolitans – cannot, consistently, embrace the idea that justice is intergenerational in scope. Remote non-overlapping future generations seem to fall out of the picture, unless the statist commitment itself is relaxed. I argue that our relationship with foreign contemporaries is morally much thicker, more significant, than our relationship with future co-nationals. I discuss three ways out for anti-cosmopolitan statists. First, letting go of the liberal nature of the theory, embracing a form of communitarianism. Assuming this is not an option, statists could bite the bullet and accept that justice only applies in the here and now. This may sound unappealing, but is less problematic than it seems. Finally, they could let go of the claim that justice only applies within the state. This is, I argue, the preferred option for statist. It does not, at least not necessarily, lead to a completely abandoning a limited scope of justice. Rather, such a view is a much better fit for the kind of world we live in. Hence, this answer aligns not just with the substantive commitments of anti-cosmopolitan statists, but also with some of the methodological commitments of these theorists.

KEYWORDS intergenerational justice; statism; cosmopolitanism; future generations

How Strong Is the Dead Hand of the Past? Examining arguments for and against the possibility of intergenerational subjection

Pablo Magaña Fernández & Iñigo González-Ricoy_
_Nova University of Lisbon & University of Barcelona

ABSTRACT To this day, the possibility that the dead may subject future generations to their will, through legal or other means, remains an important concern of political theorists and constitutional legal scholars. And yet in recent years some authors have suggested that intergenerational subjection might not be possible to begin with. If so, those worries would be, at best, importantly misplaced and, at worst, totally groundless. In this paper, we formulate and test several arguments for and against the possibility of intergenerational subjection. To do so, we borrow insights from the literature on the boundary problem and the all-subjected Principle, in which the notion of "subjection" has been subjected to close scrutiny.

KEYWORDS subjection; future generations; past generations; all-subjected
                   principle; constitutional law

PANEL 18_POLITICS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

CONVENOR: JAMES INGRAM (MCMASTER UNIVERSITY) and JOHN MCGUIRE (UNIVERSITY COLLEGE DUBLIN)

The advent of the Anthropocene and the manifold challenges of accelerated climate change pose innumerable challenges for which 'our' prevailing moral and political vocabularies appear unable to offer coherent answers. The aim of this panel is to help identify some of the 'blockages' that act as inhibitors against a timely collective response—and which may also be the facilitators of a more self-destructive politics of helplessness, nihilism, and resentment.

Are Anthropocene Politics Always Authoritarian?

James Ingram_
_McMaster University

ABSTRACT Insofar as the Anthropocene entails a break from the past—and insofar as the break is significant enough to warrant a new label—it is only fair to assume that the concepts developed prior to the advent of the Anthropocene no longer applies in the same way as they did before. This certainly goes for concepts (and practices) such as freedom and power. It might also go for a concept like authoritarianism. The aim of this paper is to pursue this line of thinking in more detail in order to pinpoint how authoritarianism, from within the challenges associated with the Anthropocene, comes the fore in new and surprising ways. Rather than seeing the two as conjoined by necessity, the idea is to examine how each amplifies and subverts elements in the other, creating an explosion of desires and attachments that negates and exceeds the vitality of life beyond what we know from older forms of authoritarianism. The paper develops this thesis by through a critical engagement with Agamben's authoritarianism and with reference to newer forms of authoritarianism such as Trump's MAGA project and the French ZID movement. The paper concludes with a series of reflections on how to resist contemporary authoritarian modes of politics by engaging in a radical democratisation of society beyond what we usually find in the literature on the Anthropocene.

KEYWORDS Authoritarianism, Anthropocene, Agamben, democracy,
                far-right social movements, politics of swarming

With or Beyond Marx? The Concept of Production in the Anthropocene.

Killian Favier_
_ University College Dublin

ABSTRACT Several recent contributions have interpreted Marx's ontology as unfit for the Anthropocene. According to authors such as Philippe Descola, Bruno Latour and Baptiste Morizot, Marx's philosophy remains tethered to an idealised conception of human production, per which nonhuman nature offers nothing more than the set of enabling conditions for human subsistence. Moreover, this violent ontological separation between humanity and nature serves to rationalise the continued exploitation of the environment. In response, I sketch a more nuanced reading of materialism in the Marxist tradition. On the one hand, materialism is concerned from the outset with the ways humans depend upon the natural world for our survival. On the other hand, it presumes a model of capitalist production which wholly subsumes nature for the sake of realising and perfecting human freedom. I show how this assumption unfolds in different instances: Marx (notably through a reading of Alfred Schmidt's Concept of Nature in Marx), Engels (the "revenge of nature" argument), and Georg Lukács. This perspective suggests that the problematic aspects of the 'production' model have evolved independently of (and perhaps despite) Marx's ontology. Thus, critical theory, instead of assuming the successful outcome of human production, must be made to confront its disastrous consequences.

KEYWORDS Anthropocene, Karl Marx, materialism, modernity

Saving the Planet with an Ontology? On the Anthropocene's Challenge to the Political

John McGuire_
_University College Dublin

ABSTRACT It is a staple of reflection on the Anthropocene, and the mounting climate emergency to which it is in large part a response, that the conceptions of politics, along with numerous ideas on which it rests (agency, responsibility, nature, and culture) which have held sway at least over the modern period needs to be drastically revised. This presentation seeks to parse and specify this claim by more closely examining a few of its more prominent spokespeople, notably Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, and Philippe Descola. By isolating the particular elements of the modern techno-scientific way of viewing and relating to the world they reject and what they hope to replace them with, I mean to distinguish between aspects of their approaches that are salutary, practically important, and even long-overdue, and others that are less illuminating or helpful. If this exercise deprives their efforts to transcend modern criticism of some of their radical elan, it also helps clarify their practical stakes.

KEYWORDS Anthropocene, climate change, political ontology, modernity,
                 postcriticism

PANEL 19_NEW MODERATE NARRATIVES IN TIMES OF EXTREMISM

CONVENOR: PEDRO GÓIS MOREIRA (TEXAS CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY)

The 90s opened a time of optimism for proponents of constitutional democracy who were vividly discussing the possibilities of public deliberation and rational dialogue. However, these last few years have seen the re-emergence of radical and antagonistic forms of politics - populism, nativism, and left activism. We currently find ourselves in "an interregnum: a period of crisis during which several tenets of the [political] consensus (...) are challenged" and where "a solution to the crisis is not yet in sight" (Mouffe, 2018).

This "crisis of liberalism" sets the tone of the discussions on the left and on the right. On the left, debates have centered around radical democracy, left populism, and on the means to further radicalize democracy (Mouffe 2018, de la Torre and Srisa-nga 2021). Radical democrats claim that they seek to reform liberalism rather than reject it, yet they are often more explicit about what they reject in liberalism than about what they wish to retain. On the right, many have been more candid, calling themselves "postliberals" (Deneen 2018) and embracing populist (Benoist 2017) or nationalist (Hazony 2022) alternatives.

Liberal and moderate responses to these developments have been markedly defensive. On the one hand, several works have taken a critical approach to populism (Müller 2016, Urbinati 2019) and identity politics (Fukuyama 2018). On the other hand, there have been talks of how a militant democracy (Malkopoulou and Kirshner 2019) could be deployed to contain the extremes. But here, too, the discussion is more about the defensive response that liberals should adopt against the extremes.

The questions that seem to be missing are the sort of new

narratives and new self-understanding that moderates should develop in response to the extremes. In the 1930s, several liberal landmarks emerged, not just as critiques, but as insightful and original reaffirmations of the open society (Lippmann 1937, Popper 1944). What, then, is extremism and what unites it? What is moderation (Craiutu 2023)? What conceptions of democracy and politics should moderates develop in response to the extremes (Muller 2021)?

The panel welcomes contributions related (but not limited) to the following questions:

- What is extremism? What is moderation? How should we understand and frame this binary historically and philosophically?
- What new conceptions of democracy and politics should moderates develop in response to the extremes?
- What are the potential benefits and shortcomings of extremism/moderation? For instance, can extremism act as a "corrective"? Does moderation have depoliticizing tendencies?
- What are some of the rhetorical tactics of extremism (e.g., demonization) and how can moderates counter them? Should moderates adopt militant democracy?

"We need to stop calling ourselves conservatives"

Bruno Garcia e Souza_
_Universidade Nova de Lisboa

ABSTRACT The suggestion came from John Daniel Davidson, a senior editor of "The Federalist," and it was repeated by Tucker Carlson on Fox News and by many other political pundits. This sort of statement is not merely a provocative trope, but rather suggests a deliberate intent by established voices on the right to exploit the current climate of polarization. Not long ago, the heirs of William Buckley Jr. occupied the leadership of the Republican Party and the time slots on the right wing media from where they proudly waved the flag of the responsible conservatism. Now, these positions were taken by Trump loyalists and intellectuals defending a new form of conservatism.

Davidson seems to have capture the spirit of this new form, yet the truth is that he is simply articulating something that can already be found in the work of the so-called postliberals. This is clearly evident in Adrian Vermeule's advocacy for conservatives to abandon Originalism in favor of a "common good constitutionalism." By alleging the urgency of the threat posed by the "woke dystopia" or dismissing their recent accomplishments, such as the decision that overturned Roe v. Wade, Vermeule, his post-liberal peers, and their ideological allies challenge the accepted general understanding of conservatism: to preserve what exists. In "Why Liberalism Failed", from 2018, Patrick Deneen claims, "The fabric of beliefs that gave rise to the nearly 250-year-old American constitutional experiment may be nearing an end." The message is clear: it is time to drop the alleged shyness and defensive prudence, often associated with conservatives, and start pushing back against the changes that threaten tradition. It is time to act instead of holding back.

The idea here is to examine the ongoing identity crisis on the American Right through the lens of the intellectuals who have implicitly or explicitly decided to move away from traditional Movement Conservatism towards an anti-liberal position and the impact they may have on the future of the American political landscape.

KEYWORDS Conservatism, Postliberalism, Intellectual History, American Right, Extremism

Fundamentalism as a Contested Concept

Nora Kindermann_
_Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

ABSTRACT Social sciences increasingly study politically contested phenomena, such as extremism, terrorism, and fundamentalism. It is hotly and persistently debated what exactly these phenomena are, how we should conceptualize them and theorize about them, and who has a say in these matters. In this presentation, I zoom in on the notion of fundamentalism and develop a strategy to clarify and deal with these persistent debates.

In the literature on fundamentalism, it is contested whether or not 'fundamentalism' is a valid category. We can distinguish two broad camps in research on fundamentalism: (1) academics who defend the concept and theories of fundamentalism; and (2) academics who are critical of the concept and dominant ways of theorizing about fundamentalism, and either want to thoroughly restrict the concept's extension or eliminate it altogether. I argue that a genealogical approach is fruitful to improve our grasp of the concept of fundamentalism, and of unquestioned and implicit assumptions that underpin conceptualizations and theories of fundamentalism (see also Bötticher 2015; Corbett 2015; Erlenbusch-Anderson 2018; Taylor 2017). In zooming in on the notion of fundamentalism, I critically assess how a genealogical approach to politically contested concepts such as fundamentalism - but also extremism or terrorism - can improve our conceptualizations and theorizing of such phenomena.

Genealogical approaches help us locate conceptual practices and the development of theories of fundamentalism in broader socio-political structures. This, in turn, helps to uncover unquestioned and implicit assumptions in our conceptual practices and manners of theorizing about fundamentalism. As an example, genealogies of the concept of fundamentalism have uncovered that the term has been used pejoratively from the beginning (see, e.g., Desjardins 2017). This has influenced early fundamentalism scholars' approach to the phenomenon, and conceptualization and theorizing thereof. Other scholars who take seriously the historical development of the notion express the worry that it is biased and Westerncentric (see, e.g., Corbett 2015; Taylor 2017).

In this paper, I argue that a firm grip on the concept's genealogy helps us to uncover unquestioned and implicit assumptions in our conceptualizations and theories, such as implicit negative (or even pejorative) evaluations, biases, and the influence of Westerncentric interests and outlooks. Taking into account the concept's historical development, I first assess the arguments against and criticisms of the notion of fundamentalism. I then scrutinize (genealogically informed) avenues to develop more fruitful conceptualizations and theories of fundamentalism (see Duthil Novaes 2020; Srinivasan 2019).

PANEL 20_

INSTITUTIONS FOR A SOCIETY OF EQUALS: SOCIAL STATUS, EQUAL TREATMENT, AND THE VALUE OF EGALITARIAN RELATIONS

CONVENOR: ALEX OLIVARES (CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY)

In 1999 Professor Elisabeth Anderson published one of the most cited papers in political philosophy in the last decades: "What's the point of Equality?". There, she discusses the desirability of focusing on distributive concerns when addressing the "Equality of What" debate. Anderson argues that social justice is not about the distribution of scarce goods or resources, rather she proposes an alternative: social relations. She argues that social justice should focus on relations among individuals, on whether individuals treat each other on an egalitarian basis, on their equal social status and standing, thus opposing hierarchy and domination. To do so, she lays out her preferred version of egalitarian relations, to wit: democratic equality.

After Anderson's seminal paper, the literature on relational egalitarianism has gained traction over the last two decades in the political philosophy debate. Contributions to the debate have generated a wide variety of interpretations of the ideal of equality in social relations. Some authors have followed Elisabeth Anderson's account of democratic equality (Scheffler,

S., 2003, 2015 and Schemmel, C. 2012, 2021), while others have argued for an account of relational equality instead (Fourie, C. et al., 2015, 2021, and Wolff, J., 2015), and others have considered that inegalitarian relations constitute a further complexity added to distributional concerns (Arneson, R., 2010). In recent years, some authors have begun to discuss non-egalitarian relational patterns, and both alternatives such as sufficientarian relations (Lippert-Rasmussen, K., 2018, 2021) as well as the role of egalitarian relations to realise individual autonomy (Voig, K., and Stoljar, N., 2021) are gaining attention in the discussion.

  Within this framework this panel takes a particular institutional stance in the discussion, aiming at addressing two main challenges: first, whether institutions should promote egalitarian relations among citizens, and if so, how; and second, what are the institutional mechanisms providing the background conditions for egalitarian treatment. Recent developments the literature proposed different answers to those two questions. Contributions to this panel include but are not limited to discussing Sophia Moreau's (2020) proposal of the three conditions that states should comply to fulfil their duty to provide the background conditions to promote egalitarian treatment among citizens; as well as Christian Schemmel's (2021) perspective of institutions expressing attitudes towards their subjects through policies, which might be analised from the point of view of justice.

  Among the questions that we would like to address are the following:

- What is the value of equal social status and social egalitarian relations?
- What does the relational egalitarian view demand in the political domain? Do institutions have a general duty to promote egalitarian relations among citizens? If they do, how should they display such a duty?
- What role do relational egalitarian concerns play in global justice? Should international institutions, to be just, promote relational, social, or democratic equality?
- Might concerns with relational and social equality such as non-domination, social status and standing, and non-oppression be captured by sufficiency views of relations? If so, what institutional implications follow?

Democratic Equality and the Institutional Promotion of Egalitarian Treatment

Cristina Astier_
_University of Pompeu Fabra

ABSTRACT International and domestic institutions generates a highly unequal and unfair distribution of positions of power and advantage that go beyond distributive concerns. These inequalities may generate relational concerns such as an unacceptable control of some over the lives of others. Unequal outcomes, in this scenario, may negatively impact relational goods including equal political influence. In this vein, this paper analyses how unfair unequal opportunity may impact democratic equality. According to Elisabeth Anderson, the failure to act as democratic equals in a society may be due to an increase in relational inequalities. In this sense, institutional discrimination or procedural unfairness may contribute to eroding citizens' ability to act as democratic equals. Inequality pervasively affects political fairness, including the erosion of equal opportunity for political influence, political decision-making, and thus, institutional responsiveness. It might be argued that an unfair distribution of positions of advantage might, thus, have a direct negative impact on democratic equality. That is to say, an unfair distribution of positions of advantage gives citizens in such positions an unjustified economic and social advantage over others. In turn, this advantage negatively impacts democracy equality: it shapes the democratic discussion, generates disdain for the voices of the poor or less advantaged, and promotes an unjust unequal influence in political decisions. Briefly, this paper argues that an institutional failure to ensure equality of opportunity, including an unjust distribution of scarce positions of advantage, might generate an institutional more general failure to provide the background conditions to promote egalitarian treatment. To do so, this paper first describes Thomas Scanlon's view of political equality and discusses how unequal opportunity impacts both political liberties and political equality (including equal opportunity for political influence) within societies, as well as citizens' opportunities to act as democratic equals. Second, it discusses what relational egalitarianism might establishes as institutions providing the background conditions to promote egalitarian

treatment (Moreau 2020, Schemmel, 2021). Finally, it clarifies what it means to act as democratic equals in a society and briefly compares three mechanisms that may contribute to it: equality of opportunity, responsiveness, and the deliberative concern.

KEYWORDS democratic equality - egalitarian treatment - political influence - subordination - responsiveness - equality of opportunity

Equality of Social Status and its Institutional Requirements

Clemens Loidl_
_Central European University

ABSTRACT Relational egalitarians tend to disagree about the positive implications of their approach to the value of equality, that is, they disagree about what is required by egalitarian relations beyond the absence of certain threats to social relations, such as oppression, social hierarchy, or vast power-asymmetries. That said, equality of social status is arguably among the core normative requirements recognised in relational egalitarian theory. Yet, despite that, little explicit attention has been paid to the questions of what equal social status specifically entails – both for individuals and from institutions – and how it can be justified. To make things worse for proponents of this egalitarian approach, it appears that some of the core relational concerns with objectionable social relations can and need to be amended without appeals to equality: an (opportunity for) adequate or sufficient, and not necessarily equal, level of social standing is, at least sometimes, what is required for rectifying the problematic aspects of instances of relational inequality that its theorists object to. In this paper, I will engage with this neglected and undertheorized problem of justifying equal social status by appeals to the value of relational equality. I shall do so, firstly, by reconstructing the argument against the necessity or desirability of equality of social status, before sketching several venues that are open for relational egalitarians to pursue in answering this objection. Analysing the problem in light of several accounts of the value of egalitarian relations, I conclude that some variants of the relational view of equality can accommodate this problem of equal social status. I shall argue that the most promising argument in favour of equal social status is supported by specific deontic relational egalitarian views and, lastly, attempt to outline the main elements and institutional implications of a substantive account for such theory.

KEYWORDS justice, relational equality - social status - institutional design - telic and deontic egalitarianism

Relational Equality in the Political Domain: Representation for a Society of Equals

Alex Olivares_
_Central European University

ABSTRACT For years, a group of scholars have argued that the point of equality should be to secure a society where individuals stand in relations of equality with one another. The problem, however, is that too often those committed to this idea do not outline the reasons we have to value those egalitarian relations. For this reason, it has become a challenge to understand what is required from this view when it is time to provide some guidance when designing political institutions. This paper aims to approach these challenges, concerning the possibilities a relational egalitarian argument has when we need to make sense of the inequalities taking place in the political domain. The article will rely on the process of reflective equilibrium to shed light on the issues that so far have been understood, purely, in formal and distributive terms. In this context, the first part of the work will introduce two different forms of political relations: citizens vis-a-vis citizens and vis-a-vis representatives. Second, I will explain why a relational egalitarian approach might be able to provide independent reasons to care about these cases and outline the value of egalitarian relations in the political domain. Finally, I aim to provide a general idea of how to move forward in the debates about the shape of our democratic institutions if we agree on the previously outlined egalitarian commitments.

KEYWORDS relational equality – institutional design – equality – distributive justice – social equality

PANEL 21_POPULISM, DEMAGOGUERY AND RHETORIC IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

CONVENORS: GIUSEPPE BALLACCI (CEPS, UMINHO) and ROB GOODMAN (TORONTO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY)

This panel is part of the project "Populism, Demagoguery and Rhetoric in Historical Perspective", PDRHP, funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (2022.05060.PTDC).

While populism is one of the most discussed topics in political theory, some key questions remain unaddressed: To what extent is populism a distinctively modern phenomenon? To what extent does it have roots in earlier periods of history? How can studying populism in the light of the history of political thought help us to understand its nature? The research project PDRHP aims to answer these questions in order to enrich the debate on populism by locating its theorization in an historical perspective.

The programme of the panel includes a general presentation of the project by the team members - Giuseppe Ballacci, P.I. (CEPS, UMinho), Rob Goodman, Co-P.I. (Toronto Metropolitan), Alessandro Mulieri (UPenn & Ca' Foscari), David Ragazzoni (Columbia), Tae-Yeoun Keum (California, Santa Barbara) and Nadia Urbinati, consultant (Columbia) -, followed by the presentation of two papers on Machiavelli and populism, by Alessandro Mulieri, and Giovanni Damele & Inês Pinheiro (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)

Machiavelli on the Conflict between the Multitude and the Elite: Some Clarifications

Giovanni Damele and Inês Pinheiro_
_Nova University Lisbon

ABSTRACT The relation between popolo (people) and grandi (elite) constitutes one of the fundamental themes of Machiavelli's political thought, and as such it has been subjected to various interpretations. Some of these are more traditional and have been substantively focused on the role of the elites as heads and leaders of the multitude, while the more contemporary ones have turned to the driving force of the people and its capability to contain the elite. Our goal is then to counter these more recent interpreters who place an emphasis on a particular agent, in this case the people. To do so, we will reread the Florentine's writings and appeal to the importance of the relation between these two actors, both of whom are essential, and of the reflections it has at the institutional level.

KEYWORDS Machiavelli, elites, people

The Democratic Turn in Machiavelli Studies. A Positive Reassessment

Alessandro Mulieri_
_UPenn / Ca' Foscari

ABSTRACT While the idea of Machiavelli as a 'teacher of evil' or as a classical republican has come under increasing scrutiny by scholars who interpret the Florentine Secretary as a democrat or a populist, far less attention has been devoted to positioning Machiavelli's ideas within the history of democratic thought before modernity. Analyzing a similar topic, i.e. Hobbes and democracy, Sophie Smith claims that there are two different ways in which political theorists and historians can study democracy before modernity. One is by reflecting on democracy as a 'purely historical phenomenon' which was the object of an active – mostly negative – discussion before modernity whereas the other looks at 'hints and springs of modern democratic theory' in pre-modern authors. One could argue that, so far, the democratic or radical republican interpreters of Machiavelli have mostly focused on the latter whereas much remains to be written on the former. For those scholars who interpret Machiavelli as a democrat or a radical republican, two points are important. First, Machiavelli's contribution to contemporary democratic theory is as a social or institutional-political innovator who rejects classical republican institutions and ideas that are elitist. Second, Machiavelli is the initiator of modern 'populist' politics because his anti-oligarchic views on popular government, constituent power, the role and power of the elites, the function of wealth and conflict go beyond those of all previous classical authors, especially Aristotle, Cicero and the humanists. This presentation partly defends the recent democratic interpretations of the democratic Machiavelli by complementing the first and questioning the second claim. A historicized analysis of Machiavelli's role within the premodern democratic tradition confirms that he was a populist and democratic theorist with a strong realist taste. However, it also shows that Machiavelli's democratic thought was far from isolated or completely original in the premodern world.

KEYWORDS Machiavelli, democracy, populism, radical republicanism

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